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Abstract 
This thesis deals with the firm-, macro-and institutional-level determinants of research and development 
(R&D) investment, assessing the impact of R&D spending on firm performance and the financing of R&D 
investment in emerging markets. The recent financial crisis has had adverse effects worldwide. This study 
finds that the financial crisis had a significant negative impact on firms’ R&D investment in emerging 
markets. It also finds that the R&D investments of both local firms and multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
were affected, and that the latter was affected 1.63 times more than the former. 
However, when the firms were split between innovative and non-innovative, it was observed that innovative 
firms continued to invest in R&D during the recession, while non-innovative firms cut down their R&D 
investment. In addition, it is found that, during a financial crisis, the firm-level determinants of R&D are firm 
age, firm size, export orientation, debt ratio and foreign ownership. This implies that the assumptions of the 
resource based view (RBV) hold true, even during a financial crisis. The results suggest that affected and 
less-/unaffected countries’ R&D determinants behave differently during a financial crisis. They also show 
that the probability of a decrease in R&D investment in affected countries is 60 percent higher than in less-
/unaffected countries. Similarly to firm-level factors, macroeconomic factors also influence R&D 
expenditure. GDP growth, exports, trade openness, patents and financial crisis are the main macroeconomic 
determinants of a country’s R&D expenditure. Moreover, analysis suggests that macroeconomic 
determinants of R&D investment behave differently in advanced and emerging countries, owing to their 
different nature and purpose, and the countries’ levels of economic development. 
In addition to firm and macroeconomic factors, the institutional environment plays an important role in R&D 
investment in emerging countries. The results show that government effectiveness and rule of law have 
significant positive impacts, while corruption and political instability have significant negative impacts on 
R&D investment in emerging countries. However, opponents of country-level factors have claimed that these 
factors influence the innovative activities and firm performance of emerging countries indirectly. This study 
finds that investor protection (safeguards) tends to have a greater moderating effect on the relationship 
between R&D and firm performance than country-level governance (systems). The results indicate that 
safeguards promote firm-level innovation in emerging markets, while systems are substituted by firm-level 
corporate governance in emerging countries. Moreover, in the case of risky and uncertain investments such 
as R&D, investors seek protection from possible losses. It is also observed that R&D financing behaves 
differently according to different levels of multi-nationality and financial systems. Local firms do not use 
external funding, while MNEs use both internal and external funding for R&D investments due to the 
availability of organisational slack. A country’s financial systems may restrict firms from choosing particular 
sources of finance. Firms within bank-based systems tend to rely on external funding and firms within 
market-based systems depend more on internal funding for R&D investment. The results indicate that 
market-based firms follow pecking order theory. 
Secondary data for the analysis were collected from various sources, including DataStream, annual financial 
reports, LexisNexis, the World Bank’s Development Indicators, Worldwide Governance Indicators and 
Protecting Minority Shareholder data, and the International Country Risk Guide database. Both static and 
dynamic panel data techniques, including generalised methods of moment (GMM) estimation, were used for 
the analysis. Dynamic GMM panel estimation was used to control for endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity, and to provide efficient and consistent estimation even in the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
The study also adopted an instrumental variable (IV) approach with OLS and Granger causality tests for the 
analysis. This study will be helpful to various stakeholders, including investors and managers, lenders and 
policy makers in emerging markets. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background of the study 
An increasingly competitive market may boost firm innovation. In such an environment, 
firms are obliged to develop and produce new products more rapidly, more effectively and 
more efficiently, resulting in greater investment in research and development (R&D) 
(Ebrahim et al., 2009). In addition to competitive pressure, export orientation and vertical 
integration influence a firm’s inclination to undertake R&D (Kumar and Saqib, 1996). 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggested that firms invest in R&D for two reasons: to 
generate new knowledge and to develop absorptive capacity. These represent an ability to 
recognise, assimilate and exploit knowledge embedded within a firm’s business processes 
and routines. Similarly, Garcia-Manjon and Romero-Merino (2012) have stated that R&D 
investment aims to generate knowledge to fuel the growth of business and the economic 
system as a whole. Thus, Evension and Kislev (1973) found that firms with higher 
investment in their own R&D are better able to exploit externally-generated knowledge 
than firms with lower R&D expenditure. 
Although it is assumed that firms invest in R&D primarily to generate new knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Garcia-Manjon and Romero-Merino, 2012), the globalisation 
of trade, far reaching deregulation and technological changes force firms to depend on 
R&D for survival and growth (Lev, 2001). The assumption is that R&D spending 
differentiates firms and ensures sustainable development and a better future (UNESCO, 
2014). Moreover, both large and small firms may benefit from R&D investment (Rothwell 
and Dodgson, 1994). Smaller firms may handle R&D activities more efficiently and 
effectively as their environment has fewer bureaucratic constraints (Scherer, 1988). On the 
other hand, larger firms have more resources and tend to be more diversified, more 
technologically complex and better aware of technological opportunities (Lall, 1983); 
therefore, they have the ability to benefit from returns on their innovative activities. Thus, 
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a firm may gain benefits from R&D investment, irrespective of size. As a result, R&D 
expenditure is considered as a core part of business strategy (Ito and Pucik, 1993) and a 
driving force for firm-level growth. 
In addition to firm-level growth, R&D activity is a key driver of the economic growth of a 
country (Rosenberg, 2004). Endogenous growth theory holds that investments in 
innovation, knowledge and human capital are significant contributors to economic growth. 
Investment in R&D ensures technological innovation and increased productivity (Griffith 
and Simpson, 1998), resulting in economic development. Ulku (2004) has found that 
higher R&D ensures higher per capita GDP for both OECD and non-OECD countries. 
Similarly, Westmore (2013) has found that growth in countries such as the USA, Canada, 
Belgium and Ireland has decreased since 2000 due to lower investment in R&D. Hence, an 
inefficient national R&D strategy may cause low economic growth, low wages, high 
unemployment rates, and even trade deficits (Perez-Sebastian, 2015). Moreover, a 
country’s standard of living depends on its investment in R&D (Bernstein, 1996). Reasons 
for this are that R&D investment results in the development of high-quality products 
(Saperstein and Rouach, 2002) and provides higher rates of return than other investments 
such as on structure, machinery and equipment (Coe et al., 1997), while the social rate of 
return is seven times higher than on fixed investments (Lichtenberg, 1992). Moreover, 
R&D investment is important in responding to global challenges such as financial crises, 
climate change and sustainable development (OECD, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). 
Given the importance of R&D investment at the firm level as well as the country level, 
researchers have been interested in examining the determinants of R&D. Exploring these 
determinants may help managers to decide the optimal level of R&D expenditure. The 
existing literature has shown that the firm-level determinants of R&D expenditure are a 
firm’s size (Schumpeter, 1942; Lall, 1983), age (Kumar and Saqib, 1996), profitability 
(Becker and Pain, 2008), diversification, sales, government subsidies, ownership control 
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(Link, 2003), R&D intensity, cash flows (Simanjuntak and Tjandrawinata, 2011), cash 
reserves and net income (Harmantzis and Tanguturi, 2005). Due to the adverse effect of the 
recent recession, the nature of relationships between R&D determinants may have 
changed. Thus, this thesis aims to relate R&D investment to the financial crisis. In Chapter 
5, common R&D determinants during a financial crisis will be examined. 
Although most of the existing literature has examined firm-level determinants (Lall, 1983, 
Kumar and Saqib, 1996; Galende and Suarez, 1999; Galende and Fuente, 2003; Lai et al., 
2015), few have examined the macroeconomic determinants of R&D expenditure (Becker 
and Pain, 2008; Wang, 2010; Sameti et al., 2010; Guloglu et al., 2012). Macroeconomic 
conditions facilitate countries’ innovative activities (OECD, 2007a). For example, patent 
protection motivates entrepreneurs to invest more in innovative activities. However, these 
determinants may vary between emerging and developed countries due to factors such as 
their financial systems, growth, skills and culture. Therefore, in Chapter 6, behavioural 
differences between emerging and developed countries are observed in terms of R&D 
investment. Similarly to macroeconomic determinants, the institutional settings of a 
country, such as government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of 
corruption and political stability, may also create a favourable environment for R&D 
investment (OECD, 2007a). In this regard, Barge-Gil and Lopez (2014) have identified the 
omission of this important R&D determinant from the literature. Peng (2008) has also 
emphasised the importance of institutional determinants. Therefore, the institutional 
determinants of R&D are examined in Chapter 7. 
In order to analyse the impact of R&D activity, it is equally important to establish its 
determinants. Analysis of outcomes is important with regard to stakeholders, as it relates to 
their financial and emotional expectations. For instance, analysis of the impact of R&D 
may help investors to assess the importance of innovation for firm growth and 
performance. Thus, researchers have established that R&D has a significant impact on firm 
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performance (Graboski, 1968; Guellec and Potterie, 2001; Yeh et al., 2010). However, 
Rafiq et al. (2016) have recently observed that R&D is not the only factor that has an 
impact on performance, but that the external environment and firm age also play important 
roles. In this regard, Srholec (2011) has suggested that not only firm characteristics, but 
also the institutional setting of the country within which the firm operates are important. 
This implies that the relationship between R&D and firm performance may be 
strengthened or weakened by the institutional setting of a country. Therefore, in Chapter 8 
the moderating effects of country-level factors on the relationship between R&D and firm 
performance are examined. 
In addition to examining the determinants and impact of R&D, the financing behaviour of 
R&D investment has been of interest in the R&D literature. Studying financing helps 
establish how funds can be raised for and allocated to R&D. Moreover, it helps firms to 
decide the optimal level of R&D investment. The financing behaviour of R&D may vary 
according to the prevalence of multinationals and the systems of a country. For example, 
firms in a market-based economy prefer to use internal funds as sources of finance 
(Bougheas, 2004), while a bank-based economy uses debt. In addition, financing decisions 
also depend on firm size, profitability, form of ownership, locality, nature, and the extent 
to which firms are prepared to “experiment with new strategy, new products, new markets, 
and so forth” (Chen and Humbrick, 1995; Bhat, 2008; Kim et al., 2008; Hambrick and 
Snow, 1977). For instance, multinational firms (MNEs) have greater access to funding than 
local firms, and may devote greater funding to innovative activities. Considering these 
issues, in Chapter 9 the role of a firm’s level of multi-nationality (local versus MNEs) and 
the financial system (market-based versus bank-based system) are examined in terms of 
financing R&D investment. 
Emerging markets have been considered as a domain for analysis of R&D determinants 
(firm-, macroeconomic-, and institutional-level), the impact of R&D and the financing of 
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R&D. Given the importance of emerging markets for the global economy, this study 
considers emerging markets as a specific domain. Emerging markets have great future 
potential for rapid social, political and economic development. Moreover, global 
competition, increased knowledge-based technologies, changing customer demands and 
strategic international cooperation boost emerging markets to invest in R&D 
(Gorodncihenko et al., 2008). In return, R&D investment may help emerging markets to 
gain timely access to emerging research, technologies and markets and revolutionise their 
global R&D groups (Edward, 2010). Lederman and Malony (2003) have provided 
evidence that returns from R&D investment in emerging countries are higher than in 
advanced countries. Therefore, emerging markets are considered as lands of opportunity 
and low-cost innovation centres. As a result, in recent years emerging markets have 
invested increasingly in R&D. Thus, by investing in innovative activities, emerging capital 
markets may contribute more to world development and become developed capital 
markets. 
1.2 Purpose of the study 
The relationship between R&D and emerging markets raises issues that will be examined 
in this study. 
The recent financial crisis has affected global markets adversely. Hud and Hussinger 
(2015) have pointed out that the recent recession has severely affected OECD countries, 
and it is assumed that it has also impacted negatively on emerging markets. Thus, this 
study examines the relationship between the financial crisis and R&D investment in 
emerging markets. The existing literature has shown that the impact of recession varies by 
firm, industry and market. Therefore, in this study, local and MNE markets are split based 
on the level of multi-nationality, and innovative and non-innovative industries. It is 
expected that the R&D investments of MNEs will be affected to a greater extent than local 
firms due to their international exposure, foreign currency risk and export orientation. 
17 
 
From an industry perspective, an innovative industry continues to invest in R&D during a 
recession, while non-innovative firms reduce R&D expenditure during a crisis. 
The economic growth of a country depends mainly on innovation (Rosenberg, 2004). 
Thus, it is assumed that the greater the innovation, the higher the economic development of 
a country. On the other hand, economic factors such as foreign direct investment (FDI), 
GDP growth, trade policy and interest rates affect the innovative activities of a country 
(OECD, 2007a). For example, an open trade policy impacts on innovation policy. 
However, in many ways, the economic policies of emerging markets are different from 
those of advanced markets. In implementing macroeconomic policy, emerging markets 
usually follow the strategies of advanced markets. Therefore, a comparative analysis of the 
behaviour of macroeconomic factors between emerging and developed markets will be 
helpful for policy makers in emerging markets seeking to promote innovative activities. 
Institutional determinants play an important role in facilitating or creating a favourable 
environment for R&D investment (OECD, 2007a). When the institutional setting of a 
country is strong, financial factors become more effective in boosting R&D investment. 
Moreover, institutions provide incentives and resources for innovation (Edquist and 
Johnson, 1997). Thus, institutions are considered as an infrastructure for innovation. Peng 
et al. (2008) has emphasised the importance of institutional settings for investment 
decisions in emerging markets. Therefore, this study examines which institutional factors 
are important for R&D expenditure in emerging markets. 
The institutional framework, including factors such as investor protection and national 
governance, may also influence the relationship between R&D investment and firm 
performance. However, not all factors moderate this relationship. In the presence of 
investor protection or national governance factors, the relationship between R&D and firm 
performance may be strengthened or weakened. Thus, the current study attempts to 
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identify which factors play a greater role in moderating the relationship between R&D and 
firm performance. 
Financing of R&D behaviour may vary from firm to firm and country to country. Due to 
the availability of resources and access to financing, local firms and MNEs may use 
different sources of funding for R&D. Therefore, this study examines this issue. R&D 
financing behaviour is also embedded in the specific environment of the firm, such as its 
financial systems. For example, in a bank-based economy, most investment financing is 
obtained from a bank or other financial institutions. Thus, this study also observes how 
financial systems relate to R&D financing in emerging markets. 
1.3 Contributions of the study 
In examining the relationship between R&D investment and capital markets, this study 
makes empirical, theoretical and methodological contributions to R&D-related research 
and policy making. 
1.3.1 Empirical contribution 
The existing literature has examined the impact of financial crises on R&D investment 
(Fillippetti and Archibugi, 2011; Paunov, 2012; Archibugi et al., 2013a, 2013b). However, 
most have been based on a specific region or country (for Europe, see Fillippetti and 
Archibugi, 2011; Archibugi et al., 2013a, 2013b; for Latin America, see Paunov, 2012), 
whereas this study considers all emerging countries from an entire region, including 
Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Moreover, this study adds to the 
existing literature by considering the relationship between markets and industries and the 
financial crisis, based on emerging markets. This thesis separates the markets of local and 
multinational firms and examines the relationship between local/multinational firms and 
the financial crisis. The results suggest that multinational firms tend to be affected more 
greatly than local firms by a financial crisis. This thesis also splits industries into 
innovative and non-innovative firms and observes their behaviour during the financial 
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crisis. The results suggest that innovative and non-innovative firms behave differently in 
the presence of a financial crisis due to their different nature and purpose. These new 
findings have policy implications for firms in terms of risky investments such as R&D 
during a financial crisis. 
Grilichies (1979) has examined the determinants of R&D, but very few researchers have 
examined these determinants in the presence of a financial crisis. This study aims to shed 
light on the existing R&D literature by examining this issue. In addition, this thesis 
separates emerging countries into crisis-affected countries and less/unaffected countries 
and examines behavioural differences between the two in terms of R&D determinants. The 
results show that, whether or not a country is affected, firm age, firm size, export 
orientation, debt ratio and foreign ownership play important roles in R&D investment 
decisions during a financial crisis, and that the resource-based view (RBV) holds true even 
during a financial crisis. This implies that firm resources and capabilities matter for 
innovation activities, even during a crisis period. Therefore, the findings of this research 
will be of particular interest to top-level management, such as CEOs and managers, 
because it indicates that they should continue to invest in innovation during future crisis 
periods in order to be crisis-resilient. 
This study extends the existing literature by examining macroeconomic determinants. 
Although a few previous studies have observed macroeconomic determinants, this study 
conducts a comparative analysis of the macroeconomic determinants of advanced and 
emerging countries in terms of R&D expenditure, observing that they behave differently. 
In terms of R&D investment, the results suggest that GDP growth, exports, trade openness, 
patents and financial crisis are the main macroeconomic determinants for advanced 
countries, while trade openness, FDI, patents and market size are the key macroeconomic 
determinants for emerging markets. This comparison helps establish how economies work 
at the macroeconomic level (Montiel, 2011). It has been assumed that emerging markets 
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follow the growth strategies of advanced markets; therefore, this study will help policy 
makers in emerging markets to develop new strategies or follow advanced market 
strategies to grow more robustly. 
This study is among the first to examine the effect of institutional determinants of R&D 
expenditure in emerging markets. It is widely accepted that there are institutional 
differences between developed and emerging markets, and that institutional differences 
between countries have a strong impact on firms’ innovation activities (Storz and Schäfer, 
2011), financing policies, international operations and managerial behaviour. The results 
show that government effectiveness, rule of law, political instability and corruption are 
institutional determinants of R&D activities in emerging markets, and that firm-level 
determinants and institutional factors are similarly important in decisions about R&D 
investment. This study will improve understanding of the importance of the external 
environment for R&D investment. In addition, the findings will facilitate shareholders and 
policy makers in making R&D investment decisions in emerging markets.  
This study is unique in comparing the moderating effects of country-level factors on the 
relationship between R&D and firm performance. The analysis considers investor 
protection factors, such as disclosures, directors’ liability and shareholders’ ability, as well 
as national governance factors, such as government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory 
quality, control of corruption, political stability and accountability. It is found that investor 
protection tends to moderate the relationship between R&D and firm performance more 
than country-level governance. This study contributes to the debate on which factors have 
a greater influence on the relationship between R&D and firm performance in emerging 
markets. It also contributes to research on investor protection and its influence on that 
relationship. 
In the context of the recent global financial crisis, the changing competitive environment, 
credit policy and incremental R&D investment, this study examines sources of financing 
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for R&D investment. In doing so, it contributes to R&D research by providing a more 
comprehensive understanding of R&D financing behaviour in emerging markets. It 
extends the existing R&D literature by examining multinationality and institutional settings 
in terms of R&D financing, incorporating the market behaviour of local firms and MNEs 
in R&D financing in emerging markets. It also considers the behaviour of both bank-based 
and market-based financial systems in this context. Emerging markets were chosen 
because little previous research has focused on these. It is found that multinational firms 
use both internal and external funds for R&D investments in emerging markets, while local 
firms do not use external funds. This result implies that access to funding plays a role in 
R&D financing. The findings also show that the financial system of the country in which 
firms are embedded influences their choice of sources of finance. Firms with bank-based 
financial systems use external funding, while those with market-based financial systems 
use internal funding for R&D investments in emerging markets. Thus, studying the source 
of financing for R&D investments will direct firms’ management, R&D investors and 
lenders to make cost-effective financial policies and reach financial goals. 
1.3.2 Theoretical contribution 
As this thesis focuses on various dimensions, including firm-, country-, and institutional-
level determinants, financing and the impact of R&D investment, it does not fit a single 
theory. Therefore, the analysis of this study adopts various theories, including cyclical, 
anti-cyclical, RBV, institutional theory, financial slack and pecking order theory. Although 
these theories have been tested on developed countries, very few have been tested on 
emerging markets. Thus, this study contributes to existing research by testing these 
theories on emerging markets. 
In this study, the relationship between the financial crisis and R&D investment is examined 
by applying cyclical and anti-cyclical theory. It is found that local and multinational firms 
follow cyclical theory. On the other hand, innovative firms follow anti-cyclical, while non-
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innovative firms follow cyclical theory. From these findings, it is difficult to generalise 
which types of firms will follow which theory. Thus, the results emerging from this 
research contribute to knowledge with regard to the development and refinement of 
existing theory. 
In addition, R&D determinants have previously been examined using RBV, testing 
whether or not RBV holds true even during a financial crisis. Currently, the theory is only 
supported during a normal period; however, there is a gap in the existing literature in terms 
of testing whether this theory holds true during a crisis period. The results of this study 
show that RBV does hold true during a financial crisis. It therefore contributes to existing 
theory by extending the scope of RBV theory. Managers might use this model even during 
a financial crisis period to gain optimal benefits from R&D investment. 
National institutional settings have a significant impact on firms’ investment decisions, 
such as in R&D (Jorde and Teece, 1990; Daude and Stein, 2007; Wang, 2010). However, 
institutional settings vary from country to country. Peng et al. (2008) have emphasised the 
importance of institutional settings for investment decisions in emerging markets. 
However, there is a little evidence in the literature regarding the applicability of 
institutional theory to R&D investment in emerging markets. Thus, this thesis examines the 
institutional determinants of R&D investment based on institutional theory in emerging 
markets. In doing so, it contributes to existing research by extending the area of 
institutional theory. Moreover, policy makers in emerging markets might use this theory 
once they have made decisions on R&D activities. 
In this study, sources of finance for R&D in emerging markets are tested based on financial 
slack and pecking order theory. It is found that local and multinational firms behave 
differently with regard to R&D financing in emerging markets, in accordance with 
financial slack theory. On the other hand, bank-based markets use external funding, 
whereas market-based countries use internal funding for R&D investments. The results 
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contribute to the research by providing new evidence from emerging markets. Investors 
and lenders might follow this theory in financing innovative activities in emerging 
markets. 
1.3.3 Methodological contribution 
The study expands the scope of R&D literature using advanced econometric techniques. 
Generalised methods of moment (GMM) estimation has been applied in the analysis, and 
an instrumental variable (IV) approach has been used. These methods were used to control 
for the problem of endogenous variables during the analysis. Moreover, GMM estimation 
better addresses the problems of heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation. Pair-wise Granger 
causality tests and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression were also used in the analysis, 
and panel data methodologies were used to address individual firm heterogeneity. The 
application of advanced econometric methods confirms that the results are unbiased and 
consistent. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 provides a general background to and 
the purpose of the study, and justifies its contributions. Chapter 2 presents a theoretical 
model relating to R&D, including RBV, financial slack, pecking order theory and 
institutional theory. Chapter 3 reviews relevant literature and debates on issues in R&D. 
Chapter 4 presents the estimations used in the analysis: an IV approach and GMM are used 
with OLS and Granger causality tests for the analysis. Chapter 5 examines the 
determinants of R&D investment during a financial crisis, and explores the relationship 
between financial crises and R&D from the perspective of markets (local versus MNEs) 
and industries (innovative versus non-innovative). Chapter 6 examines the macroeconomic 
determinants of R&D in emerging markets, in particular macroeconomic behavioural 
differences in R&D investment between advanced and emerging countries. Chapter 7 
observes institutional determinants of R&D in emerging markets and examines how factors 
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in institutional settings, such as government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law 
and corruption, have an impact on firm-level R&D investment in emerging countries. 
Chapter 8 examines the moderating effects of country-level factors on R&D investment, 
and explores the moderating effects of investor protection factors (safeguards) and country 
governance factors (systems) on the relationship between R&D and firm performance. 
Chapter 9 looks at the R&D financing behaviour of firms in emerging markets, and relates 
the R&D financing behaviour of local firms and MNEs, and bank-based and market-based 
countries in emerging markets. Chapter 10 presents conclusions from the study. 
 
1.5 Summary 
This chapter has established the context of the study, and set out the aims and objectives of 
the research. It has also outlined the purpose of the study, and has explained its potential 
contributions. The structure of the thesis has also been described. 
As is evident from the above discussion, the study concerns R&D investment in emerging 
markets. Its focus is on the determinants of firm-, macroeconomic- , and institutional-level 
R&D investments, the relationship between R&D investment and firm performance in 
emerging markets, and sources of financing for R&D investments in emerging markets. 
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Chapter 2: Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
Any analysis depends on a theory or model. The aim of this chapter is to outline theories 
relevant to R&D investment. The literature on R&D expenditure has drawn on theories 
such as Schumpeter’s theory, RBV, endogenous growth theory, behavioural theory of the 
firm, real option theory, cyclical theory, pecking order theory, financial slack and 
institutional theory. The following sections present these theories. 
2.2 Schumpeter’s theory 
The literature on R&D expenditure and firm value has generally been based on 
Schumpeter’s (1942) innovation theory. Innovation theory was derived from Schumpeter’s 
analysis of different economic and social systems. Schumpeter defined innovation as a 
whole process, from opportunity identification, ideation or invention to development, 
prototyping, production marketing and sales, whereas entrepreneurship only needs to 
involve commercialisation. Schumpeter argued that innovation comes about through new 
combinations made by an entrepreneur, resulting in a new product, a new process, the 
opening up of a new market, a new way of organising the business or a new source of 
supply. The drivers of innovation are financial pressure to reduce costs and increase 
efficiency, increased competition, shorter product lifecycles, value migration, stricter 
regulation, industry and community needs for sustainable development, increased demand 
for accountability, demographic, social and market changes, rising customer expectations 
regarding service and quality, a changing economy, and greater availability of potentially 
useful technologies coupled with a need to exceed the competition in these technologies. 
Schumpeter argued that innovation efforts are institutionalised in R&D activities. 
Innovation theory argues that innovation through R&D expenditure is the foundation of a 
firm’s long-term growth and success (Han and Chuang, 2011). Schumpeter argued that 
firms that enjoy monopoly positions are incentivised to innovate in order to avoid the entry 
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of potential rivals; a monopoly position also ensures long-run performance (Askenazy et 
al., 2007). The R&D sector develops ideas that grant a monopoly position. Schumpeter 
suggested that these temporary monopolies are necessary to provide the incentives 
necessary for firms to develop new products and processes (Pol et al., 2006), superior 
access to capital, ability to pool risks and economies of scale in the maintenance of R&D 
laboratories. However, critics have claimed that large bureaucracies reduce R&D activities. 
2.3 Cyclical theory 
Cyclical theory posits that a country’s investment and development follow cycles that rise 
and fall with economic factors such as financial crises and inflation. For example, when an 
economy faces crisis, economic output tends to decrease. The National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) has defined a financial crisis as “a significant decline in 
economic activity for several months reflected in lower GDP, lower individual income, 
reduced employment level, reducing industrial production and consumption”. According to 
Haralambie (2011), a financial crisis is “a manifestation of the economic crisis which 
reflects distrust in the financial system, a significant decrease in the volume of transactions 
on stock exchanges, disruption of market mechanisms, stock market is the business 
barometer of the economy dealing business in different sizes and from different sectors”. 
The negative impact of a financial crisis on a country’s demand, export performance, 
production, consumption and employment reduces investment. Moreover, tightened credit 
conditions adversely affect a country’s investment levels. 
The OECD (2012) has identified three factors which influence R&D investment during 
recessions: uncertainties about demand trends, access to finance, and governments’ 
responses to R&D policy. Given uncertainties in demand trends, investors seek not to 
expose themselves to additional risks by investing in risky and uncertain investments such 
as R&D. Moreover, financial tightening during a crisis makes them step back from 
innovative activities. Filippetti and Archibugi (2011) have pointed out that financial 
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constraints play an important role during a crisis, as firms use internal funds as much as 
they can. According to Cincera et al. (2012), even fast-growing emerging market firms 
face problems with credit finance during crises. Such crises encourage investors to make 
deposits to cover for an uncertain future rather than current R&D investments. Overall, to a 
greater or lesser extent, financial crises cause firms to reduce their investment in R&D 
(Cincera et al., 2012). 
2.4 Counter-cyclical theory 
Counter-cyclical theory predicts that economic output increases during an economic 
downturn. This implies that some economic indicators move in the opposite direction from 
the financial crisis, one of which is innovative activity. There are several reasons why 
innovative activity, particularly R&D investment, seems to be counter-cyclical. First, 
knowledge creation or inventions through innovative activity are not curtailed by financial 
crises. They are ongoing activities that continue in the same way during boom and bust. 
Thus, innovative activity is not driven by economic fluctuations (Schumpeter, 1939). 
Geroski and Walters (1995) found that innovative activities turn out to have many 
properties of random walk; however, innovation has a tendency to cluster during economic 
booms. Second, the opportunity costs of R&D investment are lower during crises; thus, 
firms are likely to continue to invest in R&D during crises. Third, innovation may create 
market demand through multiplier or accelerator effects (Kleinknecht and Verspagen, 
1990). Fourth, internal funding plays an important role in whether or not innovation is 
counter-cyclical. If a firm has more internal funding during a recession, it will not cut 
R&D investment. Therefore, Lopez-Garcia et al. (2012) found that if a firm’s internal 
funding increases by more than four per cent, it increases its R&D investment during a 
recession. 
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2.5 Resource-based view 
RBV was first recognised by Wernerfelt (1984), who explored the usefulness of analysing 
firms from a resource perspective rather than from a product perspective. RBV stresses the 
heterogeneous internal resources and capabilities that create competitive advantage and 
determine a firm’s performance (Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 1997). Internal resources, 
which are the basic unit of analysis for RBV, include physical, human, organisational 
(Barney, 1991), financial, commercial and technological assets used by firms to develop, 
manufacture and deliver products and services to their customers. Resources that are 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable, such as patents, trademarks, brand names, 
reputation, installed base, organisational culture, employees’ knowledge, experience and 
skills may lead to the creation of competitive advantage (Wright et al., 1994). Firms that 
have greater competitive advantage will be more successful in emerging markets (Makhija, 
2003). R&D investment is one of the main resources of a firm, creating assets which are 
difficult to imitate and substitute in order to achieve competitive advantage. Moreover, 
R&D investment helps firms to gain competitive advantage by increasing technological 
knowledge, raising product quality, improving products and processes and enhancing 
customer satisfaction. On the other hand, a firm’s innovative activities depend on its 
resources and activities. A study by Canto and González (1999) identified rules relating a 
firm’s resources and activities to R&D spending. Similarly, Galende and Fuente (2003) 
found that internal resources and innovation have a significant and interesting relationship. 
However, critics have claimed that resources alone may not contribute to a firm’s 
performance; a firm also needs entrepreneurial strategies and entrepreneurial abilities, 
which are overlooked in RBV (Akio, 2005). Moreover, Priem and Butler (2001) have 
stated that RBV ignores managerial implications and operational validity. Although RBV 
states that managers need to obtain strategic resources which are non-imitable and rare, it 
does not explain how managers can do this. RBV also overlooks the need for co-operation 
between resources to facilitate firm performance. In addition, RBV only focuses on 
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internal resources; however, external factors such as the economic, social and political 
environment may play an important role in firm performance. Thus, even if a firm has 
sufficient internal resources, owing to corruption and political turmoil they may not 
contribute to firm performance. 
2.6 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory asserts that institutional quality and environment may influence the 
structure of social and economic development. Institutions create formal and informal rules 
that organise legal, social, economic and political behaviour (North, 1990; Hodgson, 
2006). Thus, differences in institutional settings affect the outcome of development. 
Institutional theory acknowledges the role of the external environment in shaping a firm’s 
decisions and level of activities. Oliver (1997) and Brawn et al. (2001) have observed that 
institutions influence firm-level strategy. For instance, R&D activities are legitimised by 
the institutional environment. Hillier et al. (2011) found that institutional settings facilitate 
investment in R&D activities. Similarly, Pattit et al. (2012) have reported that institutional 
quality influences technological innovation and emerging technological opportunities. 
Institutions may facilitate R&D investment in several ways. First, strong institutions may 
attract foreign investors (Bénassy-Quéré, 2007) and help access external finance (La Porta 
et al., 1997). Second, institutional quality increases investor protection by protecting 
intellectual property rights, thereby encouraging investors to invest more in innovative 
activities. Moreover, strong external support provides managers and investors with a 
favourable environment in which to do business. 
2.7 Pecking order theory 
According to Myers’ (1984) “pecking order” theory, the financing of different investment 
projects is prioritised, and their order depends on the cost of asymmetric information. The 
theory suggests a hierarchy in financing projects, using internal funds first, and then 
external fund-issuing debt and/or equity. Empirical research has shown that R&D 
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financiers prefer internal funding because it is easier to raise and lower costs (Himmelberg 
and Petersen, 1994; Lee and Hwang, 2003; Brown et al., 2009). Moreover, owing to 
agency problems, it is preferable to finance R&D investment internally (Schumpeter, 
1942); the question of whether debt or equity is preferred for R&D financing arises only 
when internal funding has been exhausted. According to Hottenrott and Peters (2012), 
when internal funding is exhausted, firms use debt for R&D investments because issuing 
new equity may be costly and often unwanted. Similarly, Brown et al. (2009) have 
observed that, when internal funding is exhausted and debt is not an option, firms must 
turn to new equity issues. However, Chen et al. (2010) have argued that, in order to avoid 
the costs of debt requirements and maintain sufficient financial slack, firms prefer equity 
financing. Moreover, equity financing reduces financial obligations to pay regular interest 
(Wang and Thornhill, 2010). 
2.8 Financial slack 
Myers’ (1984) pecking order theory emphasises the use of first internal funding and then 
external funding for R&D investment. The main problem with this theory is determining 
which firms follow pecking order theory for R&D investment, and to what extent. The 
theory of the general flow of funds (Dhrymes and Kurz, 1967) holds that firms use internal 
and external funding simultaneously for R&D investment. This raises questions about their 
capacity to obtain debt for R&D investment, as there is a problem of information 
asymmetry. Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theory, popularly known as M-M theory, 
denies these concepts. They argued that it does not matter how a firm is financed. 
However, their one main assumption was a perfect capital market, which is almost absent 
in emerging markets. Given controversies between existing theories, financial slack 
provides more flexibility in choosing sources of funding for R&D investment. Financial 
slack is a facilitator of R&D investment (Lee, 2011), as slack provides the necessary 
sources of funding for R&D activities (Cyert and March, 1963). A firm may use cash (or 
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near cash) and/or debt capacity when opportunities appear, but not in a strict or orderly 
fashion as simultaneous finance. In general, it can be said that firms may use internal or 
external funding, or both, for new investments. The choice of sources of funding depends 
on the availability of financial slack. In other words, firms with lower levels of financial 
slack use internal funding only, and firms with higher levels of financial slack use both 
sources of funding for investments. 
2.9 Endogenous growth theory 
Endogenous growth theory, popularly known variously as neo-Schumpeterian growth 
theory, the Romer model, the Grossman-Helpman model or the Aghion-Howitt model, also 
acknowledges the role of internal factors but focuses on internal sector characteristics and 
technological regimes. Endogenous growth theory holds that investments in innovation, 
knowledge and human capital are significant contributors to economic growth. It suggests 
progression from R&D intensity to patenting, patenting to technological progress, and 
technological progress to economic growth (Zachariadis, 2003). Jones (1995) criticised the 
fact that the theory incorporates a scale effect property (Zachariadis, 2003). His evidence 
shows that resources devoted to R&D have been increasing exponentially, but growth rates 
in total factor productivity (TFP) and per capita output remain roughly constant over time 
(Dinopoulos and Sener, 2007). Jones (1995) then proposed a “semi-endogenous” growth 
theory. According to this model, although growth in the extended model is generated 
endogenously through R&D, long-run growth depends only on parameters that are usually 
taken to be exogenous, including the rate of population growth. Madsen (2008) found that, 
while endogenous growth theory is consistent with time-series evidence but inconsistent 
with cross-sectional evidence, semi-endogenous growth theories are consistent with neither 
time-series nor cross-sectional evidence. In contrast, exogenous growth theory, also known 
as the neoclassical growth model or Solow-Swan growth model, assumes that economic 
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growth is determined mainly by external factors such as the savings rate (Harrod-Domar 
model) and the rate of technological change (Solow model), rather than internal factors. 
2.10 Cornot Duopoly game theory 
In an “era of cheap innovation” (Galbraith, 1952, cited in Kaiser, 2002) and ever 
increasing complexity and costs, many have claimed that even large firms do not have all 
the necessary assets to develop new technology, so they must combine their research 
efforts (Hinloopen and Encore, 2003). D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) derived a two-
stage Cornot duopoly game, also called resource joint venture (RJV), which emphasised 
R&D co-operation and R&D competition. R&D co-operation takes place at the pre-
competitive stage, in which firms share basic information and efforts in R&D, creating 
common policies at the product level, but compete in the market place, as in the European 
Strategic Programme for R&D in Information Technology (ESP-RIT) and the 
Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) in the US. They 
emphasised that co-operative research efforts bring fierce competitors together. Studies by 
Hinloopen and Encore (2003) and Kaiser (2002) have revealed that co-operating firms 
invest more in R&D than non-cooperating firms. Hasnas et al. (2011) treated the Cournot 
duopoly as a differential game in which firms investing less in R&D enjoy higher profits 
than their rivals. Henriques (1990) has pointed out that this theory only holds if spill-overs 
are large. 
2.11 Encultural innovation model 
While the two-stage Cornot duopoly game focuses on R&D co-operation between two 
firms, in the encultural innovation model (also known as the co-operative model or 
interactive model) co-operation occurs between R&D activities, structural links, tacit 
knowledge, interactive learning, the cultural context, social processes, national and 
regional innovation systems, and customer and supplier relations (Lundvall, 1992; 
Campagni, 1991, cited in Johannessen et al., 1999). An emphasis on a variety of 
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knowledge types, such as systemic, explicit, tacit, hidden and relationship knowledge and 
the links between them, is regarded as the most valuable resource in the encultural model, 
and learning is regarded as the most important process. In this model, knowledge 
development, integration and application are the main productive assets of the firm. 
Innovation research is the fundamental study of change processes, knowledge development 
and knowledge integration for the purpose of generating new combinations. The model 
presupposes that the innovation process varies from firm to firm, and that there is a pattern 
of interactive processes that generates innovation activity in the firm. The dominant feature 
pertaining to the model is the importance given to collaboration, as opposed to an emphasis 
on competition (Johannessen et al., 1999). However, Scherer (1980) observed that a lack of 
competitive pressure leads to bureaucratic inertia, which discourages innovation. 
2.12 Spence’s dynamic model 
Spence’s (1984) dynamic model analysed the effect of R&D spill-overs on industry 
performance. Intra-industry R&D spill-over effects lead to reduced costs, as knowledge 
expands for the receiving firm, and production structures are affected as demands change 
in response to spill-over and rates of capital accumulation. Spence assumed that, through 
spill-overs, a firm’s R&D expenditure reduces the production costs of rival firms 
(Bernstein and Nadiri, 1989). In Spence’s model, the firm’s own and rival R&D activities 
are perfect substitutes. This may be a reasonable characterisation of industries with 
“discrete” technologies, in which innovations stand more or less alone as isolated 
discoveries, as in the chemical and drug industries (Levin, 1988). As spill-overs generate 
free-rider problems, firms’ incentives to undertake R&D activity are diminished (Bernstein 
and Nadiri, 1989). However, patent law seeks to resolve this tension between incentives for 
innovation and the widespread diffusion of benefits (Levin et al., 1987). Reinganum (1981) 
proposed a model of R&D with rivalry. Contrary to the prediction of Spence’s model, in 
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electronics-based industries, R&D expenditure is not discouraged by a high level of spill-
over (Levin, 1988). 
2.13 Behavioural theory of the firm 
According to Cyert and March (1963), the behavioural theory of the firm offers a good 
platform for integrating development and decision-making ideas for innovation. This 
theory takes the firm as its basic unit, with the goal of predicting firm behaviour with 
respect to decisions such as price, output and resource allocation, emphasising the actual 
process of organisational decision making (Mahoney, 2004). Developing innovation is a 
form of organisational search (Greve, 2003). According to Cyert and March (1963), 
information is required to make the most appropriate decisions. However, information 
gathering itself is not costless and requires resources (Mahoney, 2004). This model 
specifies that R&D expenses increase when low performance causes problemistic search 
and when excess resources cause slack search (Greve, 2003). Problemistic search is 
triggered when managers find that organisational performance falls below their aspirations 
(Cyert and March, 1963). When performance relative to aspirations decreases, R&D 
intensity increases (Greve, 2003). Slack search occurs when increased organisational 
resources allow experimentation and organisational change (March, 1981). When 
organisational slack increases, R&D intensity increases (Greve, 2003). However, critics 
claim that this theory is unnecessarily complicated. 
2.14 Real option theory 
Real option theory is a standard framework for the valuation of investment projects under 
uncertainty and flexibility. It describes the resemblance between financial options and real-
world investments. This theory is related to scenario and decision tree analysis, and is more 
adequate than expected net present value theory for investment decision analysis. The main 
assumptions of this theory are first, that investments are incremental; that is, a firm may 
undertake a small investment to establish a foothold in an area and, once uncertainty 
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regarding the future profitability of the investment is lifted, increase the investment to the 
needed scale to reap the benefits. Second, investments are immediate; that is, they will 
instantly materialise once the decision to invest has been made. Third, options are available 
to the firm; that is, the firm can undertake an investment once it has decided to do so 
(Cuervo-Cazurra and Un, 2010). There are six types of real options: the option to differ an 
investment project, the time-to-build option, the option to abandon an investment project, 
the option to contract, expend or temporarily shut down an investment, the option to switch 
input or output, and the growth option (Perlitz et al., 1999). R&D-intensive industries are 
highly unlikely to evaluate the chances and risks of a project as well as choosing the right 
one (Perlitz et al., 1999) at the right time (Cuervo-Cazurra and Un, 2010). Real option 
theory explains a method of R&D project evaluation, when valuing R&D investment and 
the frequency of investments in R&D. Real option pricing (ROP) methods are used to 
evaluate R&D projects (Hartmann and Hassan, 2006). A firm that lacks internal knowledge 
resources is more likely never to invest in R&D; a firm that has both internal and external 
knowledge resources is more likely sometimes to invest in R&D; while a firm that has 
internal knowledge resources but lacks external knowledge resources is more likely always 
to invest in R&D (Cuervo-Cazurra and Un, 2010). Investment in formal R&D is viewed as 
part of a sequential option in which the firm first invests in R&D to create growth options 
that can later be exercised with additional investment, such as prototype development, 
production and marketing (Pindyck, 1991; McGrath, 1997, cited in Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Un, 2010). The Black-Scholes (B/S) equation offers an analytical solution, and the Geski 
model provides an extension of B/S for the valuation of sequential options (Hartmann and 
Hassan, 2006). 
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2.15 Summary 
This chapter has described theories relevant to R&D investment. Several theories explain 
the causes of firm-level R&D investment. For example, Schumpeter’s theory and RBV 
explain the determinants of R&D, while institutional theories explain the importance of 
institutional determinants for R&D expenditure. Pecking order theory and financial slack 
posit possible sources of financing for R&D activities, while cyclical and anti-cyclical 
theories describe the relationship between financial crises and R&D investment.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature on R&D investments, in particular the literature 
relating to relationships between financial crises and R&D investments, firm-level R&D 
spending determinants, macroeconomic and institutional determinants of R&D 
investments, the impact of R&D on firm performance, and sources of finance for R&D 
investment. This will serve as a foundation for the discussion and analysis of subsequent 
chapters. A review of empirical studies of R&D will help identify gaps in the existing body 
of knowledge. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents a meaning and definition of 
R&D, Section 2.3 defines emerging markets, and Section 2.4 relates the financial crisis to 
R&D investment. Sections 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 describe firm-level, macroeconomic, and 
institutional determinants respectively. Section 2.8 examines the impact of R&D on firm 
performance, Section 2.9 looks at sources of finance for R&D, and Section 2.10 
summarises the chapter. 
3.2 Research and development (R&D) 
Research is the primary search for technical or scientific advancement, and development is 
the translation of such advancement into product or process innovations (Link, 1982). 
These two words, research and development (R&D), are generally used together because 
research needs development to create something that the market wants. R&D expenditure 
is used as a proxy for information asymmetry, managerial discretion, product 
differentiation or growth opportunities (Hirschey et al., 2012). Shin and Kim (2011) have 
pointed out that R&D expenditure creates intangible assets, affects profitability, and 
generates excessive stock returns in the stock market. Morbey’s (1988) empirical evidence 
confirms that R&D expenditure is an important factor in determining the sales growth and 
profitability of a firm. 
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As defined by the OECD (2000), R&D expenditure is money spent on creative work 
undertaken on a systematic basis to increase the stock of knowledge, and the use of this 
knowledge to devise new applications. Consistent with this, the Frascati Manual (OECD, 
2015a) has recently added that R&D activity must (at least in principle) meet the following 
five criteria: 
 Novel– aimed at new knowledge and findings 
 Creative– new concepts and ideas that improve existing knowledge 
 Uncertain– uncertain about the final results  
 Systematic – conducted in a planned way 
 Transferable and/or reproducible – allowing others to reuse and reproduce the results. 
The Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002a) identified three areas covered by R&D: basic 
research, applied research and experimental development. 
 Basic research is experiential research or theoretical work undertaken for new 
knowledge generation. 
 Applied research relates to original research that obtains new knowledge. 
 Experimental development is systematic research on existing knowledge directed to 
produce new processes or systems or improve existing systems. 
According to Driver and Guedes (2012), R&D is characterised by specific features: 
 Its assets are intangible (and thus largely sunk or irreversible). 
 Its gains are difficult to appropriate in full unless protection is available through 
patents, secrecy or unique complementary assets. 
 Its cash flows are both long-term and unusually risky. 
According to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 2 (1974), the 
elements of R&D expenditure are: 
 The salaries, wages and other related costs of personnel engaged in R&D activities 
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 The cost of materials and services consumed in R&D activities 
 The depreciation of buildings, equipment and facilities, and amortisation of other 
assets such as patents and licences to the extent that they are used for R&D 
activities 
 Overhead costs relating to R&D activities, payments to outside bodies (research 
laboratories, universities, etc.) for R&D projects related to the enterprise 
 Expenditure incurred in obtaining patents for new products/processes 
 Other costs that can be directly attributed to R&D activities and can be identified 
with specific projects. 
This expenditure excludes routine product testing, quality control costs, market research 
and market testing costs, the legal costs of patent applications and the sale and licensing of 
patents. 
In terms of microeconomic aspects, R&D treats R&D expenditure, R&D investment and 
R&D spending as a single or homogeneous activity. R&D is also known as technical or 
technological development, and is sometimes used interchangeably with the term 
“innovation”. 
3.3 Emerging markets 
Generally, the term “emerging markets” refers to countries which are growing rapidly, 
with favourable economic liberalisation, and integrating with global markets (Arnold and 
Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2000). According to the World Bank, which introduced the 
term in 1980, emerging markets are those markets that have not reached the minimum 
gross national product (GNP) per capita of $9,656 associated with developed markets. The 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) has defined an emerging market as a stock market 
that is in transition, increasing in size, activity or level of sophistication. In particular, the 
IFC (1999) has stated that, to be included in the emerging markets list, a stock market 
needs to meet two criteria: first, that it is located in a low-to middle-income country 
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according to World Bank criteria; and second, that its invested market capitalisation is low 
relative to most recent GDP figures. 
According to Kvint (2009): 
An emerging market country is a society transitioning from a dictatorship 
to a free-market-oriented economy, with increasing economic freedom, 
gradual integration with the global marketplace and with other members of 
the GEM [global emerging market], an expanding middle class, improving 
standards of living, social stability and tolerance, as well as an increase in 
cooperation with multilateral institutions. 
The distinguishing characteristics of emerging markets are that, besides their size and 
openness of economy, these countries’ standards of living are rapidly improving, with a 
growing middle class. Marr and Reynard (2010) have stated that emerging markets 
represent 80 percent of the world’s population and almost three-quarters of its land mass. 
Moreover, they have pointed out that 70 percent of global foreign exchange reserves, more 
than half of global energy consumption and close to half of both the world’s exports in 
purchasing power parity terms and its GDP were accounted for by emerging markets in 
2010. On the other hand, the IMF (2014) has observed three disadvantages of emerging 
markets: rising global trade, reflecting an expanding supply chain; easy financing 
conditions driven by lower interest rates in advanced markets; and high and rising 
commodity prices. In addition, owing to cheap labour costs, emerging markets have 
become key suppliers of a variety of man-made products to the rest of the world. 
Due to their competitive advantages, coupled with continued trade and liberalisation, 
emerging markets facilitate a surge of capital inflows and investment (IMF, 2014). As 
emerging markets are considered in terms of low-cost innovation and investment 
opportunities, foreign investors are attracted to invest in them. Thus, emerging markets are 
considered as lands of opportunity. 
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Various organisations, including the IMF, Goldman Sachs and The Economist have 
defined emerging markets from different perspectives. For example, the IMF defined them 
by GDP-per-capita ratio, while Goldman Sachs selected them based on macroeconomic 
stability, political maturity, trade openness, investment policies and educational quality 
criteria. As a result, the list of emerging markets may vary from one organisation to 
another (see Appendix 2 for a list of emerging markets). For example, Goldman Sachs 
identified 11 emerging markets: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, South Africa, Turkey and Vietnam. On the other hand, the IMF 
included Argentina but excluded South Korea as an emerging market. Although the lists of 
emerging markets differ, the main criterion for selection is a growing economy. 
3.4 Financial crisis and R&D investment 
The relationship between financial crises and innovation is not straightforward. The 
cyclical view suggests that financial crises impact negatively on R&D investment, while 
the anti-cyclical view suggests the opposite. In the context of the business cycle, R&D 
activity evolves with economic fluctuations such as GDP. Financial constraints, lower 
customer demand for products and services, and a “pessimistic mood” make R&D 
investment pro-cyclical. This pro-cyclical view has also been supported by Barlevy (2007), 
who has stated that there is a dynamic externality inherent in R&D that makes 
entrepreneurs myopic and concentrates their innovation in booms, even when it is optimal 
to concentrate it in crises. R&D maybe pro-cyclical because a large proportion of research 
is oriented towards short-term needs: it is devoted to adapting existing goods to new 
requirements or new markets, and hence follows demand fluctuations (Guellec and 
Ioannidis, 1997). Stiglitz (1993) and Hall (2002) have argued that firms may decrease their 
R&D investment due to credit rationing and limited internal funding during financial 
crises. Moreover, Freeman et al. (1982) stated that firms reduce their investment during 
recession because of low profit margins and a general “pessimistic mood”. Consistent with 
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Freeman et al. (1982), Lerner (2011) has argued that investors who are risk averse avoid 
committing to new obligations during recessions, although tough times such as financial 
crises may be good times for firms to develop new ways of doing things (Rae-Dupree, 
2008; Hausman and Johnston, 2014). A crisis period may be an opportune time, 
particularly for emerging market firms, as they can capitalise on foreign markets (Ma et al., 
2014). This implies that the same financial crisis may impact differently on firms based on 
the nature, development and institutional settings of the countries in which they operate. 
On the other hand, the anti-cyclical view, also known as the Schumpeterian (1934) model, 
states that financial crises induce R&D investment in order to replace old and inefficient 
production techniques with newer ones. This is popularly known as “creative destruction”. 
Opportunity costs, the availability of internal funding, high adjustment costs and the size of 
firms makes R&D investment counter-cyclical. The opportunity costs of R&D investment 
are lower than other short term investments during crises; thus, firms are unlikely to reduce 
their R&D investment. Moreover, R&D investments depend primarily on the availability 
of internal funding (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). If a firm has more internal funding 
during a recession, it will not cut down on R&D investment. Firms whose internal funding 
increases by more than four percent increase their R&D investment during recession 
(Lopez-Garica et al., 2012). Supporting the anti-cyclical view, Guellec and Ioannidis 
(1997) argued that fluctuations in R&D are limited by high adjustment costs. R&D is a 
sunk, non-tradable and irreversible cost; thus, the cost of stopping an ongoing project is 
high. Moreover, larger firms increase their R&D investment during downturns following a 
fall in industry demand (Rafferty and Funk, 2004). The main weakness of this theory is 
that it fails to identify specific firms and/or industries that will continue to invest or 
increase their R&D investment during financial crises. 
Following the recent financial crisis, the OECD (2009, 2012) and Archibugi et al. (2013a) 
found that firms reduced their investment in innovation and R&D. Paunov (2012) 
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addedthat,on average, one in four firms reduced their innovation projects during this 
financial crisis, based on panel data from 1,548 firms in eight Latin American countries. 
However, in a later paper, Archibugi et al. (2013b) found that firms, particularly fast 
growing new firms and those that were already highly innovative before the crisis, invested 
in innovation during the crisis. In their earlier paper, they used Innobarometer survey data 
from 27 EU member states, Norway and Switzerland, designed and collected by the 
European Commission, while the later paper used panel data from a UK Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS). This indicates that a country’s institutional setting does matter in 
response to crises. Consistent with Archibugi et al. (2013b), Kanerva and Hollanders’ 
(2009) study, using Innobarometer survey data from 27 European countries, documented 
that more innovative firms continued to invest in innovation during the 2008 crisis. Both 
sources have indicated that innovative firms may play different roles during a crisis. This is 
because most innovative firms are comparatively less affected by recession (Kanever and 
Hollanders, 2009). 
Like innovative firms, the responses of multinational firms to financial crises may be 
different from those of local firms. Bellak (2004) has stated that, as MNEs have greater 
international exposure and sectoral affiliation, they are hit harder by crises than domestic 
firms. On the other hand, Dachs (2014) has argued that, as MNEs are less dependent on 
external finance and have greater internal funding, they have a competitive advantage over 
local firms and may continue to invest during a crisis period. Moreover, they have greater 
ability to spread the risk of R&D projects across a larger number of countries (Dachs, 
2014). However, there is no empirical evidence of any difference between local firms’ and 
MNEs’ reactions to financial crises. Wang et al. (2005) and Varum and Rocha (2011) 
found that local firms and MNEs were equally affected by the financial crisis, although 
these results may vary within countries (Filippov, 2013). For instance, Varum and Rocha 
(2011) examined MNEs’ and domestic firms’ responses to crisis within Portugal. 
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The inconclusive empirical evidence indicates a considerable degree of heterogeneity in 
the impact of crises on R&D (Dachs, 2014). According to Cincera et al. (2012), it depends 
how companies react to a financial crisis and how they manage the R&D process, as well 
as collaboration or outsourcing. Firms follow cyclical theory when at risk of falling behind 
competitors who are continuing to invest in R&D. In contrast, firms follow the anti-
cyclical view when they wish to gain competitive advantage during a downturn. Moreover, 
the impact of economic crises on R&D investment depends on firms’ size, export 
orientation and access to credit. Export-oriented firms increase R&D during a crisis, while 
large firms and those with limited access to credit reduce R&D (Correa and Lottey, 2011). 
Paunov (2012) observed that firms with no credit constraints are less likely to abandon 
innovation projects, and that those who lose out on export market sales are more likely to 
stop innovating. In line with Paunov (2012), the OECD (2009) reported that export-
oriented and quality-certification firms increased their R&D investment during the recent 
financial crisis. Therefore, firms’ risk management, nature, orientation and financing 
policies have important implications in responding to financial crises. 
3.5 Firm-level R&D determinants 
Most empirical work on the determinants of R&D has focused on firm-level R&D 
investment (Lall, 1983; Kumar and Saqib, 1996; Galende and Suarez, 1999; Galende and 
Fuente, 2003; Lai et al., 2015), although the evidence has been inconclusive for most of 
these determinants. For example, the accelerated principle of investment supports 
profitability, while failure-inducement theory finds profitability largely irrelevant to R&D. 
Some authors support demand-side pull factors, such as sales, while others support 
technological push factors in R&D investment. On the other hand, RBV posits that R&D 
activity depends on internal resources. The main reasons for these inconclusive results are 
variations in the estimation, sample selection, sample period and domain selected for 
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analysis. The common determinants of R&D investment used in the literature are described 
below. 
3.5.1 Firm age 
Age represents knowledge, skills and managerial capabilities; in other words, a firm’s 
stock of knowledge, skills and managerial capabilities increases with firm age (Pamukcu 
and Utku-Ismihan, 2009). Moreover, experienced firms may expect higher rates of 
appropriation as they have existing routes through which to exploit new inventions 
(Abdelmoula and Etienne, 2009). Mishra (2007) added that older firms have more 
experienced scientists and better-equipped laboratories than new firms. Thus, it is assumed 
that R&D investment increases with firm age. Empirical evidence also shows a significant 
positive influence of firm age on R&D investment (Lall, 1983; Kumar and Saqib, 1996), 
although this positive relationship does not always hold true. For instance, Klepper (1996), 
Lynskey (2004) and Murro (2013) found no relationship between the two. Similarly, as 
new firms have more technological opportunities, they have greater competitive advantage 
than older firms in innovative markets (Duqi and Torluccio, 2010), which facilitates 
investment in R&D (Abdelmoula and Etienne, 2009). This indicates that newer firms may 
also influence R&D investment, although, in a recent study, Coad et al. (2016) found that 
investment in R&D is riskier for new firms than older firms. Thus, the empirical evidence 
shows mixed results regarding the relationship between firm age and R&D investment. 
3.5.2 Firm size 
According to Schumpeter’s (1942) hypothesis, larger firms make greater investments in 
R&D. They tend to be more diversified, more technologically complex and better aware of 
technological opportunities (Lall, 1983). They also have more resources to invest in R&D 
activities (Duqi and Torluccio, 2010) and the ability to benefit from returns on their 
innovative activities (Pamukcu and Utku-Ismihan, 2009).However, large size does not 
always predict firm innovation because large firms may gain no advantage from R&D 
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expenditure owing to communication difficulties, and may have insufficient motivation 
mechanisms to encourage R&D employees (Howe and McFetridge, 1976; Scherer, 1980; 
Bhattacharya and Bloch, 2004). Moreover, Kriaa and Karray (2010) have claimed that 
smaller size may have positive effects on R&D activities due to better networks of 
communication, co-ordination and informal controls. In contrast, Hertog and Thurik (1993) 
found that firm size has no significance in explaining R&D investment. Thus, Cohen et al. 
(1987) observed that it is not size that influences R&D investment, but that the latter 
depends on unique conditions of technological opportunity and appropriability. Although 
there is no consensus in the empirical results concerning the relationship between firm size 
and R&D investment, it is expected that, during critical moments such as a financial crisis, 
firm resources may play an important role. 
3.5.3 Exports 
Most of the existing literature (Braga and Willmore 1991; Ito and Pucik, 1993; Kumar and 
Saqib, 1996; Tan and Hwang, 2002; Galende and Fluente, 2003; Zemplinerova and 
Hromadkova, 2012) has shown a significant positive relationship between export 
orientation and R&D investment. Export-oriented firms will be more aware of new 
technological developments (Pamukcu and Utku-Ismihan, 2009) and strive harder to 
maintain the competitiveness of their technologies (Lall, 1983) so that they can compete 
more effectively in international markets, thereby increasing their level of R&D 
investment. Moreover, since export markets usually consist of several segmented sub-
markets, and each sub-market varies in terms of consumer preferences, entry barriers and 
elasticity, the likelihood that R&D will increase demand in some of these markets may be 
higher than in the domestic market (Parameswaran, 2010). Thus, exports allow firms to 
produce on a large scale and thereby exploit increasing economies of scale, made possible 
by fixed investments such as R&D. However, large-scale production by export-oriented 
firms does not ensure a high level of R&D expenditure because exports generally involve 
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highly standard, non-innovative products (Abdelmoula and Etienne, 2009). Thus, the more 
the firm exports, the smaller is its probability of investing in R&D.As most empirical 
studies have shown a positive influence of export orientation on R&D investment, it is 
assumed that, due to the high export orientation of emerging market firms, there is a 
positive relationship between them. 
3.5.4 Import of technology 
The international technology transfer hypothesis explains that benefits from foreign R&D 
activities may be transmitted through trade and may affect domestic R&D investment 
decisions. R&D is subsequently required because imported technologies are often not 
entirely appropriate, for example to domestic consumers’ tastes, market size and factor 
prices (Katrak, 1985), so they require adaptations and modifications to suit local 
conditions, raw materials and patterns of use (Parameswaran, 2008). Moreover, emerging 
market firms may not receive efficient support for innovation from domestic institutions 
(Peng, 2003; Hsu et al., 2015). Thus, it may be more feasible to import technology rather 
than engaging in in-house R&D activity (Parameswaran, 2008). However, easy 
importation of technology may increase the propensity for imitation rather than innovation 
and therefore, according to Pillai (1979), technology importation may reduce R&D 
investment because it discourages firms from innovating. Although it is believed that 
emerging market firms may improve production inputs and outputs through the 
importation of technology from advanced countries, empirical results have not reached a 
consensus concerning the relationship between firms’ importation of technology and their 
R&D investment. Thus, it would be interesting to observe this relationship based on 
emerging markets. 
3.5.5 Diversification 
The endogenous growth model (Romer, 1990) emphasises new products and product 
diversification for long-term growth. A more diversified firm will be better able to exploit 
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unexpected research outputs than those with narrower operations (Grabowski, 1968). In a 
diversified firm, R&D divisions may share their technological innovations, taking 
advantage of economies of scale in innovation efforts (Teece, 1980). Thus, it is expected 
that a higher degree of diversification will impact positively on a firm’s profit expectations 
from R&D investment (Nelson, 1959, cited in Grabowski, 1968). Consistent with this, 
empirical studies such as those by Grabowski (1968), Chen (1996), Galende and Fluente 
(2003) and Chiang and Mensha (2004) have shown a positive influence of diversification 
on R&D investment. However, once a firm patents its diversification, this may discourage 
further innovation. Mukherjee (2005) assumed that greater product differentiation, which 
may occur for reasons other than product characteristics, such as brand name or after-sales 
service, increases the possibility of lower R&D under product patents. In addition, 
Hoskisson et al. (1993) noted that ROI-based compensation for divisional managers in a 
diversified firm is likely to result in myopic behaviour, leading them to sacrifice longer-
term investments such as innovative activities. These inconclusive results need to be 
resolved through empirical work in emerging markets. 
3.5.6 Sales growth 
Demand-pull theory indicates that the greater the market demand, the greater the 
percentage of expenditure will be allocated to R&D. A high sales growth rate indicates a 
firm’s potential to increase its R&D investment: “The faster a firm’s sales are increasing, 
the more confidence it will have about its ability to secure the benefits from uncertain 
R&D projects, and the more patience it can afford to show in waiting for these benefits” 
(Mueller, 1967). Similarly to Manganelli’s (2010) results, Morbey (1988) found that firms 
that invest a larger percentage of sales in R&D benefit from a greater growth rate than their 
competitors, irrespective of their industrial classification. These findings suggest that major 
established firms that invest at least four per cent of sales growth in R&D show significant 
sales growth, that investing three per cent or more of sales in R&D produces an 80 percent 
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chance of long-term growth at a rate of no less than half the rate of increase in GNP, and 
that investing less than two per cent of sales in R&D leads to growth at a rate equal to or 
better than GNP. Firms with R&D investment at this low level tend to be sales laggards. 
Morbey (1988) suggested that investing three per cent or more of sales in R&D ensures 
reasonable long-term growth, and that firms investing at lower levels are probably only 
supporting their current business. Moreover, Leonard (1971), Howe and McFetridge 
(1976), Lynskey (2004), Cheng and Chen (2006) and Manganelli (2010) have reported a 
positive influence of sales on R&D investment. Thus, in terms of the effect of sales alone, 
the relationship has been shown to be fairly straightforward. 
3.5.7 Profitability 
According to the acceleration principle of investment, growing GDP influences business in 
general to increase profits, leading to an increase in R&D investment by generating sales 
and cash flow. Growth in profits through realisation of greater earnings means that a firm 
is lucrative and successful, encouraging executives who expect higher profits from R&D 
investments to decide to invest more in R&D activities (Lee and Hwang, 2003). Moreover, 
firms may seek to avoid taking out loans, and thus those with higher profits will be more 
inclined to invest in R&D (Pamukcu and Utku-Ismihan, 2009). However, Kalayci (2013) 
has claimed that a single year’s profit is a very poor indicator of financial investment in 
R&D because R&D investment is long-term and requires vast sources of funds. Sometimes 
declines in profit may encourage firms to invest in innovation to maintain market 
competitiveness or to retain their market share by doing something new. Moreover, 
declining profits signal a firm’s decline, leading management rapidly to increase R&D in 
an attempt to ensure the firm’s long-term viability. Thus, declining profitability may lead 
to increased R&D investment, and empirical studies such as those by Hundley et al. 
(1996), Kumar and Aggarwal (2005), Liu (2011) and Kalayci (2013) have found a negative 
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relationship between the two. These inconclusive results need to be resolved by empirical 
work on emerging markets. 
3.5.8 Cash flow 
According to Myers’ (1984) pecking order theory, R&D projects are financed in a 
particular order, turning first to internal funds (measured by cash flow) and then to external 
finance. Schumpeter’s (1942) hypothesis also emphasised that it is preferable to finance 
investments such as in R&D internally due to agency problems and the discretion required 
(Martinsson, 2009). In addition, internal funds theory argues that the financial status of a 
firm determines its level of investment. Internal funds for R&D investment can be raised 
more easily than external funding (Lee and Hwang, 2003). Other things being equal, the 
greater the internal cash flow, the lower the weighted average cost of capital to the firm. 
Similarly, the lower the cost of capital, the greater the value of all assets, including 
intangible R&D assets, that will be acquired by the firm (Howe and McFetridge, 1976).In 
this regard, Bhagat and Welch (1995) pointed out that R&D occurs most frequently when 
firms have greater operating cash flows and are thus able to avoid the costs of external 
capital markets. Similarly, during a period of financial constraint such as a financial crisis, 
when firms are confronted with a decline in productivity growth and reduced cash flow, 
the pool of funds available for R&D investment is reduced (Rafferty and Funk, 2005). As a 
result, Giacotto et al. (2005) found a significant positive influence of cash flow on R&D 
investment. However, firms from advanced countries with bank-based financial systems, 
where external funding can easily be raised, and large and well-established firms such as 
MNEs, which also have easy access to external funding, the relationship between cash 
flow and R&D investment may be different. Bhagat and Welch (1995) found no 
relationship between cash flow and R&D investment for Japanese, European and UK 
firms. As the relationship between cash flow and R&D investment is not straightforward, it 
needs to be determined by empirical work in emerging markets. 
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3.5.9 Debt 
Transaction cost theory and the positive theory of agency argue that debt financing may 
discourage R&D investment. In this regard, Long and Ravenscraft (1993) stated that most 
theories predict a negative association between debt and R&D investment. Debt finance 
may be expensive for R&D projects due to risk and uncertainty. With higher risk and 
uncertainty and constrained resources, firms with greater debt-equity ratios will spend 
relatively less on R&D. Firms without financial slack will not have the resources to 
develop new technologies or innovative applications, or to adapt existing technologies to 
new products (Cumming and Macintosh, 2000). Therefore, empirical studies such as those 
by Hall (1990), Cumming and Macintosh (2000) and Cheng and Chen (2006) have 
documented a significant negative influence of debt on R&D investment. However, 
Galende and Fuente (2003) have argued that debt finance in a company has an impact in 
the sense that more incremental than radical innovations are generated. They found a 
positive impact of debt finance on R&D investment. On the other hand, Bhagat and 
Welch’s (1995) study produced mixed results. They observed a negative relationship 
between the debt ratio and R&D investment of US firms and a positive relationship for 
Japanese firms, with no significant relationship for Canadian, British and European 
(German, French and Dutch) firms. They surmised either that US firms have more need to 
safeguard their R&D expenditure from possible financial distress without assuming large 
amounts of debt, or that US lenders are less willing to finance R&D projects, while, in 
contrast to the US tax code, the Japanese tax code manages to encourage R&D. Thus, the 
existing literature has shown that the relationship between debt and R&D spending is 
inconclusive. 
3.5.10 Ownership concentration 
Francis and Smith (1995) suggested a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and R&D investment. They found that the lower the ownership 
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concentration, the lower the R&D investment, and argued that ownership concentration 
effectively alleviates the agency and contracting costs associated with innovation. In a 
related study, Stein (1989) stated that the problem of a lack of R&D investment can be 
reduced through appropriate ownership concentration, and a long-term horizon has a 
positive impact on R&D investment. Baysinger et al. (1991) found that equity 
concentrations among institutional investors have positive effects on corporate R&D 
strategy, and Lee’s (2012) study produced similar results. On the other hand, Morck et al. 
(2000) reported that concentrated ownership has a negative effect on R&D intensity. They 
suggested that concentrated ownership may result in little net advantage from R&D 
expenditure as the owners control multiple firms. Thus, the results in the existing literature 
are inconclusive. In this regard, Lee (2012) observed that the results may vary due to the 
risk attitudes and time horizons of large shareholders. Therefore, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988) emphasised that a certain degree of concentration may impact favourably on 
innovation activities. 
3.5.11 Foreign ownership 
Empirical research has produced mixed results regarding the relationship between foreign 
ownership and R&D investment. Foreign ownership may induce a firm to undertake R&D 
if knowledge from the parent needs to be adapted to local conditions or if specific projects 
require collaboration with the foreign owner (UNCTAD, 2003). However, Pamukcu and 
Utku-Ismihan (2009) have claimed that large MNEs usually undertake innovative activities 
at their home base; only rarely do they engage in innovative activities in the host country. 
Studies by Veugelers and Houte (1990), Un and Cazurra (2008), Zemplinerova and 
Hromadkova (2012) and Kalayci (2013) have also found that foreign-owned firms rely on 
knowledge generated by their parent firms, and thus carry out little R&D in the host 
country, resulting in a significantly depressing effect of foreign ownership on R&D 
investment. Since the recent financial crisis adversely affected most developed countries 
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(Velde, 2008), it decreased the attractiveness of investment in developed countries due to 
probable losses from such investments. Thus, foreign investors may have shifted more of 
their investments to emerging markets to earn greater profits. Moreover, foreign investors 
may be willing to take the opportunity of short-term gains such as dividends over long-
term gains through R&D investments in emerging markets. As a result, firms in emerging 
markets have sufficient resources to invest in R&D even during an economic slowdown. In 
addition, low-cost innovation in emerging markets may attract foreign investment. Thus, 
further research is required to examine the association between foreign ownership and 
R&D in emerging markets. 
3.5.12 Institutional ownership 
Graves (1988) examined the relationship between institutional ownership and R&D 
spending and found a significant negative association between them. He stated that 
institutional owners are reluctant to invest in R&D because their emphasis is on short-term 
results as opposed to more profitable long-term investments in R&D. Graves (1990) later 
studied the same topic from a multi-industry perspective, assuming that institutional 
ownership has a limited effect on R&D expenditure and the effect varies by firms. His 
findings revealed that aerospace, drug and pharmaceutical industries show a positive 
relationship, chemical and computer industries show an insignificant positive relationship, 
and soap and detergent industries show an insignificant negative relationship with 
institutional ownership. However, Hansen and Hill (1991) observed that, after controlling 
for intervening effects, a higher level of institutional ownership is associated with greater 
R&D expenditure. They explained that this positive relationship arises because 
institutional owners’ decisions are long-term oriented and they are effectively locked into 
their stockholdings. As the existing literature has shown inconclusive results, there is a 
need to examine the role of institutional ownership in R&D in emerging markets. 
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3.5.13 Human capital 
According to human capital theory, human capital is the stock of knowledge, skills and 
competencies, which are the main drivers of R&D activity. Owing to their scientific nature, 
formal R&D activities are human-capital intensive (Bebczuk, 2002). Human capital injects 
higher skills and knowledge into an organisation, which is positive for the realisation of 
R&D activities (Kriaa and Karray, 2010). As firms grow larger and chains of command 
become increasingly stretched, the presence of talented individuals who can effectively 
communicate ideas and results may make the difference between a company’s R&D 
performance and that of its opposition (Liu, 2011). Similarly, the innovativeness of a 
company may attract creative employees, and help to increase productivity and reduce staff 
turnover (Kyrgidou and Spyropoulou, 2013). Therefore, it is assumed that human capital 
positively impacts on R&D investment. Empirical studies such as those by Tan and Hwang 
(2002), Galende and Fuente (2003), Cheng and Chen (2006), Mishra (2007) and Kriaa and 
Karray (2010) have also documented a positive relationship between human capital and 
R&D investment. However, in order to handle risky and uncertain investments such as 
R&D, firms need skilled employees. Kriaa and Karray (2010) have argued that innovating 
firms have lower rates of skilled employees in R&D. As a result, Negassi (2004) and Kriaa 
and Karray (2010) found no relationship between human capital and R&D investment. 
Thus, the existing literature has been inconclusive in defining the relationship between 
human capital and R&D investment. 
3.5.14 Wages 
In general, owing to the unavailability of educational background data, wages are used to 
measure the skills and capacity of employees in a firm. Lall (1983) argued that greater 
skills enhance the absorptive capacity of R&D. However, Tan and Hwang (2002) pointed 
out that absorptive capacity may rest mainly in the most skilled employees, rather than in 
the general workforce. Dijk et al. (1997) stated that higher wages result in more skilled 
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employees. Their results show that higher wages are significantly related to R&D spending 
for small firms, but are insignificant for large firms. Owing to increased competition, firms 
in advanced countries and MNEs offer higher wages for skilled employees, who may take 
advantage of such opportunities. As a result, firms in emerging markets may suffer from a 
lack of skilled employees for innovation. Lall’s (1983) study, based on the emerging 
market of India, found a negative relationship between wages and R&D investment, while 
and Tan and Hwang’s (2002) study, based on the Taiwanese electric industry, found no 
relationship between the two. Thus, the existing literature has been inconclusive regarding 
the relationship between wages and R&D spending. 
3.5.15 Patents 
Invention motivation theory explains that anticipation of patents provides motivation for 
useful inventions. Moreover, according to the theory of inducing commercialisation, 
patents on inventions attract the investment required to develop and commercialise those 
inventions. Patents allow the innovator to produce a particular product and ensure 
monopoly power over the market, thus increasing its profits and creating additional 
incentives for investment in R&D (Mukherjee, 2005). Wang (2010) argued that the 
strength of patents increases the market share of the owners of new goods (or processes) 
and prohibits the entrance of imitators; hence, producers invest in R&D in order to cover a 
larger market. Thus, the greater a firm’s belief that it will obtain a patent protecting the 
results of its R&D investment, the more the firm will be willing to spend on R&D 
(Cumming and Macintosh, 2000). As a result, Grabowski (1968) found a significant 
positive influence of patents on R&D investment, and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and 
Klemperer (1990) reached the same conclusion, although the relationship between patents 
and R&D may change where patent protection is less strong. Allred and Park (2007), for 
instance, found no significant impact of patent strength on R&D in emerging economies. 
Moreover, the cost of patents may play a role in this relationship. Almedia and Teixiera 
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(2007) have argued that making patents easier to obtain may actually cause a decline in 
R&D expenditure. In this sense, raising patent costs and standards may stimulate R&D. 
Therefore, this inconclusive relationship requires further examination based on emerging 
markets. 
3.5.16 Dividends 
In imperfect markets such as emerging markets, the relationship between financial policy 
and R&D is measured through dividend policies (Gaffard and Salies, 2010). The funds 
flow identity framework considers dividend payments as one element in a global system of 
interacting financial decisions made by firms. Dividend payments represent the future 
growth of firms, signalling future increases in profitability to investors (Hughes, 2008). 
Tax relief on dividends encourages the payment of high dividends, which discourages 
R&D investment, regardless of the tax regime (Thomas et al., 2003), since it may restrict 
internal cash flows for R&D investment. Under a residual dividend policy, investment 
policy is considered to be the only determinant of firm value. In this case, companies 
decide first on the optimal investments necessary to grow and to maximise shareholder 
wealth; then, depending on the availability of funds, they set the level of dividends (Lasfer, 
2002). Under an independent dividend policy framework, dividends are the prime 
consideration and investments in R&D are adjusted accordingly. Moreover, dividend cuts 
may help finance R&D investments if firms are reluctant to issue risky securities because 
of information asymmetry or high transaction costs. As a result, there is a negative 
relationship between dividends and R&D investment (Lee and Hwang, 2003). Thus, the 
relationship between dividends and R&D spending is straightforward in the existing 
literature. 
Similarly to firm-level factors, R&D investment is also influenced by the macroeconomic 
conditions of a country, including GDP growth, exports, FDI, patents, trade openness, 
interest rates, tax credits and government subsidies. The next section will discuss the 
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relationship between macroeconomic conditions and R&D investment in emerging 
markets. 
3.6 Macroeconomic determinants of R&D expenditure 
A growing body of literature has examined the macroeconomic determinants of R&D 
expenditure (Becker and Pain, 2008; Wang, 2010; Sameti et al., 2010; Guloglu et al., 
2012). The existing literature has considered factors such as GDP growth, patents, exports, 
FDI and trade openness as the main determinants of a country’s R&D investment. 
3.6.1 GDP growth 
Baumol and Wolff (1983) investigated the relationship between the rate of productivity 
growth and the level of R&D investment. They stated that productivity growth may affect 
R&D in two ways: first, productivity affects the quantity of resources available for 
investment in general and R&D investment in particular; second, it affects the output price, 
and hence the cost of R&D relative to output price. Similarly, based on a study of 30 
OECD countries for the period 1996-2008, Sameti et al. (2010) documented that GDP 
growth has a positive impact on R&D investment. They found that a 10 per cent increase 
in GDP growth results in a 1.1 per cent increase in R&D intensity. However, from a study 
of 26 OECD countries using extreme-bounds analysis (EBA) for the period 1996-2006, 
Wang (2010) found that GDP growth is a fragile determinant of R&D investment. The 
reason for this is that the R&D investment targets of OECD countries are set by 
governments or other international organisations, and are not determined by GDP growth. 
This study took no account of the emerging market context. As emerging markets are 
growing faster than developed and OECD countries, it is expected that growth will 
contribute to their innovative activities. While economic growth has an impact on R&D 
investment, the existing literature has also shown the opposite effect. 
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Silaghi et al. (2014) used a dynamic panel data model of generalised method of moments 
(GMM) estimation for the period 1998-2008 to examine the impact of R&D on economic 
growth. They found that a one per cent increase in business R&D investment boosted 
economic growth in ten Central and Eastern European countries by 0.050 per cent over the 
short run and by 0.213 per cent over the long run. In contrast, Akinwale et al. (2012) 
investigated the impact of R&D and innovation on economic growth based on the 
emerging market of Nigeria using a least squares method for the period 1977-2007. They 
documented that gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) has a significant negative impact on 
economic growth, and argued that weak institutions, high corruption, low interaction 
between academics and industry and uncorrelated industrial clusters, among other factors, 
are reasons for this relationship. In this regard, Pessoa (2010), following Jones and 
Williams (1998), suggested that the precise relationship between R&D and economic 
growth differs from country to country, and that country-specific factors, rather than 
innovation policy alone, are crucial to the link between R&D and economic growth. 
3.6.2 Exports 
Existing research has found an inconclusive relationship between exports and R&D 
investment. Guloglu et al.’s (2012) study, based on G7 countries, showed that high-
technology exports enhance technological change. Similarly, Bratti and Felice (2012) used 
an IV approach based on Italian manufacturing firms to investigate the effect of a firm’s 
export status on the likelihood of it introducing product innovations. They found a 
significant correlation between the two, derived from learning from their export strategy. 
In contrast, Damijan et al. (2010) separated their sample into process and product 
innovation-driven firms, and documented that export status has an impact on the former, 
but not on the latter. Lin and Tang (2013) found that exporting firms increase their R&D 
intensity by more than five per cent, raise their R&D investment by more than 33 per cent, 
and are four per cent more likely to engage in R&D activity than non-exporting firms in 
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China. They also documented that exporting has a smaller impact on innovation in firms 
that export processed goods, specifically those in the electronics sector, located in coastal 
provinces and foreign-owned. Similarly, Kumar and Saqib (1996) reported from a study of 
Indian manufacturing firms that export orientation influences R&D investment. However, 
due to variations in the industry, export performance may contribute differently to R&D. 
For example, in research also on India but using a sample of 100 engineering firms in 
1978, Lall (1983) found that exports are negatively related to R&D investment. He argued 
that greater international orientation seems to produce lower technology effort in the 
sample firms. 
3.6.3 Trade openness 
Varsakelis (2001) found no relationship between trade openness, indicated by the black-
market premium, and R&D investment intensity in 50 countries. Cross-industry analysis 
may be a cause of this result. Similarly, based on 88 countries for the period 1980-1990, 
Bebczuk (2002) found that trade openness has a negative impact on R&D investment, but 
this effect is mitigated as per capita GDP and trade with OECD countries increase. 
International trade in technology-intensive goods reduces duplications in R&D efforts, and 
cross-border technology inflows act as a substitute for domestic R&D. Meanwhile, Wu et 
al.’s (2007) study, based on nine OECD countries for the period 1985-1995, documented 
modest empirical support for a positive impact of trade openness on business R&D 
investment. Trade openness works as a channel of knowledge and rent spill-over, as well 
as an extension of the market; thus, it matters for private R&D investment. They found that 
a 10 per cent increase in trade openness results in an approximately seven per cent increase 
in business R&D investment. Rather than studying business R&D, Hammadou’s (2014) 
study revealed that trade openness also affects public R&D, based on 14 European 
countries between 1994 and 2006. Similarly, Yang and Lin’s (2012) research, based on 
Chinese provincial-level panel data over the period 1997-2007, found that trade openness, 
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in terms of FDI and high-technology exports, has a positive impact on regional innovation 
due to the effect of knowledge spill-overs. This inconclusive relationship between R&D 
and trade openness requires further examination based on emerging markets. 
3.6.4 Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
The existing literature has shown a relationship between FDI and R&D investment. FDI 
may impact on innovation by developing manufacturing capability, increasing competition 
and improving firm performance (Bertschek, 1995; Hsu and Chen, 2009). In an empirical 
study based on G7 countries, Guloglu et al. (2012) documented that FDI inflows are a 
determinant of innovation. However, the effect of FDI on innovation has changed over 
time in emerging markets. Kathuria’s (2008) study of Indian small and medium-sized high-
tech firms, using Probit and Tobit models, analysed the impact of FDI inflows on R&D 
investment in the country’s post-reform period. He found that, in the initial period after 
1991, increased FDI inflows had a negative impact on domestic R&D, whereas in the later 
period, the impact was not significant, indicating that firms’ expectations changed as a 
result of the reforms. At the beginning, the reforms may have caught firms off guard, 
thereby affecting their R&D investment. The second round of reforms, which started 
around 1997, increased the pace and scope of inward investment. In a later paper, 
Sasidharan and Kathuria (2011) examined FDI and R&D investment by 1,843 Indian 
manufacturing firms after the reform using a Heckman two-step procedure, and found, 
when their sample was separated on the basis of equity ownership, that FDI and R&D 
complement each other. Using Tobit IV and the linear GMM method based on Chinese 
enterprises for the period 1999-2005,Girma et al. (2008) found that sectoral-level inward 
FDI is positively related to domestic innovative activity only among firms that engage in 
their own R&D activities (that is, have some absorptive capacity) or have good access to 
domestic finance. Similar results were obtained by Bertschek (1995). Thus, from the 
existing literature, it can be assumed that FDI has an impact on R&D. 
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3.6.5 Patents 
The relationship between patents and R&D is bidirectional. Countries with a strong patent 
framework invest more in R&D (Varsakelis, 2001). Thus, according to the OECD (1997), 
patents have traditionally been considered as one of the main incentives for R&D. 
However, Wang (2012), following Encaoua and Guellec (2006), has reported that patent 
protection does not appear to be an effective way to promote R&D because patenting may 
stem the free flow of knowledge across firms’ boundaries (Bhaskarabhatla and Hegde, 
2014). Nevertheless, in an empirical study, Allred and Park (2007a) found a positive 
impact of patents on innovation, and suggested that countries use patents to encourage, 
protect and reward innovation. However, the impact of patents on R&D is not 
straightforward, but may depend on countries’ levels of financial and legal development. In 
a later paper, Allred and Park (2007b) separated their sample into developed and 
developing countries. They documented that for developing countries, patent strength 
negatively affects domestic patent filings and insignificantly affects R&D and foreign 
filings, while for developed countries, patent strength positively affects domestic patent 
filings and R&D and negatively affects foreign patent filings. They argued that global 
patent protection standards may not be conducive to developing-country innovation 
systems based largely on incremental, adaptive and imitative research. Pazderka (1999) 
investigated the impact of intellectual property rights on Canadian pharmaceutical firms’ 
R&D investment after two legislative patent protection steps taken in 1987 and 1992. He 
found that, as a result of tightening patent protection, R&D investment increased after 
1987. 
On the other hand, the reverse causality of R&D investment to patents was confirmed by 
Baraldi et al. (2014), who applied a Granger causality test. Similarly, studies by Grilichies 
(1988) and Beneito (2006) have documented that R&D investment has an impact on 
patents. Generally, patents are considered as an output of R&D investment. As a result, the 
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greater the R&D activity in a country, the greater the number of patents. Although there is 
a direct relationship between R&D and patents, it takes time for R&D projects to succeed. 
Kondo’s (1999) study of Japanese industries over the period 1970-1980 found that R&D 
investment created patent applications with a time lag of about a year and a half, both 
directly and through technology stock. Prodan (2005), following Kondo (1999), tested 
whether the number of patent applications is dependent on R&D investment, based on 
OECD and Central European countries for the period 1981-2001. He showed that there is a 
strong positive correlation between R&D investment and a country’s number of patent 
applications, and that R&D investment creates patent applications with a time lag, but this 
varies from country to country. Based on a study of OECD countries using dynamic panel 
data, Kumazawa and Gomis-Porqueras (2012) found that domestic R&D per capita 
increases domestic patents per capita only for European Patent Convention (EPC) 
countries that have decentralised approaches to innovation. Thus, the existing literature has 
shown a bi-directional relationship between a country’s R&D investment and patent 
applications. 
3.6.7 Financial crisis 
Most of the empirical literature examining the effects of financial crisis on innovation has 
concluded that it has a negative effect on R&D expenditure. Consistent with cyclical 
theory, Correa and Lootty (2011) stated that this is firstly because R&D investment is 
financed from internal funds, which contract in a crisis, and secondly because of the credit 
constraints of funding authorities. However, Barlevy (2007) reported that even relatively 
financially-unconstrained firms reduced their R&D investment during the recent crisis, 
whereas firms with no credit constraints were less likely to abandon innovation projects 
(Paunov, 2012). Using the latest three waves of UK Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
panel data, Archibugi et al. (2013b) documented that fast-growing new firms and firms that 
were already highly innovative before the crisis also invested in innovation during the 
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crisis. Results from the OECD (2009, 2012) and Archibugi et al. (2013a) support the 
cyclical theoretical argument, finding that firms reduced their investment in innovation and 
R&D during the financial crisis. Similarly, Paunov (2012) found that, on average, one in 
four firms reduced their innovation projects during the financial crisis. Therefore, it is 
assumed that when emerging markets are affected by a financial crisis (Didier et al., 2011), 
they reduce their R&D activities. 
3.6.8 Market size 
Although much of the literature has shown a relationship between firm size and R&D 
investment, very few studies have examined market size and R&D investment. According 
to Acemoglu and Linn (2004), large market size has an impact on innovation. Their study, 
based on the US pharmaceutical industry, revealed that a one per cent increase in market 
size led to a four per cent increase in non-generic drugs and new molecular entities. Based 
on the same industry, Cerda’s (2007) study found that continuous increases in population 
and market size during the second half of the twentieth century played a fundamental role 
in explaining the large-scale creation of new drugs. Both studies found a significant impact 
of market size on new drug introduction. Using a GMM method for OECD and non-OECD 
countries, Ulku (2004) concluded that OECD countries with larger markets, including the 
G7, Australia, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland, are able to increase their innovation 
by investing in R&D. Thus, following Acemoglu and Linn (2004), he argued that market 
size is an important factor in the effectiveness of R&D. Desmet and Parente (2010) found a 
positive relationship between market size and R&D investment, following the proposition 
that larger markets increase competition and facilitate process innovation. Moreover, larger 
markets have larger populations and more trade openness, and support a wider variety of 
goods, resulting in a more crowded product space. 
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3.6.9 Interest rates 
Relatively little empirical literature to date has shown a relationship between interest rates 
and R&D expenditure. Becker and Pain (2008) tested the industry characteristics and 
macroeconomic factors that influence R&D expenditure, and found that real interest rates 
have a significant negative impact on the level of R&D expenditure. They documented 
that, with a rise of one percentage point in the real interest rate, it is possible to decrease 
R&D expenditure by 12.5 percent. They also discovered that the marginal effect of real 
interest on levels of R&D expenditure is between -0.12 and -0.13. They argued that the 
long payback period of some projects and the continuous rise in sterling since 1996 may 
have had a negative impact on levels of R&D expenditure. They also pointed out that a rise 
in interest rates may reduce outputs, raise external competition and put financial pressure 
on firms. They applied a panel data model to 11 broad manufacturing industry groups in 
the UK over the period 1993-2000. 
3.6.10 Market competition 
Market competition is important in explaining a country’s R&D spending and productivity 
(OECD, 2002b). In order to counter increased competition and defend market share, firms 
invest strategically in R&D (Becker and Pain, 2008). Moreover, fierce competition may 
increase R&D investment, particularly if the survival of a firm and its management are at 
risk (IMF, 2002). On the other hand, firms that already have market power are less able to 
extract benefit from R&D investment; therefore, greater competition reduces incentives for 
R&D activities (Becker and Pain, 2008). Similarly, greater competition may reduce R&D 
investment and firms’ ability to profit from innovation (IMF, 2002). Moreover, Ayyagari 
et al. (2011) observed that greater competition decreases a firm’s freedom to deviate from 
efficient R&D investment policies. As a result, empirical results for the relationship 
between competition and R&D investment have been inconclusive. Geroski (1990), 
Blundell et al. (1999) and Becker and Pain (2008) found a positive relationship between 
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market competition and R&D investment, while Spence (1984) and Vives (2004) found a 
negative relationship between the two. In contrast, more realistic results were obtained by 
Aghion et al. (2005), who found a U-shaped association between competition and R&D. 
Using unbalanced panel data based on the UK, they found that competition discourages 
laggard firms from R&D but encourages competitive firms to engage in R&D activities. 
The combined effects of competition and the equilibrium of industry structure generate an 
inverted-U. 
3.6.11 Government subsidies 
Government subsidies provide firms with absorptive capacity, which can be used to 
acquire external knowledge or to generate new products or processes, increasing the 
productivity of firms’ R&D (Kriaa and Karray, 2010). Thus, subsidies encourage R&D 
activities in firms. Empirical studies, such as those by Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002) 
and Lin and Lin (2012), have also found a positive association between government 
subsidies and R&D investment. Becker and Pain (2008) observed that a one per cent 
increase in government subsidies is associated with an increase of 1.8 per cent in R&D 
spending. The main idea behind firm-level R&D subsidies is that social returns on R&D 
due to positive spill-over effects are higher than private returns, and thus governmental 
support for business R&D is justified (Arrow, 1962). Government subsidies for innovation 
are especially necessary during a period of financial crisis in order to maintain national 
innovation capability and employment levels (Hud and Hussinger, 2015). Moreover, 
subsidies may help recovery from a recession by fostering innovation, leading to national 
growth (Hud and Hussinger, 2015). However, Mamuneas and Nadiri (1996) claimed that, 
owing to a crowding out effect, higher levels of government subsidies may sometimes 
reduce private R&D. Lee and Hwang (2003) added that there may be a negative effect, 
since the moral hazard and burden of a result-sharing agreement as a result of a subsidy 
may result in disincentives to conduct R&D activities. However, evidence for this has 
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varied (Lach, 2002). For example, according to Guellec and Potterie (1997), subsidies have 
long-term effects on R&D investment. Thus, the existing literature has shown an 
ambiguous relationship between government subsidies and R&D investment. 
3.6.12 Tax credits 
Countries generally have tax relief rules to encourage R&D investment. Bloom et al. 
(2002) noted that tax credits vary across types of asset, country and time. Germany and the 
UK do not give any substantial, generally-available tax incentives for R&D. Japan is in an 
intermediate position. France gives more generous tax credits, but also caps the total 
amount of credit that can be claimed. However, Bloom et al.’s (2002) study showed a 
positive relationship between tax credit and R&D investment. R&D-related tax subsidies 
increase with a firm’s marginal tax rate, helping the development of new production 
processes and, to some extent, the development of new products; thus, there is a positive 
relationship between tax credits and R&D investment (Cappelen et al., 2012). However, 
according to Guellec and Potterie (1997), tax credits have only short-term effects on R&D 
investment. Higher future corporate tax rates (compared with current tax rates) may 
provide a disincentive to invest (Bhagat and Welch, 1995). Castellacci and Lie (2015) 
added that sector affects the influence of tax credits on R&D spending. They found that tax 
credits have, on average, a stronger impact on R&D spending for SMEs and firms in 
service and low-tech sectors with an increment scheme. Therefore, this inconclusive 
relationship between tax credits and R&D requires observation in the emerging market 
context. 
In addition to the above factors, other factors that impact on country-level R&D investment 
include the proportion of scientific researchers (Wang, 2010), import volumes (Potterie 
and Lichtenberg, 2001), real exchange rates (Becker and Pain, 2008) and national culture 
(Varsakelis, 2001). Although these economic factors impact on R&D investment, 
institutional factors also play an important role in a country’s R&D investment. 
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3.7 Institutional determinants of R&D investment 
The institutional environment may stimulate R&D activity by providing resources beyond 
the capacity of an individual firm (Wu et al., 2016). For example, a weak institutional 
environment signals low investor confidence and indicates an investment risk. In such an 
environment, managers are likely to undertake only riskier projects with high expected 
future profits (Cherchye and Verriest, 2016). Thus, Srholec (2011) stated that attributes of 
firms as well as the framework conditions within which they operate have an effect on 
innovation. Legal, political and social factors in the institutional environment function as a 
base or framework for investment. 
3.7.1 Political system 
According to political theory, the political environment has a significant influence on a 
country’s investment. Wan and Hoskisson (2003) stated that the political system is a 
foundation for business transactions. One important reason is that FDI depends heavily on 
the political situation of a country. Thus, Henisz (2002) observed that a favourable political 
environment is crucial to financial and technical progress and conducive to infrastructural 
development, particularly in R&D activities. In connection with this, Varsakelis (2006) 
examined the impact of political institutions on national innovation systems in 29 countries 
for the period 1995-2000. His random-effect panel data model showed that improving civil 
and political rights results in more productive national innovation systems. Similarly, 
Allard et al. (2012) concluded that political instability impacts negatively on a country’s 
innovation systems. They argued that political instability creates a barrier to firm-level 
R&D spending and reduces the quality of scientific institutions. They applied seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) to data from 107 countries, including both developing and 
developed nations, over the period 2000-2005. The relationship between the political 
environment and R&D appears straightforward, but there is little evidence from an 
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emerging-market perspective, where political systems are weaker than those of developed 
countries. 
3.7.2 Legal system 
Rule of law measures the judicial strength of a country (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). A 
sound legal environment ensures the likelihood of safe investments. Pindado et al. (2015) 
pointed out that strong legal systems ensure greater investor protection, and that the more 
effective is investor protection, the higher the market valuation of R&D. They argued that 
the characteristics and enforcement of laws play important roles in decisions to undertake 
R&D projects. Moreover, La Porta et al. (1997) found that strong legal systems help firms 
to access external finance to support strategic investments such as R&D. Greif (1993) and 
Wan and Hoskisson (2003) stated that a favourable legal environment helps firms to 
engage in complex transactions with anonymous parties, which facilitates productivity. 
Thus, Hiller et al. (2011) reported that effective legal protection facilitates R&D 
investment. On the other hand, a weak legal environment may increase investment risk. 
Hiller et al. (2011) separated their sample between countries with common law and those 
with civil law and found that R&D in common-law countries is less sensitive to cash flow 
fluctuations than in civil-law countries because the legal systems of the former mitigate 
asymmetric information more effectively. Similarly, in a recent analysis, Anderlini et al. 
(2013) compared rigid and flexible legal systems in their ability to keep pace with 
technological development. They found that rigid legal systems are preferable, in terms of 
welfare and rate of output growth, at the early stage of innovation. Although the overall 
legal system has an impact on R&D investment, it may vary according to common or civil 
law, or a rigid or flexible legal system. 
3.7.3 Education system 
Varsakelis (2006) examined the impact of education system quality on innovation 
productivity based on panel data for 29 countries and found that the quality and orientation 
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of a country’s education system impacts on innovative productivity. He argued that 
education systems create a pool of high-quality human resources, as well as high-quality 
demand for outputs of the innovation process. Moreover, a good education system makes 
society aware of new technologies to improve growth opportunities. A similar argument 
has been made by Baptista et al. (2011), who have argued that the presence of higher 
education institutions is highly related to the number of technological entrepreneurs. Using 
a policy evaluation methodology and panel data for the period 1992-2002, they found that 
the establishment of higher education institutions has a positive and significant impact on 
subsequent levels of knowledge-based firms in municipalities, but is negatively related to 
other sectors such as low-tech manufacturing. Studies by Furman et al. (2002) and 
Lundvall et al. (2002) have also reached the conclusion that there is a positive correlation 
between education and innovation. This relationship needs to be checked in the emerging 
market context. 
3.7.4 Financial system 
Tylecote (2007) argued that availability of finance impacts on firms’ activities, and 
financial systems are central actors in national systems of innovation. However, 
availability of finance depends mainly on financial institutions that have authority to make 
decisions regarding which firms should be given resources to innovate (Schumpeter, 
1996). Thus, Beck and Levine (2002) observed that greater availability of finance is 
correlated with the financial development of a country. Consistent with this, Pindado et al. 
(2015) suggested that better financial institutions mitigate market imperfections, and 
consequently reduce financing costs, thus facilitating innovation. Using a GMM estimation 
of panel data for Europe, the US and Japan over the period 1986-2003, they found that 
more highly financially-developed countries impact positively on R&D investment than 
less financially-developed countries. Using the same methodology for 32 developed and 
emerging markets, Hsu et al. (2014) have reported that equity market development is 
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positively related to innovation, while credit market development discourages innovation. 
The relationship between bank-based and market-based systems and innovation in 
emerging markets requires further investigation. 
3.7.5 Corruption 
Corruption increases the cost of investment, because investors must pay bribes to officials 
to obtain permits and licences (Daude and Stein, 2007). Thus, corruption has adverse 
effects on investment and growth (Bardhan, 1997). On the other hand, controlling 
corruption may impact positively on innovation. Veracierto (2008) documented that 
detecting corruption or making small reductions in corruption by introducing penalties may 
result in large increases in R&D investment. Using panel data for 64 countries, Anokhin 
and Schulze (2009) obtained similar results. Mauro (1995) found that, for one standard 
deviation increase in control of corruption, there is a probability that investment will 
increase by 2.9 percent of GDP. This means that controlling corruption enables firms to 
increase their R&D investment. However, taking a slightly different focus, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) suggested that corrupt firms use high technologies, even though they are not 
essential. This implies that R&D activities seem large only due to the presence of 
corruption (Mahagaonkar, 2009). Although the existing literature has shown an 
inconclusive relationship between corruption and R&D investment, as emerging market 
firms suffer from this problem, it is expected that there is a negative relationship between 
them. 
3.7.6 Government effectiveness 
Government effectiveness and quality of regulation are an essential part of a strong 
institutional environment (Williams and Martinez, 2012). High government effectiveness 
reduces the likelihood of uncertainty of return from risky investments such as R&D. 
Moreover, fiscal policies set out by the government provide internal incentives to the firm 
and promote entrepreneurial activities (Jiao et al., 2015). In addition, Mahmood and Rufin 
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(2005) have stated that an active role played by government accelerates technological 
innovation as a result of spill-overs creating networks between firms and individuals. 
Williams and Martinez (2012) added that government effectiveness affects firms’ 
international strategies positively. Therefore, it is assumed that a more effective 
government will result in more innovative activities, more international trade and growth. 
Varsakelis (2006) suggested that effective governance may improve a country’s R&D 
productivity, leading to improved growth prospects. He also found that innovative 
activities increase with the level of government efficiency. Jiao et al. (2015) also 
concluded that government effectiveness impacts positively on R&D investment in an 
emerging market. Therefore, this hypothesis needs to be examined with respect to other 
emerging markets. 
3.7.7 Regulatory quality 
Regulatory quality is considered to be another important institutional component. Djankov 
et al. (2002) suggested that strict entry regulations are detrimental to firm performance. In 
a later paper (Djankov et al., 2006), they found that good and efficient business regulations 
promote growth. In addition, Jalilian et al.’s (2007) study, based on data from 117 
countries, suggested a strong causality between regulatory quality and economic 
performance. This implies that regulatory quality is important for growth and performance. 
Mahendra et al. (2015) examined the impact of the quality of local regulation on 
innovation and found that regulatory quality and access to finance impact positively on 
innovation. They also reported that regulatory quality varies across different sizes of firm, 
and that it is more relevant to large firms. Blind (2013) reported from a study of 21 OECD 
countries that social, economic and institutional regulations have different impacts on 
innovation. This relationship may vary in emerging markets, due to variation in regulatory 
quality. Therefore, the association between regulatory quality and R&D spending needs to 
be examined in the context of emerging markets. 
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3.8 R&D and firm performance 
Growing attention has been given in the literature to the relationship between R&D and 
firm performance. This section reviews the literature on R&D investment in terms of firm 
performance, investor protection (safeguards) and country-level governance (systems). 
3.8.1 R&D and firm performance 
The resource-based view was developed by Wernerfelt (1984). RBV stresses that 
heterogeneous internal resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991) determine a firm’s 
performance (Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 1997). Resources that are valuable, rare, 
inimitable and non-substitutable may create competitive advantage (Wright et al., 1994). 
Capabilities are defined as clusters of activities that a firm does especially well in 
comparison with others. They allow firms to create new markets and add value for the 
customer (Henry, 2007). Canto and Gonzalez (1999) confirmed the relevant role of 
resources and capabilities in R&D activities. Empirical studies such as those by Ehie and 
Olibe (2010) and Hasmi and Stojcic (2013) have found that investment in R&D activities 
has a significant positive impact on firm performance because it ensures the introduction of 
new products and processes, resulting in increased market share and productivity through 
technological progress (Coad et al., 2016.) On the other hand, substandard performance 
stimulates R&D investment (Bolton, 1993) to improve performance and reputation and 
gain market position. Thus, there is a direct relationship between R&D and firm 
performance. 
However, the measurement of firm performance is multifaceted, using indicators such as 
sales growth, profitability and productivity. Regarding sales growth, Morbey (1988) found 
a strong correlation between R&D intensity and subsequent sales growth. Morbey and 
Reithner (1990) re-examined the influence of R&D on sales, and their results fully 
supported those obtained from earlier studies. Sales growth may be achieved through the 
introduction of new and improved products or processes, or by improving the company’s 
73 
 
competitive position with a mature or declining product. Morbey (1988) also showed a 
stronger correlation between R&D investment and sales growth as the growth period 
lengthens, with a 0.46 correlation co-efficient between initial R&D intensity and sales 
growth over a five-year period (1976-1981), and 0.57 over a 10-year period (1976-1985). 
Garcia-Manjon and Romero-Merino (2012) have added further evidence that this 
correlation is more intense in high-technology firms than in low-technology firms, because 
the latter do not obtain clear market responses to their R&D efforts. 
However, Del Monte and Papagni (2003, p.1006) argued that, “There are many reasons 
why it is not easy to find such a relationship empirical [sic].” A study by Booz Allen 
Hamilton (BAH) of the 1,000 public firms around the world that spent most on R&D in 
2004 reported that there is no relationship between R&D spending and sales growth 
(Jaruzelski et al., 2005). However, the same study showed that spending too little on R&D 
may harm firm performance. According to Jaruzelski et al. (2005), when a firm is seeking 
to grow through innovation, it is more important to develop a robust business model and 
good cross-functional capabilities than to boost the R&D budget. 
Innovation has direct and indirect impacts on firm profitability (Geroski et al., 1993). 
Innovation directly affects profitability through the development of new products or the 
introduction of new processes, and impacts indirectly on how firms generate profits, 
because it signals the transformation of a firm’s internal capabilities associated with the 
process of innovating. Hanel and St-Pierre (2002) added that R&D has a direct, positive 
effect on profitability, especially in industries with effective patent protection. Patent 
protection and other barriers to rapid imitation permit firms to enjoy significant temporary 
monopolies on inventions (Scherer, 1965). Moreover, Johansson and Loof’s (2008) study 
of Swedish manufacturing firms for the period 2002-2004 revealed that a continuous 
strategy of R&D is associated with more than 40 percent greater profitability than for non-
R&D firms. In addition, Lev and Sougiannis (1996), Hanel and St-Pierre (2002) and 
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Eberhart et al. (2004) documented a positive relationship between R&D and profitability. 
Karjalainen (2008) suggested that widespread information leakage, availability of equity 
financing and active corporate control strengthen the relationship between R&D 
expenditure and future firm profitability. 
However, Morbey’s (1988) study suggested that the relationship between R&D 
expenditure and profitability is weak. He claimed that economic climate and market 
competitiveness may contribute to profitability. Morbey and Reither (1990) re-examined 
the relationship between R&D and profitability, using data from 134 firms in the US, and 
did not find any direct relationship. This is consistent with the analyses of Scherer (1965) 
and Wagner (1984), although they found a positive relationship between R&D expenditure 
per employee and profitability. Thus, they described the relationship between R&D 
intensity and profitability as “complex”, arguing that this relationship is influenced and 
dominated by firm productivity. On the other hand, Parcharidis and Varsakelis (2007) 
provided mixed results based on Greek data, and found that R&D investment impacts 
negatively on profit in the year of the investment but, similarly to Natasha and Hutagaol’s 
(2009) Indonesian study, they showed a strong positive relationship two years later. They 
argued that new product development, new production methods and information 
technology need time to produce results. 
With regard to productivity, Griliches (1979) first introduced a model that described the 
relationship between innovation and the knowledge production function. The model 
assumed that production of new knowledge depends on investment in current and past new 
knowledge (i.e. current and past R&D investment), as well as some other factors, including 
capital and labour (Johansson and Loof, 2008). Guellec and Potterei (2004) argued that 
R&D expenditure results in new goods and services, higher quality of output and new 
production processes, which are sources of productivity growth. Guellec and Potterie 
(2001) analysed 16 OECD countries using panel data for 1980-1998 and found that a one 
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percent increase in R&D investment produces a 0.13 percent increase in productivity 
growth. Using panel data for the period 1965-2005, Bravo-Ortega and Marin (2011) 
estimated that a ten per cent increase in R&D per capita generates an average increase of 
about 1.6 per cent in long-run TFP. 
However, the relationship between R&D investment and productivity is mixed in emerging 
markets. Lee and Kang’s (2007) study of Korean manufacturing firms found a positive 
relationship between innovation and productivity growth. Jefersson et al. (2006) and Liu et 
al. (2013) obtained similar results based on Chinese and Taiwanese data respectively. 
Crespi and Zuniga (2010) examined six Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay) using micro-data from an innovation survey 
and found that firms that innovate have higher labour productivity than those that do not. 
However, Benavente (2006), based on Chile, and Perez et al. (2005, cited in Crespi and 
Zuniga, 2010), based on Mexico, found no relationship between the two. Hall and Mairsee 
(2006, cited in Crespi and Zuniga, 2010) argued that this is because emerging markets may 
reflect different circumstances surrounding innovation. Moreover, Acemoglu et al. (2006) 
stated that emerging countries are too far from the technological frontier, and incentives to 
invest in R&D are weak or absent. 
The existing literature has provided inconclusive results for the impact of R&D on firm 
performance, whether considered in terms of sales, profit or productivity. According to 
Zhu and Huang (2012), the first reason for these inconclusive results is that some 
researchers have tested the relationship between R&D and performance in the same year as 
the investment, but R&D investment takes time to show results (Natasha and Hutagaol, 
2009), so such a model may undervalue the contribution of R&D. Secondly, most 
researchers have focused on manufacturing firms, but R&D activity may have different 
impacts on firm performance across different types of industry. Existing research has paid 
little attention to this difference. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, R&D reporting is 
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not mandatory for all countries. Moreover, some countries treat it as an expense and show 
it in the profit and loss account, whereas others treat it as capital, which is shown on the 
balance sheet. 
3.8.2 Investor protection (safeguards) 
Defond and Hung (2004) observed that investor protection fosters good governance, 
which, in turn, increases investor confidence. When investor rights are protected, external 
investors and entrepreneurs are willing to pay more for financial assets such as debt and 
equity, leading to financial development (La Porta et al., 2002). Similarly, Volpin (2002) 
suggested that stronger investor protection reduces the risk of expropriation, allows 
separation of ownership and control, and increases growth. Thus, investor protection has 
an influence on firm performance. Moreover, firm-level strategic decisions, such as R&D 
investments, are also influenced by investor protection. McLean et al. (2012) examined a 
sample of 44 countries over the period 1990-2007 and found that investor protection plays 
a role in the relationship between investment and financial activities. They found that the 
relationship between investment and Tobin’s q and cash flow becomes stronger when a 
country has strong investor protection, and contended that investor protection reduces 
firms’ financial constraints and enables them to access external finance. Supporting this 
theoretical argument, Brown et al. (2013) found that firms in countries with stronger 
investor protection use significantly more external finance, and therefore make significant 
investments in R&D activities. Their analysis was based on data from 5,300 firms across 
32 countries over the period 1990-2007. Moreover, the OECD (2000) reported that R&D 
investment, R&D personnel and patents tend to rise with investor protection. Stronger 
investor protection reduces managers’ opportunistic behaviour in diverting cash flows to 
themselves; therefore, more resources are employed in value-enhancing capital projects 
such as R&D (Ghosh and He, 2015). 
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In addition, stronger investor protection is related to better capital allocation efficiency 
(Wurgler, 2000), which ensures sufficient investment in R&D activities. Xiao (2013) 
observed that investor protection is an effective tool to improve the efficiency of firms’ 
R&D investment by reducing over- and under-investment. He argued that investor 
protection increases efficiency in two ways. First, investor protection enables firms to 
access external financing and so reduce under-investment in R&D activities. Second, it 
mitigates agency problems, and thus reduces the likelihood of R&D over- and under-
investment. Based on panel data from 38 countries over the period 1993-2008, he also 
found that investor protection moderates the relationship between R&D investment and 
firm growth. The results reveal that the difference in economic effect between the strongest 
and weakest investor protection is as large as 19 per cent per year. 
In comparing the impact of investor protection on R&D investment, both McLean et al. 
(2012) and Brown et al. (2013) emphasised external finance, while Xiao’s (2013) study 
gave more attention to efficiency of capital allocation. Thus, empirical studies have shown 
that investor protection facilitates R&D investment by allowing firms to access external 
finance and encouraging the efficient allocation of capital. Moreover, in the presence of 
strong protection, risky and uncertain investments such as R&D may influence firm 
performance more effectively. In recent years, emerging markets have taken steps to 
increase investor protection; therefore, it is expected that investor protection moderates the 
relationship between R&D investment and firm performance. In particular, investor 
protection may strengthen the relationship between R&D and firm performance in 
emerging markets. 
3.8.3 Country-level governance (systems) 
The existing literature has confirmed the importance of country-level governance factors 
(systems) for R&D investment (Hillier et al., 2011; Pindado et al., 2015), although whether 
country-level or firm-level factors better explain the relationship is unresolved (Pindado et 
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al., 2015). In this regard, Francis et al. (2012) stated that country-level and firm-level 
corporate governance are substitutable in the case of financial contracts. Their results 
conflict with Klapper and Love (2004), who argued that the relationship between country-
level and firm-level governance factors is far from obvious. They supposed that, firstly, 
firms in countries with weak corporate governance will want to adopt strong firm-level 
corporate governance to counterbalance that weakness. Secondly, there may be a positive 
relationship between them, in that firm-level governance follows country-level 
governance. They found a positive relationship between country-level factors and firm-
level governance based on 14 emerging countries. From a study of 22 countries, Anderson 
and Gupta (2009) found that a country’s financial structure and legal systems jointly affect 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Although there is 
some sort of relationship (Daniel et al., 2012), owing to their distinct nature and 
characteristics, they may play different roles in explaining firm-level decisions. 
Ngobo and Fouda (2012) have argued that a good governance system reduces investment 
risk and leads to high returns. Therefore, it is assumed that strong national governance 
systems encourage risky investments such as R&D. In addition, Hiller et al. (2011) found 
that national systems facilitate R&D investment. They applied GMM estimation to data 
from11 countries over the period 1990-2003, and concluded that good governance 
facilitates the availability of external financing for R&D investment. In line with this, 
Clarke’s (2001) study of developing countries found that R&D investment tends to be 
lower in countries where institutional quality, such as rule of law and protection of 
property rights, is weak and the risk of expropriation is higher. It can thus be argued that a 
favourable institutional environment increases a firm’s capacity and ability for R&D 
investment, which in turn improves firm performance (Volberda, et al., 2012; Hong et al., 
2015) through risk reduction, learning by doing and access to finance. 
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In a recent empirical paper, Pindado et al. (2015) examined how country-level governance 
factors moderate the relationship between R&D and market values. They supported 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic’s (2002) notion that legal and financial systems reduce 
the magnitude of market imperfections caused by agency problems where R&D is 
characterised by information asymmetries. Moreover, they computed the elasticity for the 
coefficient of each variable for each model, showing that the explanatory power index is 
0.5152 for control mechanisms, 0.4505 for corporate governance, 0.3680 for financial 
systems, and 0.2974 for effective investor protection, which supports the importance of 
country-level governance factors. Their results were based on GMM estimation on a 
sample of 12 countries comprising the EU, Japan and USA over the period 1986-2003. 
Therefore, the existing literature has shown that institutional setting and country-level 
governance play an important role in explaining the relationship between R&D and firm 
performance. 
3.9 Financing of R&D 
Firms may finance R&D investment from internal (Hall, 1992) or external funds (Httenrott 
and Peters, 2012), or both (Brown and Peterson, 2009). According to Myers’ (1984) 
pecking order theory, R&D projects are financed in a particular order. First internal funds 
are used, followed by external funding, and issuing debt and/or equity. Schumpeter (1942) 
emphasised that, due to agency problems, it is preferable to finance R&D investment 
internally. Similarly, Hall (1992) argued that the extreme riskiness of R&D projects and 
the cost of revealing information about such projects may lead firms to prefer internal 
finance. Moreover, internal funding can be raised more easily (Lee and Hwang, 2003) and 
costs less (Brown et al., 2009). Thus, Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) considered it as the 
main determinant of R&D investment because of capital market imperfections, although 
size of firm is an important factor in relying on internal funding (Himmelberg and 
Petersen, 1994). For instance, Bougheas (2004) found that many small firms in the USA 
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and UK, and to a lesser extent in Canada, do not have access to external capital markets, 
and thus rely on internal finance for R&D investments. On the other hand, large and well-
established firms may have easy access to external funds because of their established track 
record (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992; Chiu et al., 2012). Similarly, firm age, liquidity and 
dividend policy also have impacts on choosing internal funding. Fazzari et al. (1988) and 
Chiu et al. (2012) found that young, low-liquidity and low-dividend firms are more likely 
to use internal funding due to information asymmetry. Thus, in an empirical study, 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) found that internal funding has a positive impact on 
R&D investment. As a result, Martinsson (2009) observed that R&D investment depends 
on internal funding. However, Bloch (2004) has stated that dependence on internal funding 
indicates that R&D-intensive firms are financially constrained. He assumed that, if firm 
borrowing is constrained, R&D investment will be dependent on internal funding. 
Therefore, the ability of internal funding to explain R&D investment provides evidence of 
financial constraints. Moreover, internal funds may vary due to changes in labour costs, 
interest rates, oil prices and exchange rates (Brown et al., 2009). Therefore, Mueller (1967) 
and Elliot (1971) found no relationship between internal funding and R&D investment. 
Similar results were obtained by Ayyagari et al. (2011), based on 47 emerging markets. 
They also found that innovation by foreign firms depends on external finance. 
However, external finance, and specifically debt, is not a favoured form of finance for 
R&D investment (Hall, 1992). Hall (1992) argued that servicing debt usually requires a 
stable source of cash flow, making it more difficult to find the funds for R&D investment. 
Chaio (2002) re-examined and confirmed Hall’s (1992) hypothesis for science-based firms 
but not for non-science-based firms, and stated that non-science-based firms neither spend 
more on R&D nor own high R&D capital stock. He suggested that Hall (1992) may not 
have considered the heterogeneity of firms in different industries and the simultaneous 
nature of investment and debt; thus, he separated science-based and non-science-based 
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firms. He used an OLS regression method, while Chaio (2002) applied GMM to US firm-
level data. Moreover, empirical studies such as those by Aghion et al. (2004), Ho et al. 
(2006) and Chen et al. (2010) have found a negative relationship between debt financing 
and R&D investment. The reasons for this negative relationship are problems of 
information asymmetry (Bloch, 2004), adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), moral 
hazard (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) and agency costs (Chen et al., 2010). These 
problems may lead investors to restrict financing of R&D investment. Information 
asymmetries may occur more frequently in R&D for two reasons. First, the nature of R&D 
makes it difficult for lenders to appraise R&D projects accurately. Second, managers 
generally withhold R&D information for confidentiality reasons, because information 
transmitted to lenders may also convey useful technological knowledge to rivals (Chen et 
al., 2010). Adverse selection problems may occur due to the inherent riskiness of R&D 
projects (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In the case of limited liability, firms may be willing to 
take on greater risk than otherwise when projects are financed by debt. Agency-cost 
problems between debt holders and firms render debt financing of R&D investments more 
expensive (Chen et al., 2010). Moreover, debt financing increases a firm’s transaction costs 
(Kochhar, 1996). As a result, external financing is more expensive for R&D investments 
than for normal investments (Heshmati and Lööf, 2005). Thus, firms will reduce debts 
arising from investments in R&D in order to avoid the burden of higher interest (Chai, 
2010). 
On the other hand, firms use debt for R&D investments because internal funding is 
naturally limited and issuing new equity may be costly and often unwanted (Hottenrott and 
Peters, 2012). Moreover, the disciplinary role of debt acts as a positive influence on 
managerial behaviour, reining in managerial discretion (Ho et al., 2006). Managers are 
more concerned with insolvency, as debt increases the chance of bankruptcy. Furthermore, 
managers are highly likely to lose their jobs in case of bankruptcy (Ogawa, 2004). 
82 
 
Financing R&D with bank loans may be feasible, especially if banks are willing to monitor 
the investment activities of their clients (Bougheas, 2004). On the other hand, R&D 
investment firms provide more real collateral to lenders than others. R&D investments 
improve firms’ efficiency, and consequently their goodwill, as time goes on, and may offer 
increasing real collateral guarantees to potential lenders (Martinez-Ros and Tribo, 1999). 
Debt financing reduces over-investment (Amihud and Lev, 1981) and is less expensive 
than equity financing due to tax shields (Wang and Thornhill, 2010). Moreover, firms 
prefer to use debt rather than new equity for R&D investments as it involves giving up less 
control rights (Aghion et al., 2004). Thus, Szewczyk et al. (1996), Zantout (1997), Chiao 
(2002) and Martinsson (2009) have found a positive relationship between debt and R&D 
investment. Zantout (1997) explained that one reason for this positive relationship is that 
management plans to increase R&D expenditure may imply an increase in a firm’s 
investment risk, resulting in the transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders, the 
severity of which is positively related to the debt ratio. A second reason is that a high 
percentage of managerial ownership of the firm’s common stock gives managers 
incentives to make decisions that increase shareholder wealth. 
 
Bhagat and Welch’s (1995) study produced mixed results. They observed a negative 
relationship between debt ratio and R&D investment for US firms, and a positive 
relationship for Japanese firms. Their interpretation was that US firms either have more 
need to safeguard their R&D expenditure from possible financial distress without assuming 
a large amount of debt, or alternatively that US lenders are less willing to finance R&D 
projects, whereas, in contrast to the US tax code, the Japanese tax code manages to 
encourage R&D. Bhagat and Welch (1995) used regression analysis on R&D data from 
6,549 firm-years of US, Canadian, British, European and Japanese firms for the period 
1985-1990. Ghosh (2012) examined the inter-linkage between R&D efforts, leverage and 
firm ownership, and found that a ten per cent rise in leverage lowers R&D by 0.2 percent. 
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His study revealed that the dampening effect of R&D-intensity on leverage is highest for 
foreign private firms, and R&D activity appears to be positively related to leverage for 
state-owned firms, by virtue of state-owned firms’ access to subsidised government loans. 
Ayyagari et al. (2011) argued that even state-owned firms have access to external finance, 
but they are still less innovative. Overall, the existing literature has provided mixed results 
regarding the relationship between debt finance and R&D investment. In this regard, Chiao 
(2002) argued that this relationship depends on characteristics of industries such as 
intensity of R&D activities. 
In the absence of internal and external funding, what are the potential financing sources for 
R&D? Brown et al. (2009) observed that, when internal funding is exhausted and debt is 
not an option, firms must turn to new equity issues. The asset substitution hypothesis 
suggests that firms involved in R&D activities will prefer equity financing to debt 
financing. Bah and Dumontier (2001) added that firms will prefer equity because a 
significant proportion of their market value is accounted for by growth opportunities. 
Equity financing is important for R&D activity because bank loans are difficult to obtain 
for R&D projects (Muller and Zimmermann, 2009). These results show that firms with 
higher equity ratios are more involved in R&D. Moreover, firms prefer equity financing in 
order to avoid the costs of debt requirements and maintain sufficient financial slack (Chen 
et al., 2010). In this regard, Ou and Haynes (2006) argued that high-growth innovative 
firms are more likely to depend on equity owing to highly uneven profits, information 
asymmetries and lack of collateral. In addition, equity financing provides managers with 
autonomy in project selection (Dittmar and Thakor, 2007). Using equity finance enables a 
firm to avoid the liquidity pressure of making loan repayments and reduce the risk of 
running out of cash while trying to compete on the basis of innovation (Chen et al., 2010). 
Moreover, equity financing reduces the financial obligation to pay regular interest (Wang 
and Thornhill, 2010). However, financial theories predict that the marginal cost of equity 
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will increase due to adverse selection (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Krasker, 1986, cited in 
Brown et al., 2009). Other than equity, venture capital and FDI are used as alternative 
external sources for R&D investment (Guariglia and Liu, 2014). Thus, the existing 
literature has shown that firms’ sources of R&D financing depend on the cost of funding, 
firms’ resources and capabilities, and managers’ discretion. 
In addition, differences between countries’ institutional settings, such as financial systems, 
need to be considered in financing R&D investments (David et al., 2008). There are two 
main types of financial system, bank-based and market-based. In bank-based financial 
systems, banks and other financial intermediaries tend to be larger, more active and more 
efficient, as in Austria, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999). The bank-based theory stresses that banks 
are more effective than the market in financing development in emerging countries 
(Ujanwa et al., 2012). Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) pointed out that, in market-based 
systems, stock markets tend to be larger, more active and more efficient, as in the USA and 
the UK. They argued that countries with a common-law tradition, strong protection of 
shareholder rights, good accounting regulations, low levels of corruption and no explicit 
deposit insurance tend to be more market-based. The market-based theory identifies the 
role of the market as a source of permanent capital for businesses, an avenue for mobilising 
savings for investment, a mechanism for redistributing wealth among investors, and a good 
measure of economic performance (Ujanwa et al., 2012). Levine (2002) argued that bank-
based and market-based financial systems may co-exist and complement each other. 
The existing literature has shown that a country’s financial systems determine the available 
sources of finance for R&D investment. Empirical studies (e.g. Bougheas, 2004; David et 
al., 2008) have found a significant positive relationship between external financing under 
bank-based systems and R&D investment. Bougheas (2004) found that firms in bank-based 
financial systems such as in Germany, France, and especially Japan, have access to bank 
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loans to finance R&D. Under bank-based systems, it is expected that firms and banks will 
develop mutual relationships. Relational banking provides the hierarchical governance 
essential to aligning the interests and incentives of investors in and managers of R&D-
intensive firms (David et al., 2008). Moreover, Bougheas (2004) argued that bank-based 
financial systems may finance R&D if banks are willing to monitor investment activities. 
Monitoring by banks helps to overcome agency problems (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993) 
and mitigate informational asymmetries (Boot, 2000). However, Levine (2002) has stated 
that bank-based systems may curtail technological innovation due to the highly risky 
nature of R&D projects. On the other hand, firms in market-based financial systems, such 
as in the USA, UK and Canada, rely on internal funding to finance R&D (Bougheas, 
2004). Bougheas assumed that a lack of tangible assets forces them to rely on internal 
funding. Martinsson (2009) revealed that external financing is inappropriate in market-
based systems for strategic investments such as R&D. He argued that market-based 
systems do not provide the necessary disclosure of R&D project-related information and 
suffer the problem of inflexibility. From a corporate governance viewpoint, David et al. 
(2008) stated that market-based systems rely on market governance and cannot provide the 
strong exchange safeguards needed for R&D investments. Therefore, the inconclusiveness 
of previous research regarding the choice of R&D financing, along with the effect of the 
recent global financial crisis, sets the context for examining sources of finance for R&D 
investment. 
3.10 Summary 
This review has identified some important gaps in the literature. First, the existing 
literature has examined the relationship between the recent financial crisis and R&D 
investment, while ignoring how local firms and MNEs, and innovative and non-innovative 
firms, have behaved in terms of R&D investment. An understanding of how firms behave 
with regard to innovative activities during a financial crisis is important because it explains 
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why some firms continue to invest in innovative activities while others do not. Second, 
empirical studies have focused on the macroeconomic determinants of R&D investment, 
but have not distinguished between advanced and emerging markets. Research on this 
aspect would be helpful to policy makers in emerging markets, which tend to follow the 
strategies of developed countries. Moreover, it would help them to increase their 
innovative activities. Third, virtually no studies have tested the institutional determinants 
of R&D investment. However, examining institutional determinants would determine their 
importance in addition to firm-level determinants for R&D investment. Fourth, the existing 
literature has described the relationship between R&D and firm performance, while 
ignoring which of the two makes a greater contribution to this relationship. Such analysis 
would enable firms to make changes to their strategies to increase their R&D activities. 
Fifth, the empirical evidence reveals relevant financing sources for R&D investment, while 
ignoring the role of local and MNE markets and market- and bank-based systems on 
financing strategies. However, identifying an appropriate channel through which to finance 
R&D investment under a particular market and financial system will promote the long-
term growth of the firm. Finally, most of the empirical evidence has been drawn from 
developed countries, while little evidence is available from emerging countries. The 
current study seeks to close this gap in the literature by researching emerging markets. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter revolves around four questions: First, what is the relationship between 
financial crisis and R&D investment in emerging markets, and what are the firm-level 
determinants of R&D investment during a financial crisis? Second, what are the 
macroeconomic and institutional determinants of R&D investment in emerging markets? 
Third, in terms of the impact of R&D on firm performance and investor protection or 
country-level governance, which contributes more to the relationship between R&D and 
firm performance in emerging markets? Fourth, how are R&D investment projects 
financed in emerging markets? In order to address these questions, an appropriate method 
must be used. This chapter will explain how suitable methods were chosen to address these 
questions, and how the data were analysed. 
4.2 Research strategy and design 
There are two main types of research: empirical and theoretical. Empirical research 
supports the development of new ideas and/or thoughts based on data, while theoretical 
research supports the discovery of new ideas from existing works using theories and 
explanations. In other words, theoretical research focuses mainly on theory or concepts, 
while empirical research tests the theory based on data. From the perspective of theory 
construction, these two approaches are different. However, they are interrelated in the 
sense that empirical studies depend on theoretical studies. Nowadays, many studies are 
empirical, because results or evidence that are not in accordance with theory may 
contribute to a body of knowledge or help build a new theory. This study mainly follows 
an empirical research strategy to address the research questions, although a theoretical 
approach is followed to develop and operationalise the research objectives. 
Another important aspect that may guide the structure and direction of the research process 
and design is the research philosophy. There are two types of research design: positivist 
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and interpretive. The positivist approach is commonly used to test a theory, while the 
interpretive approach is used to build a theory. Positivist designs look for general patterns 
based on an objective view of reality (Bhattacherjee, 2012). According to Mukherji and 
Albon (2014), in order to understand a phenomenon, we need to observe events in a 
systematic way and then work out the underlying theory that causes the event to occur. 
This approach also helps define cause and effect relationships among variables. On the 
other hand, interpretive designs look for subjective interpretations of social phenomena 
from the perspectives of the subjects involved (Bhattacherjee, 2012). In other words, 
interpretive designs deal with how people experience phenomena and define their 
meanings in reality. This can be achieved by subjective analysis. For this study, a positivist 
design was chosen for the following reasons: 
1. Positivist designs facilitate coverage of a wide range of situations by representing 
wider populations, and are easy to replicate in order to arrive at a general conclusion. A 
lack of restriction on replication of a study leads to the production of more acceptable 
generalisations. In contrast, according to Remenyi et al. (1998), it is difficult to 
generalise using an interpretive approach. 
2. Positivist results are more likely to be expressed quantitatively, while interpretive 
results are usually expressed qualitatively (Kielmann et al., 2011). As the current study 
uses numerical data and quantitative methods to address the research questions, the 
positivist approach is better suited to this study. 
3. The positivist paradigm is more economical than the interpretive approach when time 
and resources are limited. This study had a limited time frame, so is better suited to a 
positivist approach. 
4. The positivist approach aims to make statistical comparisons (Kielmann et al., 2011), 
which contributes to the depth of analysis of this study. 
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4.3 Choice of methods 
The choice of research methodology is closely related to the choice of research philosophy. 
Kielmann et al. (2011) observed that the positivist approach usually has quantitative 
characteristics, while the interpretive approach is more qualitative. Quantitative methods 
deal with data to measure what people think, while qualitative research focuses on why 
people make choices, and what and how they choose. Therefore, qualitative research 
provides a deeper knowledge and understanding of the phenomena being researched 
(Gramatikov et al., 2010). On the other hand, quantitative research reveals more important 
facts about the data, such as trends, demographics and differences among the group. In 
quantitative research, researchers gather, organise and analyse data using an appropriate 
method. In qualitative research, researchers use interview techniques or conduct face-to-
face or telephone interviews with a target group to analyse a certain concept. This study 
examines firm-, macroeconomic- and institutional-level R&D determinants, the 
relationships between R&D and firm performance, and sources of financing for R&D. The 
variables selected to analyse these objectives are based on the literature review and are 
quantifiable and measurable. Moreover, hypotheses are developed and tested using a 
quantitative approach. In addition, most previous published research on these topics has 
been based on quantitative research. This study also adopts a quantitative methodology to 
examine the stated objectives. 
4.4 Data sources 
In order to fulfil the objectives of this study, secondary data were drawn from various 
sources, including DataStream, companies’ annual financial reports, LexisNexis, the 
World Bank’s Development Indicators, Worldwide Governance Indictors and Protecting 
Minority Shareholders data, and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. 
Data from DataStream, annual financial reports and LexisNexis were used to examine 
firm-level determinants in the presence of a financial crisis and the relationship between 
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financial crisis and R&D in emerging markets. Data from annual reports were used to fill 
missing values in the DataStream data. LexisNexis was used to collect more details about 
firms, such as their years of establishment and their nature, whether local or MNE. Yearly 
data were collected for the period 2003-2012 to fill gaps in the latest data. Only firms with 
10 consecutive years of data were chosen. Owing to the differing nature of financial firms, 
in terms of corporate structure and strategy, these were excluded from the analysis. Details 
of the data are presented in Chapter 5. 
The World Bank’s Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indictors were 
used to make macroeconomic comparisons between advanced and emerging markets. 
Country-level data were collected to observe the macroeconomic determinants of 
aggregate R&D expenditure. Owing to data availability and to minimise gaps in the latest 
data, the chosen sample period was from 2002 to 2011. Details of the macroeconomic data 
are presented in Chapter 6. 
DataStream and ICRG data were used to examine institutional determinants. DataStream 
was used to collect firm-level data, while ICRG was used for institutional variables. A 
sample period of 2006-2013 was chosen based on data availability. Details of the 
institutional data are presented in Chapter 7. 
Data were collected from DataStream, and the Protecting Minority Shareholders and ICRG 
databases to examine the relationship between R&D and firm performance and investor 
protection or country-level governance, and to establish which makes a greater 
contribution to the relationship between R&D and firm performance in emerging markets. 
Firm-level data, such as sales growth, sales, fixed assets, total assets and debt, were drawn 
from DataStream, investor protection data were gathered from the Protecting Minority 
Shareholder database, and country-level governance data were taken from ICRG. Owing to 
data availability, particularly in the Protecting Minority Shareholder data, the selected 
sample period was 2006-2013. To be included in the sample, firms must have five 
91 
 
consecutive years of data. Financial firms were excluded from the analysis due to the 
nature of their corporate structure and strategy. Details of these data are presented in 
Chapter 8. 
Data from DataStream, annual financial reports and LexisNexis were used to study the 
financing behaviour for R&D investments in emerging markets. Annual financial reports 
were used to fill in missing values in the DataStream data. LexisNexis was also used to 
gather further details about the firms. In order to minimise gaps in the latest data, yearly 
data were collected for the period 2003-2012. Only firms with 10 consecutive years of data 
were selected. Financial firms were excluded due to the nature of their corporate structure 
and strategy. Details of these data are presented in Chapter 9. 
4.5 Data structure 
There are three types of data: cross-sectional, time series and panel data (or time series 
cross-sectional data).Cross-sectional data describe multiple individuals at the same time, 
for example sales growth data for Tesco, Sainsbury’s and Morrisons for the year 2015. 
Time series data deal with single individuals over multiple time periods, for example sales 
growth for Tesco from 2000 to 2015. Panel data are a combination of cross-sectional and 
time series data, using datasets with multiple individuals for multiple time periods, such as 
sales growth data for Tesco, Sainsbury’s and Morrisons from 2000 to 2015. 
Panel data were used for their distinct advantages over cross-sectional and time series data. 
The advantages of panel data are described below. 
1) Panel data provide great flexibility in modelling differences in behaviour across 
individuals over a cross-sectional dataset (Greene, 2003). Moreover, Pindado and 
Requejo (2014) observed that panel data deal with unobservable heterogeneity. It is 
crucial to consider unobservable heterogeneity in analysis of R&D investment, as it 
depends on firm strategy, corporate culture and the propensity to innovate (Hiller et al., 
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2011). Therefore, in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, panel data were 
used rather than cross-sectional or time series data. 
2) Panel data provide more informative data, more variability, less collinearity between 
variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency (Baltagi, 2013), whereas time 
series studies may have problems of collinearity. Panel data are useful for identifying 
and measuring effects that are not measurable in cross-sectional or time series data. In 
addition, panel data help to test more complicated behaviour. For instance, panel data 
are better for analysing technical efficiency (Koop and Steel, 2001). 
3) According to Pindado and Requejo (2015), panel data help to study the dynamics of 
adjustments in firm-level decision making. Baltagi (2013) stated that cross-sectional 
data hide amultitude of changes. Moreover, panel data mitigate the bias of aggregation 
which may arise when time series estimations are used to characterise individual 
behaviour. 
4) Panel data allow a composite error term to be split into sub components, for example 
εit = ηi+dt+ vit (Pindado and Requejo, 2015). First, individual heterogeneity which is 
denoted by ηi, can be used to control for individual or firm-specific effects. Second, 
panel data by nature incorporate the time-series dimension, which controls 
macroeconomic effects on dependent variables. By using the time dummy, dt, on the 
right hand side, it is possible to control for macroeconomic effects that would 
otherwise be included in the error term. 
5) Panel data analysis simplifies computations. For instance, panel unit root tests have 
standard asymptotic distribution and do not suffer from the problem of non-standard 
distributions encountered in time series analysis (Baltagi, 2013). 
However, the major problem of panel data analysis is data collection. Due to the nature of 
panel data, researchers need to collect data on multiple individuals for multiple time 
periods; however, non-responses, and problems with coverage, frequency of interviews, 
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firm listings and bankruptcy, mean it is not always feasible to work with panel data. 
Moreover, panel data do not always account for cross-sectional dependency. This problem 
may arise when a researcher uses macro-panel data on countries or regions over long time 
periods (Baltagi, 2013). In addition, Cameron and Trivedi (2013) have stated that panel 
data estimations are more complicated than cross-sectional estimations, and require much 
richer models and estimation methods. 
4.6 Data analysis 
In order to undertake the analysis for this study, panel data estimation was carried out 
using STATA software. This study mainly used a GMM approach for several reasons. 
First, it was used to control for the endogeneity problem (Hillier et al., 2011). According to 
Pindado and Requejo (2015), most finance studies face endogeneity problems. Generally, 
these may arise when there is a relationship between the explanatory variables and the 
error term. Wooldridge (2010) found three factors that may create endogeneity problems: 
omitted variables, measurement errors and causality. Omitted variables may correlate with 
explanatory variables. For instance, some firms invest more in R&D than others due to 
growth opportunities or firm culture, which may create omitted variable bias. Measurement 
error may occur in any dependent or explanatory variables. Causality issues may arise 
when a dependent variable and at least one explanatory variable are determined 
simultaneously. For example, R&D investment and firm size have a simultaneous 
relationship. Owing to their high resource capacity and growth opportunities, large firms 
invest more in R&D activities. On the other hand, high R&D investment may increase 
product quality and foster sales performance, which ultimately impacts on firm size. 
Second, the endogeneity problem can also be controlled by an IV approach. However, in 
order to apply this approach, the researcher must find external instruments, which are 
sometimes very difficult to obtain, from both theoretical and empirical points of view. In 
this regard, Liu et al. (2015) and Pindado et al. (2014) have pointed out that external 
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instruments may not be readily available and finding them is extremely complex. On the 
other hand, GMM uses lags of variables as instruments for estimations, and therefore 
provides efficient estimations. Strategic investments such as R&D follow the path-
dependent hypothesis (Garcia-Quevedo et al., 2014), and cumulativeness of information 
and knowledge implies that the current year’s R&D investment follows that of the previous 
year. Therefore, use of lagged values of dependent variables as instruments may produce 
biased results. However, GMM estimations control for lagged values of the dependent 
variable (David et al., 2006). 
Third, both heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation problems can be addressed by GMM 
estimations. Heteroscedasticity may arise because different countries in the sample have 
different characteristics, thus residuals are unlikely to be constant across observations. 
Auto-correlation may arise as a result of using the lag of the dependent variable for the 
hypothesis test. These problems cannot be controlled by OLS. Moreover, Baum et al. 
(2003) observed that, in the presence of heteroscedasticity, IV estimations provide 
inconsistent estimations of standard errors. However, GMM provides more consistent 
estimations than two-stage least squares (2SLS) in the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
auto-correlation (David et al., 2006). 
Fourth, according to Hansen (1982), GMM estimations provide a general framework 
within which to take into account issues of statistical inference, as they encompass many 
estimators of interest to econometrics. In this regard, Worrall (2008) stated that, within a 
single framework, GMM nests several estimations, such as OLS, 2SLS and IV. Moreover, 
as GMM estimations use richer sets of instruments than IV estimators, they provide a 
higher level of efficiency estimation (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
Finally, previous researchers (e.g. David et al., 2006; Hillier et al., 2011; Pindado et al., 
2015) have applied GMM estimation to this topic. 
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4.7 Summary 
This chapter has explained the research methods used for this study, focusing in particular 
on the research philosophy, data collection and choice of methodology. The research 
adopts a positivist approach using a quantitative methodology. For the analysis, secondary 
data were collected from sources such as DataStream, annual financial reports, LexisNexis, 
the World Bank’s Development Indicators, Worldwide Governance Indicators and 
Protecting Minority Shareholder data, and the ICRG database. GMM estimation is the 
main technique used for data analysis. In addition, OLS, the IV approach and Granger 
causality tests are used for data analysis. 
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Chapter 5: Financial Crisis and R&D Investment in Emerging 
Markets 
5.1 Introduction 
It has long been recognised that R&D has a significant impact on firms’ long-term 
performance. It has also been proved that R&D investment may improve ability to learn, 
quality and efficiency of work, and incorporation of new knowledge and technologies into 
machinery and other equipment (OECD, 2011). As a result, R&D investment emerges as 
firms’ choice for growth, innovation, networking and technological advance. Thus, from 
Grilichies (1979) onwards, a key interest of research has been to observe the determinants 
of R&D. However, changing customer demands, globalisation, increasingly knowledge-
based technologies and, most importantly, the recent financial crisis have sparked renewed 
interest in rediscovering the determinants of R&D investment. Empirical works following 
RBV show that the most common determinants of R&D investment are firm age, size, 
sales and debt. However, as a result of the negative impact of the financial crisis, the nature 
of the relationship between these determinants may have changed. Thus, this study focuses 
on the relationship between financial crisis and R&D investment, and the common 
determinants of R&D in the presence of financial crisis. 
There is controversy about the relationship between financial crisis and R&D investment. 
The cyclical view suggests that financial crises have a negative impact on R&D 
investment, while the anti-cyclical view suggests a positive relationship between the two. 
Therefore, it is presumed that financial crises have a dramatic impact on R&D investment, 
but the impact may vary substantially across firms, industries and countries (Fillippetti and 
Archibugi, 2011; OECD, 2012). The reasons for this variation are, first, the nature of firms. 
For example, fast-growing new firms and highly innovative firms continue to invest in 
R&D during recessions (Archibugi et al., 2013). Second, market demand for a product, 
profit and technological opportunities are reasons for this variation at industry level 
(Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011). Finally, stock market efficiency, financial systems 
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(Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011) and the extent to which a country is affected by a financial 
crisis may play a role, although relatively little attention has been given to these issues in 
emerging countries. The aims of this study are to close this gap, and firstly to examine 
whether local firms and MNEs behave differently with regard to R&D investment during a 
recession, and secondly whether innovative firms continue to invest in R&D during a 
financial crisis. 
RBV (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) stated that firm-specific internal resources and 
capabilities enable them to achieve competitive advantage, leading to superior 
performance. Galende and Fuente (2003) found that internal resources and R&D activities 
are significantly related. Following RBV, the internal resources and factors that explain 
R&D investment are firm age (Galende and Fuente, 2003), firm size (Lai et al., 2015), debt 
and sales (Galende and Fuente, 2003). However, not all internal factors play the same role 
during a financial crisis. The negative impact of the recent financial crisis may have 
changed the direction of internal factors. For example, Galende and Fuente (2003) found 
that debt impacts positively on R&D investment. However, due to credit constraints during 
a financial crisis, debt may impact negatively on R&D investment, although emerging 
countries were not all equally affected by the recent financial crisis. Thus, this study also 
examines whether RBV holds true in the presence of a financial crisis and whether the 
drivers of R&D behave differently in affected and less-/unaffected emerging countries in 
the presence of a financial crisis. 
Emerging countries are growing faster than developed and under-developed ones (Lague, 
2011). It is assumed that the growth rate of emerging markets will be three times higher 
than that of advanced economies by 2020. This faster growth may lead to higher rates of 
return than on similar investments in developed countries (Logue, 2011). Moreover, global 
market competition, changing customer demand and strategic international cooperation 
between businesses boost emerging markets to invest in R&D (Gorodnichenko et al., 
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2008). Therefore, in recent years, emerging markets have considerably increased their 
R&D investment; for example, according to Booz & Company (2012), India and China 
increased their R&D spending by about 28 per cent in 2011. However, there is a lack of 
literature examining the common determinants of R&D investment in emerging markets. 
In addition, it is important to establish which factors played a role during the recent 
financial crisis in emerging countries. 
This study contributes to the existing R&D literature in several ways. First, it complements 
previous studies of the impact of the 2007-2008 financial crisis on R&D in emerging 
markets. There is a gap in the existing R&D literature that examines the impact of 
recessions on R&D. Most previous studies have been based on specific countries or 
regions (for Europe, see Kanever and Hollanders, 2009; Correa and Lottty, 2011; 
Fillippetti and Archibugi, 2011; Mannasoo and Merikull, 2011; Cincera et al., 2012; 
Archibugi et al., 2013a, 2013b; Adcock et al., 2014; and for Latin America, see Paunov, 
2012). However, this study considers all emerging markets in the regions of Africa, Asia, 
Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Second, the study adds value to the current 
R&D literature by examining the relationship between locality and multi-nationality, 
innovativeness and non-innovativeness during the recent financial crisis. While a few 
studies have shown a relationship between innovation/non-innovation and financial crisis, 
there is a lack of evidence for a relationship between local/multinational firms and 
financial crisis. Thus, this study examines the impact of financial crisis on R&D from held 
true during the recent financial crisis. In addition, it adds value to the literature on how 
R&D factors in affected or less-/unaffected countries behaved during the financial crisis. 
Fourth, most earlier studies (Correal and Lottey, 2011; Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011; 
Cincera et al., 2012; Paunov, 2012; Archibugi et al., 2013b) have been based on cross-
sectional data, which have many limitations. For example, cross-sectional data are unable 
to control for individual heterogeneity, data distributions that look relatively stable may 
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hide a multitude of changes, and the effects of identifying and measuring data are 
undetectable in cross-sectional data (Baltagi, 2013). Thus, when using cross-sectional data 
for innovation/R&D investment, there is a risk of obtaining biased results because R&D 
investment decisions are very closely related to firm specificity (Pindado et al., 2010). 
Moreover, most earlier studies have been based on surveys rather than panel data (e.g. 
Archibugi et al., 2013a). Survey data have problems such as failure to show in-depth 
dynamic behaviour and failure to reveal the actual impact of a crisis. This study is among 
the first to use comprehensive firm-level panel data. In addition, examining this issue may 
help policy makers, investors, managers and senior executives in emerging markets to 
make decisions on R&D investment. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the financial crisis and 
emerging markets, Section 5.3 presents the variables and hypotheses of the study, Section 
5.4 explains the data and research methodology, Section 5.5 presents and discusses the 
results, and Section 5.6 provides conclusions from this study. 
5.2 Financial crisis and emerging markets 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis started in the USA but quickly spread across the world. Any 
shock to US markets is bound to have global effects because US financial assets represent 
31 percent of global financial assets and 62 percent of reserve currency assets (Claessens et 
al., 2010). Moreover, emerging markets and the USA are closely related owing to 
exchange rates, exports of goods and services and the spill-over of information, in terms of 
both returns and volatility. Lahrecha and Sylwester (2011) and Graham et al. (2012) found 
a strong co-movement between the USA and emerging markets, although the impact of a 
financial crisis may vary across countries (Fillippetti and Archibugi, 2011; OECD, 2012). 
For example, the recent financial crisis had only a limited effect on Argentina, China and 
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Estonia (OECD, 2012). To check the extent to which the sample countries were affected by 
the recent financial crisis, a Granger causality test was performed (see Table 5.1)
1
. 
                                              Table 5.1: Granger Causality Test 
Group-A: Causality 
Observations Lags Country F-Stat Country F-Stat 
1564 2 USA 7.641** Greece 61.559*** 
1564 2 USA 9.399*** Hong Kong 420.37*** 
1564 2 USA 8.115*** Indonesia 253.13*** 
1042 3 USA 13.81*** Israel 87.945*** 
521 4 USA 8.101* Malaysia 199.34*** 
1564 2 USA 6.272** Mexico 11.491*** 
1564 2 USA 7.575** Philippines 477.94*** 
1564 2 USA 5.791* South Africa 235.41*** 
Level of significance: * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, ***<0.01. 
      Group-B: No causality 
Observations Lags Country F-Stat Country F-Stat 
521 4 USA 1.045 Bangladesh 3.0516 
521 4 USA 5.664 Brazil 34.061*** 
521 4 USA 2.769 Chile 30.361*** 
521 4 USA 2.181 China 38.253*** 
521 4 USA 2.799 India 59.588*** 
521 4 USA 2.182 Pakistan 12.553** 
521 4 USA 3.487 Peru 16.837*** 
521 4 USA 2.345 Poland 61.567*** 
521 4 USA 4.239 Russia 81.687*** 
521 4 USA 1.391 Sri Lanka 31.996*** 
521 4 USA 0.839 Thailand 144.69*** 
521 4 USA 2.299 Turkey 59.979*** 
Level of significance: * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, ***<0.01. 
 
Affected countries are considered to be those with a causal relationship with the USA, and 
less-/unaffected countries are those that have no causal relationship. Consistent with 
Lahrecha and Sylwester (2011) and Graham et al. (2012), the results show that Greece, 
                                                 
1 The daily stock price index was used for 10 years from 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2012 for all 20 emerging markets and the 
USA. The stock price data used in this paper were drawn from the main stock market indexes using the common denominator USD for 
pair wise Granger causality tests. As this test is used to examine whether a past value of a series, X t , will help to predict the value of 
another series in the present, Y t , taking into account the past value of the Y t , (Granger, 1988), a maximum lag value of 4 was taken for 
this test. Prior to lag selection, lag order selection was based on AIC criteria. Before performing the Granger causality tests, the two 
series were tested for stationarity using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test. 
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Hong Kong, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines and South Africa have a 
bi-directional relationship with the USA, meaning that these countries were affected by the 
financial crisis. However, Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Chile, China, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, 
Russia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Turkey have no causal relationship with the USA, 
implying that these countries were less-/unaffected by the financial crisis. This is because 
some emerging markets have different characteristics from developed markets like the 
USA, such as high returns and high volatility (Graham et al., 2012); and many emerging 
markets, such as Asian countries, were well prepared as they had experienced crises 
before. Some markets are not integrated into the world market, some countries’ banking 
laws and regulations are very strict, as in Latin America (Wenn, 2013), and some have 
strong internal stock markets. 
5.3 Hypotheses to be tested 
In general, due to the recent financial crisis, local firms’ sales, profits, exports, FDI, and 
even sources of finance, were reduced (Wu, 2012). This had a direct effect on long-term 
investment. Garicano and Steinwender (2015) found that local firms cut down on long-
term investments such as R&D during the crisis. Moreover, investment in R&D is risky, 
uncertain and long-term (Hud and Hussinger, 2015); therefore, local firms were reluctant 
to engage in it during the crisis, preferring to invest in physical assets or projects that 
would give quick returns. In addition, local firms are small and imitative by nature. Hence, 
their investment rate in R&D is generally lower and the crisis allowed them to make real 
investments rather than invest in R&D. In addition to local firms, MNEs were affected by 
the recent financial crisis. Varum and Rocha (2011) suggested that local firms and MNEs 
were equally affected by the crisis. Moreover, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, 
MNEs in Israel, such as Intel, Microsoft and IBM, drastically reduced their R&D during 
the crisis. The credit crunch during the crisis made MNEs focus on real investments and 
reduced their investments in R&D. However, some believe that, as MNEs have greater 
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international exposure, foreign exchange risk and reliance on exports than local firms, their 
R&D investments were more affected by the financial crisis. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 1: The financial crisis had a negative impact on the R&D investments 
of local firms. 
Hypothesis 2: The financial crisis had a negative impact on the R&D investments 
of MNEs, and MNEs were affected more by the financial crisis than local firms. 
Innovative firms are different from other firms (Aghion et al., 2004), as they emphasise 
new knowledge creation and technology advancement. Even during the financial crisis, 
they adopted bold strategies of investing in R&D, expecting to gain high profits and 
market share during the market up-turn. For example, Samsung Electronics and Google 
strongly increased their R&D investment during and after the “new economy” collapse of 
2001(OECD, 2009). Koksal and Ozgul (2007) have argued that, despite all the financial 
limitations imposed by a financial crisis, increasing R&D investment during a crisis has an 
important impact on performance. It is considered to be a “good cost” during a crisis. 
Innovative firms concentrated similarly on R&D during the financial crisis. Moreover, as 
R&D investment is a long-term project, it cannot be captured by short-term responses to 
the financial crisis (Archibugi et al., 2013). On the other hand, non-innovative firms did 
not have the same commitment to R&D investment as innovative firms, and did not 
concentrate similarly on R&D during the financial crisis. The reason for this is that non-
innovative firms do not visibly profit from R&D spending (García-Manjón and Romero-
Merino, 2012). Non-innovative firms in emerging markets prefer to imitate (Kumar and 
Saqib, 1996) and are less resource-intensive. Thus, due to financial constraints during the 
financial crisis, non-innovative firms reduced their R&D investments. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 3: The financial crisis had a positive impact on the R&D investment of 
innovative firms. 
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Hypothesis 4: The financial crisis had a negative impact on the R&D investment of 
non-innovative firms. 
While focusing on the impact of the financial crisis on R&D investment, the existing 
literature (see Table 5.4) has suggested that R&D investment was also affected by other 
factors, such as firm age, firm size, export orientation, diversification, sales growth, 
profitability, debt ratio, foreign ownership and institutional ownership. These are 
considered as control variables in the analysis and are discussed below. 
Firm age is used as a proxy for accumulated learning and knowledge. Thus, it is believed 
that the higher the firm age, the greater the firm’s experience and knowledge. By gathering 
experience and knowledge, a firm can develop or increase its skills and capacity, and 
therefore invest in innovative activities. Accumulated learning, experienced scientists and 
better-equipped laboratories determine a firm’s likelihood of engaging in R&D investment. 
According to this view, older firms are more likely to engage in innovative activities. 
However, empirical evidence shows an inconclusive relationship between firm age and 
R&D investment. For instance, Lall (1983) and Kumar and Saqib (1996) found a positive 
relationship, while Klepper (1996), Lynskey (2004) and Murro (2013) found no 
relationship between them. As emerging markets are growing, it is reasonable to believe 
that there will be a large number of new or young firms, increasing the probability of 
negative or no relationship with R&D investment. 
Firm size reflects the firm’s financial performance. Generally, large firms have greater 
market power, resources and access to external finance, which increase their probability of 
investment in R&D. This notion is supported by Schumpeter’s (1942) hypothesis. 
Similarly, Lall (1983), Katrak (1985), Kumar and Saqib (1996), Tan and Hwang (2002), 
Galende and Fuente (2003), Griffiths and Webster (2010) and Murro (2013) found a 
significant positive influence of firm size on R&D investment. However, industry plays an 
important role in the relationship between size and R&D investment. For example, even 
small firms in an innovative industry (such as software, pharmaceuticals and computers) 
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have a tendency to make large investments in R&D. Therefore, as Cohen et al. (1987) 
observed, it is not size by itself that influences R&D investment, but the conditions of 
technological opportunity and appropriability. However, it is expected that, during a crisis, 
due to their greater internal funding and capacity, large firms will be better able to invest in 
R&D. 
Export orientation reflects a firm’s international market participation. In order to increase 
firm competitiveness in the international market by increasing product quality and sales, 
firms need to invest in R&D. Although increasing product standards does not necessarily 
mean investing in R&D (Abdelmoula and Etienne, 2009), R&D investment helps firms to 
make products that people want to buy. In this regard, Kumar and Saqib (1996) observed 
that firms can compete more effectively in international markets by investing in R&D 
activities. Similarly, Galende and Fluente (2003) and Zemplinerova and Hromadkova 
(2012) found a positive relationship between export orientation and R&D investment. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the greater the export orientation, the greater the propensity 
for investment in R&D. Moreover, it is expected that firms with more international links 
will be more able to alleviate crisis risks. 
Product diversification may relate to R&D investment in several ways. First, greater 
diversification means firms have higher product classification and greater differentiation, 
which can be achieved by R&D investment. Second, in order to achieve diversification, 
firms need diversified human capital and a broad range of knowledge that boosts them to 
invest in R&D. Third, a more diversified firm will be better able to exploit more resources 
and capacity, which facilitates R&D activities. Thus, the empirical evidence shows a 
positive relationship between product diversification and R&D investment. Baysinger and 
Hoskisson (1989) found that, in large multi-product firms, there is a positive relationship 
between diversification and R&D spending; yet, Mukherjee (2005) claimed a negative 
relationship because, under product patents, greater product differentiation increases the 
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possibility of lower R&D. Moreover, agency theory confirms a negative relationship 
between diversification and innovation. However, following the endogenous growth 
model, it is predicted that the positive effect of product diversification on R&D investment 
will dominate in emerging markets. 
According to the demand-pull theory, higher demands generate optimistic expectations and 
growth opportunities that boost innovative activities. Cumming and Macintosh (2000) 
stated that demand-pull encourages R&D investment as there is less financing risk. 
Moreover, sales growth makes investors more confident about future returns from R&D 
investment; therefore, firms with higher sales growth invest more in R&D to maintain 
performance and grab future potential opportunities. As a result, Coad and Rao (2010) and 
Morbey (1988) found that R&D investment increases following growth in a firm’s sales. 
However, Bhattacharya and Bloch (2004) found an insignificant relationship between 
growth and R&D expenditure. From the emerging markets perspective, where market 
demand has increased significantly, it is reasonable to expect that firm performance will 
influence firm-level decisions such as R&D investment. 
The relationship between profitability and R&D expenditure is inconclusive. Tan and 
Hwang (2002) and Bhattacharya and Bloch (2004) found a significant positive impact of 
profitability on R&D investment, whereas Hundley et al. (1996), Kumar and Aggarwal 
(2005), Liu (2011) and Kalayci (2013) found a significant negative impact. As R&D 
investment involves a high degree of risk and uncertainty, it faces external financial 
constraints. To overcome this problem, retained earnings can be used as a source of 
funding for R&D spending (Grabowski, 1968). Due to lower transaction costs, firms may 
gain advantages from using retained earnings rather than external financing (Anwar and 
Sun, 2013). This implies that higher profits motivate investment in R&D. On the other 
hand, according to the failure inducement hypothesis (Antonelli, 1989), lower profits 
induce firms to invest in R&D. Earning lower profits provides an incentive to engage in 
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R&D activities, which may help a firm to improve business performance (Anwar and Sun, 
2013). 
According to pecking order theory, firms first use internal funding, and then external 
funding such as debt or equity to finance R&D investments. In addition, Himmelberg and 
Petersen, (1994) observed that firms prefer to use internal funding for R&D investments. 
Moreover, transaction cost theory posits that debt financing may discourage R&D 
investment. Due to higher costs of interest, firms are less likely to use external funding for 
R&D investments. Moreover, the highly risky and uncertain nature of R&D investments 
makes it difficult for firms to obtain loans from outsiders. In this respect, Hall (1992) 
pointed out that servicing debt usually requires a stable source of cash flow, making it 
more difficult to find the funds for R&D investments. In addition, the recent financial crisis 
imposed external financing constraints on emerging countries. As a result, Hall (1990), 
Cumming and Macintosh (2000) and Cheng and Chen (2006) found a significant negative 
impact of debt on R&D investment. Therefore, it is assumed that, due to the recent 
financial crisis, firms will avoid debt financing of R&D investments. 
As emerging markets grow faster, they attract considerable interest from foreign investors. 
David et al. (2006) found that foreign ownership enhances strategic investment decisions 
such as R&D when firms have high growth opportunities. Moreover, foreign ownership 
influences firms to undertake R&D if knowledge from the parent needs to be adapted to 
local conditions or if specific projects require collaboration with the foreign owner 
(UNCTAD, 2003). In addition, foreign ownership facilitates R&D investment by enabling 
money to be raised from foreign sources. Funding secured from multiple sources or parties 
is likely to be supportive in determining the level of long-term investments such as R&D 
(David et al., 2006). Multiple owners also help to monitor managers (Allen, 1993). 
Moreover, empirical evidence shows a significant positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and R&D investment (Gannicott, 1984; Becker and Pain, 2008; Parameswaran 
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2008; Kriaa and Karray, 2010; Lee, 2012). Thus, it is expected that foreign presence in 
emerging markets will foster innovative activities. 
A number of existing empirical studies have found that institutional ownership has a 
significant impact on R&D investment decisions, but the results have been inconclusive. 
Institutional ownership has a positive impact on R&D investment, as institutional investors 
are able to diversify the risk of R&D investments (Baysinger et al., 1991).Moreover, 
according to Chauvin and Hirschey (1993), large numbers of institutional investors are 
associated with greater R&D investment in IT firms by increasing their competitiveness. 
On the other hand, Graves (1988) found a significant negative relationship between 
institutional investors and R&D investments. He observed an emphasis of institutional 
ownership on short-term results as opposed to more profitable long-term investments in 
R&D. However, David et al. (2001) found that activism by institutional investors may put 
pressure on managers to undertake long-term R&D investments. This relationship may be 
stronger when R&D spending is more likely to improve firm value. 
5.4 Data and methodology 
5.4.1Data 
Different organisations have defined emerging markets from different perspectives. For 
example, the IMF has defined the min terms of GDP-per-capita ratio, while Goldman 
Sachs selected them based on their macroeconomic stability, political maturity, trade 
openness, investment policies and educational quality criteria. As a result, the list of 
emerging markets may vary from one organisation to another. To avoid this problem, all 
emerging markets from all organisations’ lists (IMF, Goldman Sachs, FTSE, MSCI, The 
Economist, S&P, Dow Jones, BBVA and Columbia University EMGP) were selected for 
this study (see Appendix 2 for a full list of emerging markets). Thomson Reuter 
DataStream was the main source of data for a sample of 51 emerging markets. In addition, 
LexisNexis and firms’ annual financial reports were used. In order to avoid sample 
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selection bias, all listed firms in an emerging market were considered. First, data on 25,251 
firms were searched on DataStream. In the case of missing values or unrealistic figures on 
DataStream, for example where R&D expenditure was missing, these values were dropped 
from the dataset. South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore were excluded from the sample 
because these are now considered as emerged countries. To be included in the sample, the 
country must have at least two firms and these firms must have 10 years of consecutive 
data. As DataStream provided some data with missing values, data from annual reports 
were used to fill the gaps. LexisNexis was used to collect data on firm age and level of 
multinationality. After taking these issues into account, DataStream, annual reports and 
LexisNexis provided 310 firms from 20 emerging markets (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). The 
time periods before and after the financial crisis were considered, as the main variable of 
interest was the financial crisis. Following Erkens et al. (2012), 2007 and 2008 were 
considered as financial crisis years in emerging markets. 2009 was excluded from the crisis 
years because emerging countries started to recover from 2009 (Didier et al., 2011). Gaps 
in the latest data were minimised as far as possible. An equal time period was taken before 
and after the crisis. Thus, the 10-year sample time period chosen was from 2003 to 2012. 
Balanced panel data were used for sample firms. Panel data were used because they enable 
control for firm heterogeneity, provide more information, variability and degrees of 
freedom, avoid multicollinearity problems, provide more efficient results, and are more 
suitable for identifying and measuring effects that are not detectable in pure cross-sectional 
or pure time series data (Baltagi, 2013). 
 
 
 
109 
 
 
                                                   Table 5.2: Sample Selection 
Description 
No. of 
countries 
No. of 
firms 
Initial search on DataStream 51 25,251 
Firms with10 years of consecutive data 37 892 
Countries with more than one firm 23 878 
Dropped: Countries that had already emerged 3 568 
Final sample 20 310 
            Source: DataStream, LexisNexis and Annual reports 
 
 
                                                Table 5.3: Sample by Country 
Country 
No. of 
firms 
Percentage 
of firms 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Hong Kong 62 20.00 20.00 
India 52 16.77 36.77 
Turkey 30 9.68 46.45 
China 23 7.42 53.87 
South Africa 23 7.42 61.29 
Israel 22 7.10 68.39 
Bangladesh 21 6.77 75.16 
Greece 19 6.13 81.29 
Malaysia 13 4.19 85.48 
Philippines 8 2.58 88.06 
Indonesia 7 2.26 90.32 
Sri Lanka 5 1.61 91.94 
Brazil 4 1.29 93.23 
Mexico 4 1.29 94.52 
Pakistan 4 1.29 95.81 
Russia 4 1.29 97.10 
Chile 3 0.97 98.06 
Peru 2 0.65 98.71 
Poland 2 0.65 99.35 
Thailand 2 0.65 100.00 
Total 310 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Table 5.4 gives definitions of the variables. The existing literature has found these 
variables to have a significant effect on firms’ R&D investment. In this paper, R&D 
expenditure is considered as a dependent variable which takes the logarithm of firms’ 
annual R&D expenditure. The main independent variable is the financial crisis. The 
extensive list of control variables are age, size, export orientation, diversification, sales 
growth, profitability, debt ratio, foreign ownership and institutional ownership. All 
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variables are standardised to a common USD exchange rate. Some explanatory variables 
have higher scales than others. Moreover, the absolute value of variables increases the 
presence of heteroscedasticity (Grabowski, 1968). In order to avoid these problems, natural 
logarithms are adopted for R&D and size variables, gross profit to sales ratio, debt to total 
asset ratio, and percentage of foreign and institutional shareholders. 
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                                                                                                     Table 5.4: Summary Variables 
 
 
 
Variable Type of data Description Empirical study 
R&D Continuous R&D expenditure of the firm in a year (In log) Howe and McFetridge (1976) 
Age Continuous Calculated by subtracting the year the firm was incorporated from 2003 Mishra (2007) 
Size Continuous Measured by total assets (In log) Murro (2013) 
Export orientation Dummy Takes a value of 1 if a firm exports Kumar and Saqib (1996) 
Diversification Dummy Takes a value of 1 if a firm has more than one segment Galende and Fluente (2003) 
Sales growth Ratio Annual sales growth of the firm Bhattacharya and Bloch (2004) 
Profitability Ratio Annual gross profit of the firm scaled to total sales Bhattacharya and Bloch (2004) 
Debt ratio Ratio Measured by the ratio of debt to total assets Cumming and Macintosh (2000) 
Foreign ownership Percentage Percentage of foreign shareholders Kriaa and Karray (2010) 
Institutional ownership Percentage Percentage of institutional shareholders Hansen and Hill (1991) 
Financial crisis Dummy Takes a value of 1 during the crisis years 2007 and 2008 Archibugi et al. (2013) 
Industry dummy Dummy Takes a value of 1 if the firm is innovative, and 0 if it is non-innovative 
 
Market dummy Dummy Takes a value of 1 if the firm is an MNE, and 0 if it is local 
 
Country dummy Dummy Takes a value of 1 if the firm was affected by the US financial crisis   
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Table 5.5 reports summary statistics for all sample firms in emerging markets. The 
descriptive statistics show the diversity of R&D investment, age, sales growth, foreign 
ownership and institutional ownership across emerging markets. For example, there are 
more foreign ownership firms in China than in any other emerging markets. This is 
because some emerging markets are growing faster than others. For example, BRIC 
markets (Brazil, Russia, India and China) are growing more rapidly than the N-11 
emerging markets (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Turkey, South Korea and Vietnam). It is predicted that, in terms of economic 
growth, BRIC’s emerging markets will overtake the G7 in 2032. 
                                          Table 5.5: Summary Statistics for All Firms 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
R&D 2.79086 1.51199 0 6.36103 
Age 33.75530 23.45550 1 125 
Size 5.63202 0.87318 2.84073 8.57482 
Export orientation 0.45731 0.49825 0 1 
Diversification 0.86751 0.33907 0 1 
Sales growth 0.28787 3.62369 -0.94655 182.106 
Profitability 0.27238 0.31782 -10.9659 2.83380 
Debt ratio 0.20378 0.18306 0 0.89991 
Foreign ownership 14.26220 24.02330 0 95 
Institutional ownership 3.87731 9.90616 0 92.92 
Financial crisis 0.19986 0.39996 0 1 
Industry dummy 0.57343 0.49465 0 1 
Market dummy 0.56918 0.49527 0 1 
Country dummy 0.51292 0.49991 0 1 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Table 5.6 displays summary statistics for countries affected and less-/unaffected by the 
recent financial crisis. Older firms were less affected than newer firms due to their 
experience of handling bad situations. In contrast to the common view, the results show 
that sales growth was higher in affected countries than in less-/unaffected countries. This 
can be explained by the fact that, as a result of the financial crisis, firms reduced their costs 
but retained the same sales strategies. 
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                                                                       Table 5.6: Summary Statistics for Affected and Less-/Unaffected Countries 
 Affected countries Un-/Less-affected countries 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
R&D 2.877021 1.456446 0 6.13468 2.752176 1.585581 0 6.36103 
Age 31.2317 24.48936 2 125 37.46772 21.7465 3 116 
Size 5.578379 0.8120117 2.840730 7.86357 5.760626 0.9190695 3.1038 8.57482 
Export orientation 0.471926 0.4993887 0 1 0.4414414 0.4967456 0 1 
Diversification 0.897655 0.3032098 0 1 0.8363363 0.370109 0 1 
Sales growth 0.332571 5.113939 -0.946546 182.107 0.2289178 1.452534 -0.94491 51.3413 
Profitability 0.300943 0.2386868 -3.462360 0.948974 0.2493804 0.2232613 -1.0631 2.83381 
Debt ratio 0.184219 0.1620047 0 0.887209 0.2210901 0.1961689 0 0.888627 
Foreign ownership 19.462 26.21891 0 95 8.918769 19.98745 0 94 
Institutional ownership 2.936745 6.182581 0 54 5.184767 12.5395 0 92.92 
Financial crisis 0.22317 0.4165194 0 1 0.2222222 0.4158959 0 1 
Industry dummy 0.546553 0.4980051 0 1 0.6021021 0.489648 0 1 
Market dummy 0.683014 0.4654676 0 1 0.4512012 0.4977999 0 1 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Higher sales generate higher profits; thus, affected countries had higher profitability than 
unaffected countries. Firm financing was constrained by the financial crisis. The results 
show that debt capacity reduced more in affected countries than in less-/unaffected 
countries. To protect investors’ interests, shareholders reshaped corporate governance 
practices in order to deflect any threats resulting from the economic and political crisis 
(Roe, 2003). Therefore, increases or decreases in foreign and institutional ownership were 
likely. Thus, it can be seen that, in affected countries, foreign ownership was higher and 
institutional ownership lower than in less-/unaffected countries during the crisis. 
Table 5.7 reports summary statistics for local firms and MNEs in emerging markets. 
Following Bae and Noh (2001), local firms are those that operate domestically, whereas 
MNEs operate in multiple countries. The theory of the multinational suggests that MNEs 
have greater resources and opportunities, enabling them to gain greater returns on 
intangible assets, use their market power, spread their market risks, and seek less expensive 
inputs and less price-sensitive markets (Kim et al., 1993). Thus, MNEs have more product 
diversity than local firms (Bae and Noh, 2001). The same conclusion was reached by 
Tallman and Li (1996). Similarly, MNEs tend to be more export-oriented than local firms. 
The firm-specific advantages of MNEs allow them to manage disadvantageous positions 
by lowering transaction costs and overcoming international trade barriers in foreign 
markets. The export behaviour of firms is also influenced by ownership structure 
(Athukorala et al., 1995). It is widely accepted that MNEs have greater foreign ownership 
than local firms. As most MNEs’ parent companies are administered or controlled by two 
or more countries, they are likely to have more foreign ownership than local firms. For 
example, Unilever is an MNE in Bangladesh which is controlled by British and Dutch 
interests and had61 percent foreign ownership in 2011. 
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                                                                                          Table 5.7: Summary Statistics for Local Firms and MNEs 
 Local Firms MNEs 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
R&D 2.55441 1.50699 0 5.98412 2.96982 1.49147 0 6.36103 
Age 33.2460 22.5931 2 125 34.1408 24.0871 1 123 
Size 5.44093 0.90273 2.9818 8.57482 5.77665 0.82133 2.84073 8.55341 
Export orientation 0.35383 0.47834 0 1 0.53563 0.49887 0 1 
Diversification 0.80637 0.39528 0 1 0.91379 0.28075 0 1 
Sales growth 0.27685 2.17612 -0.9465 53.5833 0.29621 4.41498 -0.8789 182.107 
Profitability 0.28791 0.20814 -1.0631 0.97959 0.26063 0.38000 -10.966 2.83381 
Debt ratio 0.21814 0.19976 0 0.89991 0.19291 0.16858 0 0.88721 
Foreign ownership 9.66711 20.1514 0 95 17.7403 26.0536 0 90 
Institutional ownership 4.24200 11.6357 0 92.92 3.60127 8.35565 0 73 
Financial crisis 0.19969 0.39992 0 1 0.20000 0.40011 0 1 
Industry dummy 0.57858 0.49397 0 1 0.56954 0.49528 0 1 
Country dummy 0.37737 0.48491 0 1 0.61551 0.48661 0 1 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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However, local firms have more institutional ownership than MNEs. Generally, institutions 
do not seek to invest in foreign firms; they tend to try to encourage local firms. 
Following Kallunki et al. (2009), the sample firms were split between innovative and non-
innovative industries (see Table 5.8). 
                              Table 5.8: Innovative versus Non-Innovative Industries 
Innovative Industries Non-innovative Industries 
Aerospace and defence Beverages  
Automobiles Coal 
Biotechnology and medical research Containers and packaging 
Construction materials Food and tobacco 
Communications and networks Hotels and entertainment 
Electronics Leisure products 
Engineering Office equipment 
Healthcare equipment and supplies Oil and gas 
Machinery and equipment components Paper and forest products 
Renewable energy Media and publishing 
Pharmaceuticals Transport infrastructure 
Metals and mining Textiles and apparel 
Software and IT Water utilities 
Telecommunications Miscellaneous 
 
Table 5.9 reports summary statistics for innovative and non-innovative firms in emerging 
markets. In general innovative firms are more technology-intensive than non-innovative 
firms. 
In comparison, innovative firms put more emphasis on bringing new knowledge to 
markets, advancing technology, and increasing employees’ skills, internal competencies 
and capabilities. Thus, innovative firms spend more on R&D than non-innovative firms 
(Tabrizi, 2005). As a result of new, diversified and improved production and 
manufacturing, innovative firms have higher sales growth rates than non-innovative firms. 
Similar results were found by Baldwin and Gellatly (2003). Easy access to knowledge, 
information and technology attract foreign customers to invest in innovative firms. Thus, 
innovative firms have more foreign ownership than non-innovative firms. 
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                                                                             Table 5.9: Summary Statistics for Innovative and Non-Innovative Firms 
 Innovative Non-Innovative 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
R&D 3.12196 1.32447 0 6.13468 2.34574 1.63013 0 6.36103 
Age 30.2076 21.8795 1 125 38.5245 24.6365 1 123 
Size 5.46076 0.83588 2.8407 7.93519 5.86224 0.86962 3.26245 8.57482 
Export orientation 0.48944 0.50003 0 1 0.41411 0.49275 0 1 
Diversification 0.89731 0.30362 0 1 0.82745 0.37799 0 1 
Sales growth 0.36631 4.76479 -0.9465 182.107 0.18243 0.50128 -0.9449 10.959 
Profitability 0.25238 0.35626 -10.966 1.19263 0.29927 0.25491 -4.0428 2.83381 
Debt ratio 0.17966 0.17559 0 0.88721 0.23621 0.18789 0 0.89991 
Foreign ownership 17.1386 25.1242 0 95 10.3955 21.8795 0 90 
Institutional ownership 3.75664 8.86774 0 89 4.03954 11.1523 0 92.92 
Financial crisis 0.20022 0.40028 0 1 0.19938 0.39969 0 1 
Market dummy 0.56531 0.49585 0 1 0.57438 0.49462 0 1 
Country dummy 0.49001 0.50004 0 1 0.54371 0.49827 0 1 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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However, non-innovative firms tend to be older than innovative firms. Emerging countries 
are considered as late-industrialised countries, which implies that they started their 
innovative activities later. For example, China began to strengthen its innovation systems 
in 1980 and technological advancement through innovation in 1990 (World Bank, 2013). 
5.4.2 Method of study 
Panel data were estimated using GMM. Several econometrical issues led to the choice of 
this specification. 
First, individual heterogeneity is important for this analysis because R&D investment 
decisions depend entirely on firm-specific features such as strategy, firm culture and the 
propensity to innovate (Hillier et al., 2011). Thus, there is a probability of obtaining biased 
results. In order to obtain bias-free results, the analysis needed to control for individual 
firm heterogeneity, taking ηi as individual effects in the model and then eliminating by 
taking the first differences of the variables. Thus, the model for the analysis is as follows: 
In(R&D it ) = α i  + β 1 (Age it ) + β 2 In(Size it ) + β 3 (Export oriented it ) + β 4
(Diversifications it ) + β 5  (Sales Growth it ) + β 6 (Profitability it )+ β 7 (Debt ratio
it )+ β 8 (Foreign ownership it )+β 9 (Institutional Ownership it )+β 10 (Financial 
Crisis it )+ η i  +C i
 
+I i
 
+ M i  +ε it       (1) 
Besides individual firm effects, country, industry, market and time dummies were included 
in the empirical model. The country dummy captures country-specific effects, the industry 
dummy captures industry-specific effects, the market dummy captures market-specific 
effects, and the time dummy captures time-varying effects that control the macroeconomic 
variables of firm value. Moreover, εit is a random disturbance which is assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d. normal). 
Second, some independent variables in the model are endogenous, which might create an 
endogeneity problem. For example, firm size and R&D investment causality might run in 
both directions – from firm size to R&D investment and vice versa. Therefore, the models 
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were estimated using instruments. Lagged levels were used for both difference equations 
and levels of equation in combination with system GMM. System GMM was used because 
it has been found to be more efficient than difference GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
Moreover, difference GMM estimation suffers from the problem of weak instruments 
(Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1999). A two-step estimation was performed on the 
grounds that it produces more efficient estimates than one-step estimation. In two-step 
estimation, the standard covariance matrix is robust to panel-specific heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation, but the standard errors are downward biased. To fix possible 
downward bias, the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample corrected covariance matrix was 
used. 
Third, the lagged value of dependent variables was included on the right-hand side as a 
regressor. The presence of a lagged dependent variable may give rise to an auto-correlation 
problem. Thus, the estimation of the model using OLS in levels will be inconsistent, even 
if the errors are not auto-correlated. 
Finally, the model was tested for potential misspecification. First, the Hansen J statistic of 
over-identifying restrictions was used to test whether the instruments were valid, i.e. they 
were uncorrelated with the error term. The results showed that the instruments were valid 
in the models. The hypothesis that the error term was not second-order serially correlated 
was then tested, denoted by AR(2). The results showed that there were no second-order 
serial correlations in the models. As a result of the first difference transformation, there 
might be first-order serial correlation AR(1), but this would not create a specification 
problem with the models. However, the results also showed that first-order serial 
correlations AR(1) were not present. Finally, two Wald tests were used: z1was a test of the 
joint significance of the regressors, and z2 was a test of the joint significance of the time 
dummy, suggesting that aggregate factors exert a significant influence on the relationship 
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between R&D investment and the explanatory variables. The results showed that the two 
Wald tests provided satisfactory results for the models. 
5.5 Empirical results 
5.5.1 Financial crisis and R&D 
Table5.10 reports the results for local firms and MNEs. The financial crisis had negative 
effects on both local firms and MNEs. However, MNEs tended to be more affected than 
local firms. Empirical studies, such as those by Flamm (1984), Gao and Eshaghoff (2004) 
and Lee and Makhija (2009), have also supported this notion. With a one-unit change in 
financial crisis, the probability of R&D investment decreases by 94.32 per cent for local 
firms and 153.27 percent for MNEs. This means that the effect of the recent financial crisis 
on MNEs was 1.63 times higher than on local firms. This is because MNEs have more 
foreign exposure and greater export orientation than local firms. 
                      Table 5.10: Summary of Results for Local Firms and MNEs 
 Local Firms MNEs 
Variable Name Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
R&Dt-1 0.88118*** 0.04113 0.62874*** 0.09096 
Age -0.00219** 0.00103 -0.00138 0.00178 
Size 0.21002*** 0.07162 0.34640*** 0.11900 
Exportorientation 0.26796* 0.14737 0.30205* 0.17776 
Diversification -0.00953 0.06030 0.27874* 0.15011 
Sales growth 0.03775*** 0.01279 -0.00384*** 0.00131 
Profitability 0.11225 0.16003 0.07721 0.09835 
Debt ratio -0.03591 0.19837 0.28668 0.29377 
Foreign ownership 0.00166* 0.00089 0.00270** 0.00122 
Institutional ownership -0.00231 0.00255 0.00563** 0.00276 
Financial crisis -0.94323*** 0.38720 -1.53277*** 0.63909 
Industry dummy Yes 
 
Yes 
 Country dummy Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year dummy Yes 
 
Yes 
 Total Observations 1177 
 
1562 
 AR(1), p-value -4.18 0.000 -2.59 0.010 
AR(2), p-value -0.51 0.610 0.99 0.320 
z 1 , p-value 
 
728.20(13) 0.000 769.42(13) 0.000 
z 2 , p-value 2.48(8) 0.015 1.81(8) 0.078 
Hansen, p-value 119.21(175) 0.999 157.87(155) 0.421 
Significance level: * <0.10, ** <0.05, ***<0.01 
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Moreover, international production facilities and the need to cut operational costs forced 
them to react more abruptly than local firms (Flamm, 1984; Gao and Eshaghoff, 2004; Lee 
and Makhija, 2009; Varum and Rocha, 2011). Thus, the results support the cyclical view of 
R&D investment and Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Firm size, export orientation, sales growth and foreign ownership had a significant impact 
on the R&D investments of both local firms and MNEs in emerging markets. Sales growth 
had a positive impact on the R&D investments of local firms but a negative impact on 
those of MNEs. This is because the recession affected MNEs more than local firms. Varum 
and Rocha (2011) found that MNEs showed 10 to 15 per cent lower sales growth than local 
firms during the crisis. Moreover, MNEs’ R&D investments depended on their 
diversification and institutional ownership. Firm age had a significant negative impact on 
the R&D investment of local firms. Older local firms had fewer technological 
opportunities than younger local ones. In addition, newcomer or younger firms might 
invest more in R&D to compete with both local firms and MNEs. 
Table 5.11 reports the results for innovative versus non-innovative firms. The financial 
crisis had a significant positive impact on innovative firms but a significant negative 
impact on non-innovative firms. Supporting the anti-cyclical view of R&D investment, the 
results show that a one-unit change in the financial crisis led to a 6.98 per cent increase in 
innovative firms’ R&D investment. This suggests that innovative firms followed a strong 
R&D policy which worked as a safeguard against the crisis. Similar results were obtained 
in a study by Kanever and Hollanders (2009). In contrast, supporting the cyclical view of 
R&D investment, non-innovative firms decreased their R&D investment by 92.10 percent 
per one-unit change in the recession. Thus, the results support Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
Although innovative firms’ R&D investment increased during the crisis period, the 
increase rate was very low compared with the decrease rate in non-innovative firms. Firm 
size, export orientation and profitability had a significant positive impact on both 
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innovative and non-innovative firms. Firm age and debt ratio had a significant negative 
influence on the R&D investments of innovative firms. This implies that innovative firms’ 
investments were not influenced by age because of the nature of the firms. From the 
inception of their business, they had had to invest in R&D. Due to the credit crunch during 
the recession, firms’ access to external funding reduced; therefore, the debt ratio affected 
R&D investments negatively. Foreign ownership had a significant positive influence on the 
R&D investments of non-innovative firms. 
             Table 5.11: Summary of Results for Innovative and Non-Innovative Firms 
 Innovative Non Innovative 
Variable Name Coefficient 
Standard 
error Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
R&Dt-1 0.68382*** 0.10197 0.87058*** 0.04560 
Age -0.00460** 0.00187 0.00108 0.00088 
Size 0.31629*** 0.09750 0.17403** 0.06827 
Export orientation 0.12322* 0.06989 0.30170* 0.17688 
Diversification -0.08197 0.10831 0.05794 0.08087 
Sales growth -0.00157 0.00413 -0.02001 0.03106 
Profitability 0.19754* 0.10959 0.20408* 0.10431 
Debt ratio -0.38174*** 0.14234 0.15239 0.21944 
Foreign ownership -0.00159 0.00098 0.00296** 0.00116 
Institutional ownership 0.00115 0.00222 -0.00177 0.00242 
Financial crisis 0.06978* 0.04069 -0.92098** 0.36452 
Market dummy Yes 
 
Yes 
 Country dummy Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year dummy Yes 
 
Yes 
 Total Observations 1571 
 
1168 
 AR(1), p-value -2.35 0.019 -4.33 0.000 
AR(2), p-value 0.96 0.339 -0.02 0.981 
z 1 , p-value 
 
74.12(13) 0.000 618.35(13) 0.000 
z 2 , p-value 1.72(8) 0.096 2.26(8) 0.027 
Hansen, p-value 84.27(73) 0.173 104.66(103) 0.439 
Significance level: * <0.10, ** <0.05, ***<0.01 
5.5.2 Determinants of R&D 
Table 5.12 reports the results of baseline estimations, the interest of which was to establish 
the common determinants of R&D investments in emerging markets. The lagged value of 
the dependent variable is significantly different from zero, showing the persistency of 
R&D investment. A persistence rate of 72.16 percent suggests that firms follow a stable 
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R&D policy. The main determinants of R&D investment in emerging markets are age, 
size, export orientation, debt ratio and foreign ownership. This implies that firms held the 
assumption of RBV even during the financial crisis. Age has a significant negative impact 
on R&D investment, indicating that, in order to stay in competitive markets and meet 
growing customer demand, new firms invested more than old firms in R&D. Moreover, 
emerging markets were less dependent on high-tech sectors; older firms in low-tech sectors 
invested less in R&D than those in high-tech-sectors. With a one-unit change in age, the 
likelihood of R&D investment decreased by 0.31 percent in emerging markets. Studies 
such as those by Klepper (1996), Lynskey (2004) and Murro (2013) have supported this 
finding. Larger firms, more export-oriented firms and firms with higher foreign ownership 
invested more in R&D than small, less export-oriented and domestically-owned firms. 
Larger firms had more resources to invest in R&D activities and the ability to benefit from 
returns on their innovative activities. Moreover, Lall (1983), Katrak (1985), Kumar and 
Saqib (1996), Tan and Hwang (2002), Galende and Fluente (2003), Liu (2011) and Murro 
(2013) found a positive relationship between firm size and R&D investment. 
Exports allow firms to produce on a large scale and thereby exploit increasing returns on 
scale, made possible by fixed investments like R&D. Thus, exporter firms invest more in 
R&D than non-exporter firms. With a one-unit change in exports, the probability of 
investment in R&D increases by about 60 per cent. Braga and Willmore (1991), Kumar 
and Saqib (1996), Tan and Hwang (2002), Galende and Fluente (2003) and Zemplinerova 
and Hromadkova (2012) reached the same conclusion. High growth opportunities in 
emerging markets influence foreign owners to invest in R&D. Moreover, in order to make 
more profits and gain market share, foreign ownership firms invest more in R&D than 
domestically-owned firms. The results show that with a one-unit change in foreign 
ownership, R&D investment increases by 0.13 percent. Gannicott (1984), Becker and Pain 
(2008), Parameswaran (2008), Kriaa and Karray (2010) and Lee (2012) obtained similar 
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results. Due to the lower collateralisable value of R&D investments, R&D is significantly 
negatively affected by the debt ratio in emerging markets. Moreover, the presence of 
agency costs and information asymmetry problems are likely to exert a negative influence. 
         Table 5.12: Summary of Results for All, Affected and Less-/Unaffected Countries 
Variable Name 
All 
Countries 
Affected 
Countries 
Less-/Unaffected 
Countries 
R&Dt-1 0.72155*** 0.66717*** 0.84628*** 
 
(0.06410) (0.11188) (0.05542) 
Age -0.00310** -0.00005 -0.00072 
 
(0.00149) (0.00408) (0.00101) 
Size 0.38907*** 0.29540*** 0.17209** 
 
(0.10619) (0.10411) (0.07683) 
Export orientation 0.59557** 0.40151** 0.04960 
 
(0.25989) (0.20427) (0.04357) 
Diversification -0.00269 0.20095 0.02122 
 
(0.09833) (0.15242) (0.06761) 
Sales growth 0.00218 0.00288 0.03340*** 
 
(0.00511) (0.00666) (0.00827) 
Profitability -0.03938 0.30490* 0.19743* 
 
(0.08303) (0.16698) (0.11667) 
Debt ratio -0.28508** 0.27846 0.03327 
 
(0.16541) (0.29606) (0.17585) 
Foreign ownership 0.00137* 0.00272* -0.00027 
 
(0.00073) (0.00138) (0.00107) 
Institutional ownership -0.00081 -0.00157 -0.00038 
 
(0.00196) (0.00377) (0.00147) 
Financial crisis -1.62602*** -1.29717** -0.69653* 
 
(0.51825) (0.54475) (0.36338) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Market dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes 
  Total Observations 2739 1407 1332 
AR(1) -3.43 -2.2 -3.9 
p-value 0.001 0.028 0 
AR(2) 0.92 0.98 -0.1 
p-value 0.359 0.328 0.922 
z 1  960.43(14) 395.57(13) 879.61(13) 
p-value 0.0061 0 0 
z 2  2.50(8) 2.03(8) 1.93(8) 
p-value 0.0122 0.0465 0.06 
Hansen J 123.81(119) 136.35(121) 133.42(119) 
p-value 0.363 0.161 0.173 
Significance levels: * <0.10, ** <0.05, ***<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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With a one-unit change in debt, the probability of R&D investment decreases by 28.51 per 
cent. This result is consistent with studies by Hall (1990), Cumming and Macintosh (2000) 
and Cheng and Chen (2006). Moreover, the adverse environment created by the financial 
crisis also affected R&D investment negatively in emerging markets in general. 
When the sample was separated between crisis-affected countries and less-/unaffected 
countries, some interesting results were produced for R&D determinants. Consistent with 
Cincera at al. (2012), the results show that R&D investments in both types of country were 
reduced to a greater or lesser extent by the financial crisis. Affected countries’ R&D 
investments were negatively influenced 1.86 times more than less-/unaffected countries. In 
other words, the crisis decreased the chances of R&D investment by 60 per cent more for 
crisis-affected than for less-/unaffected countries. The results show that, during the 
financial crisis, the R&D determinants for affected countries were firm size, exports, 
profitability and foreign ownership, while for less-/unaffected countries, the R&D 
determinants were firm size, sales growth and profitability. This suggests that firms’ R&D 
determinants behave differently in a financial crisis for affected and less-/unaffected 
countries. The results also imply that, whether a country is affected or not, firm size and 
profitability play an important role in R&D spending. This also confirms RBV, indicating 
that firm resources and capabilities are important determinants of R&D investment, even in 
a financial crisis. 
Firm size is positively related to R&D investment for both affected and less-/unaffected 
countries. This is because larger firms had more organisational slack, so they could invest 
in innovation even during the crisis period. Profitability impacted positively on R&D 
investment for both affected and less-/unaffected countries. This is due to that fact that 
high-profit firms remained in a more advantageous position to grow more quickly than 
other firms during the crisis period. Interestingly, the results show that the scale of the 
impact of firm size and profitability in affected countries was greater than in less-
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/unaffected countries, implying that affected countries devoted more resources and profits 
to innovative activities to alleviate the crisis. The results also show that sales growth does 
not explain R&D investment in financial crisis-affected countries. However, as expected, 
sales growth positively impacts on R&D expenditure in less-/unaffected countries more 
than in affected countries. With a one-unit change in sales growth, the probability of R&D 
spending increases by 3.33 per cent in less-/unaffected countries. This is because, during a 
crisis period, demand in affected countries is significantly reduced (Stiglitz, 1993; Hud and 
Hussinger, 2015). Exports significantly impacted on R&D during the crisis. With a one-
unit change in exports, there was a likelihood of increasing R&D investment by 40.15 per 
cent in affected countries. An explanation for this is that, before the beginning of the actual 
recession, some firms may have stocked up on products, and then sold them overseas 
during the recession to meet customer demand, earn greater profits and retain market 
power. 
The presence of foreign ownership had a significant positive impact on R&D spending in 
during the financial crisis for affected countries. This is because, owing to the credit 
crunch, affected countries tended to finance R&D investments from foreign investors. This 
result is similar to that obtained by Mangena et al. (2012), who also found that, during the 
political and economic crisis, ownership structures changed. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has empirically examined the firm-level determinants of R&D investment, 
focusing on the recent financial crisis in emerging markets. 3,100 firm-year observations 
were analysed for the period 2003-2012 using a Granger causality test and system GMM 
estimation. The Granger causality test was used to identify countries affected and less-
/unaffected by the recession. The results show that Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Israel, 
Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines and South Africa were affected by the financial crisis of 
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2007-2008. However, Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Chile, China, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, 
Russia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Turkey were less-/unaffected. 
In order to examine the impact of the financial crisis, the firms in emerging markets were 
divided into local firms and MNEs, and innovative and non-innovative firms. It has been 
found that both local firms and MNEs were negatively affected by the recent financial 
crisis. Moreover, MNEs’ R&D spending was more greatly affected by the financial crisis 
than that of local firms. The results show that MNEs were 1.63 times more affected by the 
recent financial crisis than local firms. Similarly, following cyclical theory, non-innovative 
firms’ R&D expenditure was negatively affected by the financial crisis. In contrast, 
innovative firms were positively affected. The results indicate that innovative firms 
continued to invest in R&D during the crisis, expecting to gain competitive advantage 
when a market up-turn arrived. Moreover, the results suggest that the degree to which 
firms’ R&D was affected by the financial crisis depended on their R&D policy. In other 
words, a strong R&D policy worked as a safeguard against recession. These empirical 
results support the cyclical and countercyclical views of R&D investment. Overall, the 
recent financial crisis adversely affected the R&D investment of emerging market firms. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that firm age, firm size, export orientation, debt ratio and 
foreign ownership were the main determinants of R&D investment in emerging markets 
during the financial crisis. In addition, it has been found that firms’ R&D determinants 
behave differently between affected and less-/unaffected countries. The results show that 
the R&D determinants in affected countries were firm size, exports, profitability and 
foreign ownership, while in less-/unaffected countries the determinants were firm size, 
sales growth and profitability. Firm size and profitability were the main R&D 
determinants, irrespective of whether or not a country was affected by the financial crisis. 
Following RBV, the results confirm that a firm’s resources and capabilities are the main 
determinants of R&D investment, even during a financial crisis. Furthermore, affected 
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countries’ R&D investments were negatively influenced1.86 times more than less-
/unaffected countries. In other words, the probability of a decrease in R&D investment in 
crisis-affected countries is 60 per cent higher than in less-/unaffected countries. 
The work presented here has profound implications for future studies of R&D investment 
in emerging markets, and may help policy makers, investors, managers and senior 
executives in emerging markets to make decisions on R&D investments. Due to missing 
values, some emerging markets were not included in the analysis, which is a limitation of 
this study. Further research is needed on other emerging markets to observe the impact of 
the financial crisis and identify the precise and correct determinants of R&D investment in 
emerging markets. Future research might be based on regions, because entire regions were 
affected equally by the financial crisis. For example, Asian emerging markets were less 
affected than European emerging markets by the recent financial crisis. 
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Chapter 6: Behaviour of Macroeconomic Determinants of R&D 
Investments in Advanced and Emerging Markets 
6.1 Introduction 
In this knowledge-based era, only technologically-advanced countries such as the USA, 
South Korea and Japan are dominant in world competition. At the core of this 
technological advancement is innovativeness. Innovation helps to transform the economic 
development of a country. Thus, the higher the innovativeness, the more advanced and 
knowledge-based the economy.  Moreover, a country’s standard of living (Bernstein, 
1996), and economic and productivity growth (Griliches, 1988) depend on its investment 
in R&D. The argument is that R&D investment provides a higher rate of return than 
investment in structures, machines and equipment (Coe et al., 1997). Moreover, the social 
rate of return on private R&D is seven times as large as on fixed investments (Lichtenberg, 
1992). However, returns from R&D investments depend on other external factors (OECD, 
2006). Oliver (1997) pointed out that the external environment, particularly institutions, 
have an influence on firm strategies such as R&D that create sustainable competitive 
advantage. In an empirical study, Hillier et al. (2011) found that institutional settings 
facilitate investment in R&D activities. Firms are most likely to respond positively to 
institutional pressure for R&D investment when they possess idiosyncratic resources and 
capabilities. This implies that firms tend to be more innovative in the presence of strong 
economic, social, legal and political institutions. Economic institutions have a particularly 
large impact on investment, financial development and economic growth (Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2005).  Furthermore, the economic institutions of a country attract MNEs to set 
up business operations there (Du et al., 2008), and economic institutions support managers 
and investors in accessing external finance for R&D activities in a timely manner. 
Macroeconomic factors form part of the effect of economic institutions. For example, 
strong economic institutions set lower interest rates, which creates a favourable 
environment for business investment, while adverse macroeconomic conditions, such as a 
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financial crisis, may be avoided or mitigated by strong economic institutions. Therefore, 
the combined framework of institutional context and firm strategy allow an examination of 
the macroeconomic determinants of aggregate R&D investment. 
There are several reasons why the macroeconomic environment is considered to be the 
most important driver of aggregate R&D expenditure. First, favourable macroeconomic 
conditions are essential for a country’s overall R&D performance (OECD, 2014). It is 
argued that macroeconomic factors determine budgets, policies and strategies for R&D 
expenditure. For example, a trade liberalisation policy has an impact on R&D investment 
(OECD, 2006). Clarke (2001) stated that trade openness, either to imports or foreign 
investment, increases market competition, which may affect domestic R&D spending. 
Similarly, it is highly likely that restricted trade liberalisation discourages technological 
change as it raises the price of incentives to innovate. Second, stability of macroeconomic 
factors helps to maintain a country’s investment in R&D (OECD, 2014). Moreover, in 
order to maintain economic growth and development and grow more robustly, a country 
will increase R&D expenditure, which is considered as the foundation for new businesses, 
new jobs and productivity growth (Braconier et al., 2014; OECD, 2015b). Therefore, 
identifying appropriate macroeconomic factors for R&D expenditure will help policy 
makers devise long-term plans for national economic growth. Most earlier papers that have 
dealt with macroeconomic determinants have been based on developed countries (e.g. 
Becker and Pain, 2008; Wang, 2010; Sameti et al., 2010; Guloglu, 2012; Hammadou et al., 
2014) and have covered the pre-crisis period. Thus, this study seeks to close this gap and 
observe the macroeconomic determinants of R&D investment for both advanced and 
emerging countries, covering the pre- and post-crisis periods. 
The existing literature has shown that GDP growth (Sameti et al., 2010), patents 
(Varsakelis, 2001), trade openness (Wu et al., 2007) and FDI (Guloglu et al., 2012) are the 
main macroeconomic determinants of a country’s R&D investments. Economic growth 
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creates employment opportunities, increasing the number of R&D researchers. Countries 
use patents to encourage, protect and reward innovation (Allred and Park, 2007a). 
Moreover, patents encourage individuals or firms to take first-mover advantage. Trade 
openness helps traders or partners to pool research, and this pooled research facilitates 
investment in large projects such as R&D. Furthermore, trade openness intensifies global 
market competition, and market competition boosts R&D investment (Barker, 2010; Kilic, 
2014). FDI may benefit R&D activity in the host country via spill-over channels such as 
reverse engineering, skilled labour turnover, demonstration effects and supplier–customer 
relationships (Cheung and Lin, 2004). In addition, FDI facilitates the use of upgraded 
technologies that help to increase productivity, fostering R&D investment (Rowthorn and 
Wells, 1987; Robert and Romana, 1997, cited in Lin and Yeh, 2005). 
Consistent with the existing literature, by applying a fixed and random-effect regression 
model with an IV approach for 36 countries during the period 2002-2011, this study finds 
that GDP growth, exports, trade openness, patents and financial crisis are the main 
macroeconomic determinants of a country’s R&D investment. Interesting results emerge 
when the sample countries are separated into sub-samples of advanced and emerging 
countries. It is found that GDP growth, exports, trade openness, patents and financial crisis 
are the macroeconomic determinants for advanced countries, while exports, trade 
openness, FDI, patents and market size are the macroeconomic determinants for emerging 
countries. Among the common determinants, only patents have a positive impact on R&D 
investments for both advanced and emerging countries. This implies that both types of 
country encourage the protection of property rights. Export intensity positively affects 
emerging countries’ R&D intensity while negatively affecting advanced countries. On the 
other hand, trade openness is negatively related to R&D intensity in emerging countries 
while positively related in advanced countries. In general, the results of the analysis 
suggest that macroeconomic determinants behave differently for R&D investment between 
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advanced and emerging countries, owing to their different nature and purpose and their 
level of economic development. 
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. First, although numerous researchers have 
examined the firm- and industry-level determinants of R&D investment, few have 
emphasised its macroeconomic determinants (e.g. Varsakelis, 2001; Becker and Pain, 
2008; Wang, 2010; Sameti et al., 2010; Guloglu, 2012; Hammadou et al., 2014). 
Therefore, the latter are examined in this study. Moreover, this is the first work to consider 
the financial crisis as a determinant of a country’s R&D policy. The main reason for doing 
so is that the recent financial crisis adversely affected most countries worldwide, and 
during the recession, the role of other economic variables may have changed. 
Second, this is thought to be among the first efforts to test variation across the 
macroeconomic determinants of R&D investment for advanced and emerging countries. 
Macroeconomic policies determine a country’s growth and development path, which 
affects the aggregate economy (Ames et al., 2001). Moreover, macroeconomic policies 
create networks with the rest of the world. For example, a country’s export intensity 
depends on international relations with other countries which can be achieved through an 
open trade policy or a flexible tax policy. However, these macroeconomic policies differ 
between emerging and advanced countries (Monteil, 2011). It is widely accepted that 
developed countries’ macroeconomic policies are stable, while the sensitivity of emerging 
market policies is highly likely to depend on policy changes and shocks. As a result, 
macroeconomic policies are made in the context of emerging economies (Montiel, 2011). 
Moreover, Montiel (2011) has pointed out that distinguishing emerging markets from 
developed markets helps provide an understanding of how economies work at the 
macroeconomic level. Thus, this study will be of particular interest to policy makers in 
emerging markets, who need constantly to make decisions on macroeconomic policies. 
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Third, in relation to the methodological contribution, this study is among the first to 
investigate the macroeconomic drivers of R&D investment by addressing causality. Most 
of the existing literature has shown causality between GDP growth and R&D investment, 
and between patents and R&D investment (see Section 6.2)
2
. Moreover, unobserved 
heterogeneity is taken into account, as the results described in this chapter are based on 
panel data estimation. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 presents the hypotheses of the study, 
Section 6.3 introduces the data and research methods, Section 6.4 presents and discusses 
the results, and Section 6.5 draws conclusions from this study. 
6.2 Hypotheses to be tested 
There is a strong relationship between GDP growth and R&D investment (OECD, 2015b). 
According to the acceleration principle, changes in economic growth have an effect on 
R&D investment. Rising economic growth indicates rising profits and sales and greater use 
of existing capacity. In order to maintain and improve firm performance, firms ultimately 
invest in R&D (Pindado et al., 2015). In a similar vein, in order to maintain economic 
growth and grow more robustly, countries increase their R&D expenditure. Furthermore, 
economic growth that results in the creation of employment opportunities increases the 
number of R&D researchers. Markusen (1986) stated that richer consumers tend to allocate 
a greater share of income to differentiated products, which are more R&D intensive. Thus, 
increased GDP growth seems to lead to increased investment in R&D. As a result, Wang 
(2010) argued that GDP growth creates stronger incentives for R&D investment. Sameti et 
al.’s (2010) study, based on 30 OECD countries, revealed that GDP growth has a positive 
impact on R&D investment. On the other hand, Wang (2010) found a fragile relationship 
between GDP growth and R&D investment, arguing that R&D investment policies and 
                                                 
2 There may be causality between exports and R&D investment, FDI and R&D investment and market size 
and R&D investment, but the existing literature does not provide sufficient evidence for these. 
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targets are determined by governments and other international organisations, not by GDP 
growth. Santos and Catalão-Lopes (2014) examined the causality between GDP growth 
and R&D in European countries, with an emphasis on Portugal, and found that causality 
may exist but varies across countries. Thus, the existing literature has provided 
inconclusive results. On the grounds of the acceleration principle, the following hypothesis 
is postulated: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the GDP growth, the higher the R&D investment 
intensity. 
A larger export market increases the probability of investment in R&D (Kumar and Saqib, 
1996; Tan and Hwang, 2002). Foreign exposure induces increases in productivity growth 
that ultimately foster investment in R&D. As a result of international linkages, exporters 
are constantly updated on recent technological developments. Moreover, in order to 
maintain competitive strength and produce international-standard, diversified products, 
exporters need to invest in R&D. Damijan et al. (2010) stated that exporters are two to five 
times more likely to be innovative than non-exporters, while Aw et al. (2007) revealed that 
exporters that invest in R&D and staff training are 10 to 17 percent more efficient than 
non-exporters. Furthermore, in a study based on Canadian manufacturing firms, Baldwin 
and Gu (2004) observed that new exporters are likely to invest in advanced technology in 
order to enhance absorptive capacity. This concept supports the “learning by exporting” 
hypothesis, implying that previous exporting experience increases the probability of firms’ 
R&D investment (Salomon and Shaver, 2005). Damijan et al. (2010) found that exporting 
activity helps firms to become more process-innovative. Moreover, Aw et al. (2007) found 
a positive relationship between exports and R&D investment based on micro-data. 
However, according to Abdelmoula and Etienne (2010), exports generally involve 
standard, non-innovative products. Earlier studies have failed to reach a consensus on the 
relationship between exports and R&D investment. Although earlier results have been 
inconclusive, on the basis of foreign exposure, the following hypothesis is postulated: 
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Hypothesis 2: Exports have a positive impact on R&D expenditure. 
Trade openness has an impact on R&D investment (Wu et al., 2007) and facilitates traders 
or partners in pooled research, which aids investments in large projects such as R&D. 
Trade openness intensifies global market competition, and market competition boosts 
R&D investment. The greater the competitiveness of a country, the higher its R&D 
investment (Varsakellis, 2001). Lower trade barriers encourage foreign presence, which 
has a positive impact on R&D activity (Anwar and Sun, 2013). Moreover, trade openness 
increases stock market efficiency (Lim and Kim, 2011), which ensures that investors create 
wealth by investing in R&D. According to Matsushima et al. (2008, cited in Sameti et al., 
2010), high innovation and fixed trade costs cause a positive relationship between trade 
openness and the R&D activities of a firm, while low innovation and fixed trade costs 
cause a negative relationship between the two. However, based on a cross-country study, 
Varsakellis (2001) explained that, due to the cross-industry effect, there is no relationship 
between economy openness and R&D intensity. Trade openness increases competition, and 
on these grounds the following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 3: Trade openness has a positive impact on R&D expenditure. 
In general, expansion of FDI increases R&D investment by MNEs and foreign firms in 
local markets. FDI may benefit R&D activity in the host country through spill-over 
channels such as reverse engineering, skilled labour turnover, demonstration effects and 
supplier-customer relationships (Cheung and Lin, 2004). Sasidharan and Kathuria’s (2011) 
examination of the relationship between FDI and R&D investment in Indian manufacturing 
firms for the period 1994-2005 found, when their sample was divided according to equity 
ownership, that FDI and R&D are complements not substitutes. They also found that FDI 
induces foreign-owned firms to increase R&D investment in high-tech industries and firms 
with minority ownership. However, Beladi and Firoozi (2008) have stated that the existing 
literature has not shown an inconclusive relationship between FDI and R&D investment. 
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There is a negative relationship if MNEs avoid entry because domestic firms face 
technological challenges, and a positive relationship when MNEs are motivated partly by 
technological spill-over into domestic markets. From the macroeconomic perspective, 
increased FDI leads to de-industrialisation (Lin and Yeh, 2005), which reduces R&D 
investment. This is because increased FDI decreases domestic investment, employment 
and exports (Singh, 1977; Thirlwall, 1982, both cited in Lin and Yeh, 2005). On the other 
hand, FDI facilitates the use of upgraded technologies, which helps to increase productivity 
(Rowthorn and Wells, 1987; Robert and Romana, 1997, cited in Lin and Yeh, 2005) and 
fosters R&D investment. However, Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001) argued that FDI 
contributes to neither improvement nor reduction of the technological base of host 
countries. On the grounds of the spill-over effects of FDI, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the FDI, the higher the R&D investment. 
Invention motivation theory explains that anticipation of patents provides motivation for 
useful inventions. Moreover, inducing commercialisation theory views patents on 
inventions as inducing the investment needed to develop and commercialise those 
inventions. Patents allow innovators to produce particular products and ensure monopoly 
power in the market, thus increasing profits and creating additional incentives for 
investment in R&D (Mukherjee, 2005). In this regard, Allred and Park (2007a) stated that 
countries use patents to encourage, protect and reward innovation. Wang (2010) argued 
that strong patents increase the market share of owners of new goods or processes, and 
prohibit the entrance of imitators; hence, producers invest in R&D in order to cover a 
larger market. As a result, Grabowski’s (1968) study found a significant positive influence 
of patents on R&D investment. Klemperer’s (1990) study also came to the same 
conclusion. On the other hand, Almedia and Teixiera (2007) provided mixed results. They 
argued that making patents easier to obtain may actually cause R&D expenditure to 
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decline. In this sense, raising patent costs and increasing standards will stimulate R&D. 
Although the existing literature has shown inconclusive results, on the basis of invention 
motivation theory, the following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 5: Patents have a positive impact on R&D expenditure. 
Financial crisis is never welcome. Following cyclical theory, during a financial crisis, 
firms reduce their R&D investment due to financial constraints. Financial constraints, 
lower customer demand for products and services, low profit margins and a generally 
“pessimistic mood” (Freeman et al., 1982) make R&D cyclical. Moreover, Stiglitz (1993) 
and Hall (2002) argued that firms will decrease their R&D investments during a financial 
crisis due to credit rationing and limited internal funding. In light of the recent financial 
crisis, the OECD (2009, 2012) and Archibugi et al. (2013) found that firms reduced their 
investment in innovation and R&D. The anti-cyclical view states that financial crises 
induce R&D investment in order to replace old and inefficient production techniques with 
newer ones. Opportunity costs, availability of internal funding, high adjustment costs and 
large firm size make R&D investment counter-cyclical. Consistent with the anti-cyclical 
view, Archibugi et al. (2013b) found that fast-growing new firms and those already highly 
innovative before a crisis invest in innovation during the crisis. Thus, whether or not R&D 
investment is cyclical remains an open question. According to Cincera et al. (2012), it 
depends on how a company reacts to a financial crisis and the way it manages the R&D 
process and collaboration or outsourcing with others. At a country level, a financial crisis 
may have different effects because of pre-crisis preparation, previous experience, stock 
market strength, and the law and regulations of a country (Graham et al., 2012; Wenn, 
2013). Following cyclical theory, the following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 6: Financial crisis has a negative impact on R&D expenditure. 
Increase in market size has an impact on R&D investment (Acemoglu and Linn, 2004). 
Market size influences R&D decisions in the following ways. First, larger markets have a 
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larger number of producers, which ensures market competition, and greater market 
competition boosts firms to invest in R&D. Second, larger market share indicates higher 
internal funding and more profits that can be used to finance R&D activity. Third, larger 
market share ensures an ability to recoup returns on R&D investment. Acemoglu and Linn 
(2004) tested the effects of market size on innovation in the US pharmaceutical industry 
for the period 1965-2000, and found that a one per cent increase in market size led to an 
approximately four per cent increase in the introduction of new drugs and new molecular 
entities, and that R&D and technological change was directed toward more profitable 
areas. Moreover, Berry and Waldfogel (2010) examined the relationship between market 
size and product quality, finding that with variable-cost products, such as restaurants, the 
range on offer increases with market size, and with fixed-cost products, such as 
newspapers, the quality of products increases with market size. On the grounds of the 
above discussion, the following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 7: Larger market size ensures greater R&D investment. 
6.3 Data, model and method 
6.3.1 Data 
Annual data were drawn from the World Bank’s Development Indicators and Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. After removing data with missing values, the World Bank provided 
data on 36 countries (see Appendix 1). To be included in the sample, a country must have 
10 consecutive years of data. The 10-year sample period of the study was from 2002 to 
2011. This period was selected because of data availability on the variables from the World 
Bank’s database. Gaps in the latest data were minimised where possible. Balanced panel 
data were used for the sample countries. Panel data were used because they enable control 
for firm heterogeneity, provide more information, greater variability and more degrees of 
freedom, avoid multicollinearity problems, provide more efficient results and are more 
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suitable for identifying and measuring effects that are not detectable in pure cross-sectional 
or pure time series data (Baltagi, 2013). 
                                          Table 6.1: Summary of Variables 
Variable Description  
R&D intensity R&D expenditure by percentage of GDP 
GDP growth Annual GDP growth 
Exports Exports of goods and services by percentage of GDP 
Trade openness Ratio of exports and imports to GDP 
FDI FDI received (In log) 
Patents Number of patent applications (In log) 
Financial crisis dummy Takes a value of 1 during crisis years 2007-2009 
Market size Market value of shares by percentage of GDP 
Regulatory quality Mean value from -2.5 to 2.5 capturing the ability of the government 
Government effectiveness Mean value from -2.5 to 2.5 capturing quality of policy formulation 
and implementation 
Savings Gross savings by percentage of GDP 
Inflation Annual percentage change in consumer price index 
Country dummy Takes a value of 1 if the country is advanced, and 0 otherwise 
 
Table 6.1 provides definitions of the variables. From the existing literature, the above-
listed variables have been found to have significant effects on countries’ R&D expenditure. 
In this study, R&D intensity is considered as a dependent variable, being the ratio of 
annual R&D expenditure to GDP. The main independent variables are GDP growth, 
exports, trade openness, FDI, patents, financial crisis and size of the market. The control 
variables are regulatory quality and government effectiveness, and the instrumental 
variables are savings and inflation. All variables are standardised to a common USD 
exchange rate. Some of the explanatory variables have higher scales than other, and the 
absolute value of the variables increases the presence of heteroscedasticity (Grabowski, 
1968). In order to avoid these problems, natural logarithm, ratio and percentage variables 
are adopted. 
6.3.1.1 Control Variables 
R&D investment is highly related to country-specific factors such as the political, legal and 
social environment. In order to isolate the effect of specificity, institutional factors are used 
as a control variable. The control variables are the quality of regulation and government 
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effectiveness of a country. Regulatory quality measures the ability of a government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that promote private-sector 
development (World Bank, 2014). Issues for consideration include market competition 
policy, protection of intellectual property, reliability of financial statements, tax codes and 
investment incentives (The Economist, 2014). Regulatory quality ranges from 
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) for scores of governance performance. The 
government effectiveness of a country measures its quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, the sincerity of its commitment to such policies, and its degree of 
independence from political pressure (World Bank, 2014). 
6.3.1.2 Instrumental variables 
From the existing literature, it can be said that there is causality between R&D investment 
and GDP growth and between R&D investment and patents, which create an endogeneity 
bias problem. In order to avoid endogeneity bias and obtain estimates of the simultaneity 
of R&D investment and GDP growth and patents, three instrumental variables are used: the 
gross savings and inflation of a country, and the lag of the dependent variable. Using these 
instrumental variables adds variation to GDP growth and patents, making them exogenous 
to R&D intensity. 
There is no doubt about the relationship between a country’s savings and economic 
growth. Higher savings indicate lower consumption, enhancing investment opportunities, 
employment and production, and leading to higher economic growth. On the other hand, 
higher economic growth may increase a country’s savings rate. According to the Harrod-
Domar growth model, two important factors for economic growth are a country’s savings 
and its capital-output ratio. 
Inflation is a strong predictor of GDP growth. Higher inflation decreases economic growth 
while lower inflation increases economic growth. Lower inflation indicates stability and 
assurance, which lead to higher investment, and higher investment may lead to stronger 
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economic growth. On the other hand, economic growth also influences inflation. For 
example, in the period of the Lawson boom of the 1980s, the UK’s annual economic 
growth reached five per cent, causing an 11 per cent increase in inflation. 
R&D investment encourages innovation (Prodan, 2005). Innovation helps to increase 
national productivity and employment which, in turn, spurs GDP growth. Moreover, 
innovation ensures a country’s long-term growth. R&D investments with a time lag also 
use a country’s patent applications as an input. According to Grief (1985, cited in Prodan, 
2005), it takes one to two years from R&D investment to patent application, although Hall 
et al. (1986) denied the existence of this time lag. In this study, a one-year lag is considered 
for R&D intensity with regard to patent applications. 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 present descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent, control and 
instrumental variables. 
                                     Table 6.2: Summary Statistics for All Countries 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
R&D intensity 1.56845 1.00826 0.11597 4.52323 
GDP growth 3.22602 4.25394 -17.95499 15.24038 
Exports 47.55467 34.45117 9.06343 230.26900 
Trade openness 94.40744 64.75060 21.16393 439.65670 
FDI 9.68017 1.99117 0.00000 11.53156 
Patents 3.32678 0.97004 1.25527 5.61892 
Financial crisis 0.30000 0.45890 0.00000 1.00000 
Market size 56.69986 42.25633 3.77917 248.51920 
Regulatory quality 0.95831 0.67498 -0.61000 1.94000 
Government effectiveness 0.96072 0.81427 -0.81000 2.43000 
Savings 23.24385 8.10167 9.03011 53.34713 
Inflation 3.99289 4.29327 -4.47994 44.96412 
Country dummy 0.61111 0.48818 0.00000 1.00000 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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                                                                                        Table 6.3: Summary Statistics for Advanced and Emerging Markets 
 Advanced countries Emerging countries 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
R&D intensity 2.07424 0.96462 0.37808 4.52323 0.77362 0.34400 0.11597 1.83617 
GDP growth 2.36238 3.81298 -17.95499 15.24038 4.58318 4.56015 -14.80000 14.16239 
Exports 54.26905 40.34749 9.06343 230.26900 37.00351 17.80641 10.87158 93.99816 
Trade openness 106.07120 75.26125 21.16393 439.65670 76.07869 36.74961 22.11830 180.50120 
FDI 9.59976 2.30682 0.00000 11.53156 9.80653 1.35259 0.00000 11.52060 
Patents 3.42711 1.01875 1.25527 5.56634 3.16912 0.86841 1.73239 5.61892 
Financial crisis 0.30000 0.45930 0.00000 1.00000 0.30000 0.45990 0.00000 1.00000 
Market size 68.54734 45.36044 3.77917 248.51920 38.08239 28.26092 4.58916 178.19710 
Regulatory quality 1.38927 0.32055 0.48000 1.94000 0.28107 0.50881 -0.61000 1.31000 
Government effectiveness 1.50368 0.46456 0.49000 2.43000 0.10750 0.41544 -0.81000 1.02000 
Savings 23.82910 7.19826 10.00310 51.53243 22.32418 9.30014 9.03011 53.34713 
Inflation 2.39881 2.01980 -4.47994 15.40320 6.49787 5.55302 -1.14575 44.96412 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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R&D intensity in advanced countries is almost double that of emerging countries, although 
GDP growth is completely the opposite, being almost double in emerging countries 
compared with advanced countries. Consumer spending power and structural development 
increase GDP growth in emerging markets. Owing to the risk of intellectual property theft 
and management issues, R&D investment in emerging markets is far below that of 
advanced ones (The Economist, 2014), although emerging-market R&D investment has 
recently increased considerably. Investments in technology are established and fixed in 
advanced countries (Logue, 2011). There are significant disparities in exports, trade 
openness and market size between advanced and emerging countries. However, higher 
standard deviations for these factors indicate variations across advanced countries. 
Institutional factors such as regulatory quality and government effectiveness are better in 
advanced countries than in emerging countries. Regulatory quality is weak and often 
uncertain, and governments are typically more intrusive and less transparent in emerging 
markets (The Economist, 2014). Emerging countries’ inflation rates vary, but are 
commonly higher than in advanced countries. 
6.3.2 Model 
In order to examine the macroeconomic determinants of R&D expenditure, the following 
model was devised. A semi-logarithmic model is used for the analysis, firstly because 
financial crisis is a dummy variable which takes values of 0 and 1, so the logarithm cannot 
be used for this variable as the logarithm of 0 does not exist. Secondly, GDP growth, 
regulatory quality and government effectiveness may be negative; thus, the logarithms of 
these values cannot be used. 
RD Intensityit = αi + β1(GDP growthit) + β2(Exportit) + β3(Trade Opennessit) 
+ β4ln(FDIit) + β5ln(Patentit) +β6(Financial crisisit)+ β7(Market Sizeit) + 
β8(Regularity Qualityit)+β9(Government Effectivenessit) +ci + vit                                (1) 
where subscript i represents the country and t represents the year. Here αi, and β1 to 
β9represent the relationships between R&D investment and GDP growth, exports, trade 
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openness, FDI, patents, financial crisis, market size, regulatory quality and government 
effectiveness. The error component εit is separated into two components εit = ci + vit. As the 
countries are split between advanced and emerging, a country dummy, ci is included. The 
country dummy captures country-specific effects. Moreover, vit is considered as a random 
disturbance term which is assumed to be i.i.d. normal. 
6.3.3 Method 
A fixed- and random-effect model with an IV approach was used to examine the 
macroeconomic determinants of a country’s R&D investment. 
An IV approach was adopted for the following reasons. First, the existing literature has 
shown causality between R&D investment and GDP growth and between R&D investment 
and patents. These simultaneously create a problem of endogeneity bias. In the presence of 
endogeneity, OLS estimation will be biased and inconsistent, and standard errors will be 
unreliable. According to Worrall (2010), an IV approach provides a potential solution to 
endogeneity bias in the context of panel data. Second, the IV approach provides consistent 
estimation under the assumption that valid instruments exist (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). 
Finally, the model was tested for potential misspecification. First, the hypothesis that the 
instruments are weak was tested. An Anderson-Rubin Wald test rejected the null 
hypothesis at the statistically significant one per cent level. Moreover, the Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic exceeded the 10 per cent maximum bias critical value. Second, the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test indicated that the excluded instruments predict the 
endogenous variable at the five per cent significance level. Third, the Hansen J statistic of 
over-identifying restrictions was used to test whether the instruments are valid, i.e. 
uncorrelated with the error terms. The results show that the instruments in the model are 
valid. Fourth, the hypothesis that the regressors are exogenous was tested. An endogeneity 
test rejected the null hypothesis at the one per cent significance level. 
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Although the Hausman test shows a preference for a fixed-effects model, due to their 
distinct advantages, both fixed-effects and random-effects models were used. A fixed-
effects model adjusts data changes within individuals, while a random-effects model is 
efficient in adjusting changes across individuals. A fixed-effects model assumes that 
individual-level residuals are correlated with predictors, while a random-effects model 
assumes no correlation. 
A fixed-effects model was devised using two-step GMM with robust standard errors, and a 
random-effects model using generalised least squares (GLS) without robust standard 
errors. GMM was used rather than 2SLS or limited information maximum likelihood 
(LIML) for the following reasons. First, GMM is robust to autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity, and Wooldridge and Modified Wald tests confirmed the presence of 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problems in the data. Second, GMM nests several 
estimations within a single framework, including OLS, 2SLS and IV (Worrall, 2008). 
Moreover, GMM provides more efficient estimation when there are two endogenous 
variables. Due to software limitations, the specification test and robust standard errors are 
not reported for the random-effects model, although the fixed- and random-effects models 
provided almost the same results. 
6.4 Results 
Table 6.4 presents the empirical results of analysis based on the IV approach. The results 
show that GDP growth, exports, trade openness, patents and financial crisis are the main 
macroeconomic determinants of a country’s R&D investment. GDP growth, exports, and 
financial crisis have a significant negative impact on R&D investment, while patents and 
trade openness have a significant positive impact. 
A one-unit rise in GDP growth is associated with a 3.2 per cent reduction in R&D 
intensity. This reversely supports Hypothesis 1, showing that lower GDP growth induces a 
country to be more innovative. Moreover, during the recent financial crisis, countries 
146 
employed capital for real investments or projects that would provide quick returns, rather 
than long-term R&D investments. In addition, the negative relationship between GDP 
growth and R&D investment may be due to the selected sample period. Wang (2010) also 
found that GDP growth is a fragile determinant of R&D intensity, based on 26 OECD 
countries. R&D investment changes with variations in a country’s export performance. 
With a one-unit change in exports, the probability of R&D investment decreases by four 
percent. This means that the adverse effect of the recent financial crisis reduced the exit 
probability of exporter firms. Moreover, Paunov (2012) pointed out that losses on export 
market sales are more likely to lead to discontinuation of innovation. In contrast, Domijan 
et al. (2010) found that the learning effect of exporting does not contribute to R&D 
investment. This reversely supports Hypothesis 2. A one percent change in trade openness 
produces a three per cent change in R&D investment. Higher trade openness opens the 
door to global market competition, which influences firms to invest in R&D. Sameti et al. 
(2010) also identified trade openness as a determinant of R&D intensity. The results 
support Hypothesis 3. With a one-unit change in patenting, there is a probability of a 246 
per cent increase in R&D investment. This is because patents motivate greater investment 
in R&D to obtain first-mover advantage. This is supported by invention motivation theory. 
Similar results were obtained by Varsakelis (2001), based on a study of 50 countries. Thus, 
Hypothesis 5 is supported. According to cyclical theory, financial crisis causes firms to cut 
down on R&D investment in order to cope with difficult times. With a one-unit rise in 
financial crisis, the likelihood of R&D investment reduces by around 16 percent. This 
implies that recession adversely affects a country’s productivity, investment and 
employment. An OECD (2012) study found similar results. Thus, Hypothesis 6 is 
supported. 
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                                       Table 6.4: Results Summary – IV Approach 
 Fixed Effects Estimation Random Effects Estimation 
 All Advanced Emerging All Advanced Emerging 
GDP growth -0.03260** -0.05068* 0.00557 -0.03734** -0.04721** -0.00051 
 (0.01627) (0.02757) (0.00761) (0.01217) (0.02202) (0.00513) 
Exports -0.04080* -0.09382** 0.01897* -0.04688** -0.09279** 0.00667 
 (0.02413) (0.03945) (0.01120) (0.01637) (0.03012) (0.00751) 
Trade openness 0.03033** 0.06420** -0.01074* 0.03469*** 0.06362*** -0.00209 
 (0.01411) (0.02357) (0.00632) (0.00940) (0.01707) (0.00429) 
FDI 0.00176 0.00970 -0.01059** 0.00196 0.00617 -0.01604* 
 (0.00879) (0.01311) (0.00483) (0.00851) (0.0116) (0.0081) 
Patents 2.46312*** 3.74313*** 1.01426*** 2.30475*** 2.80906*** 0.85662*** 
 (0.50563) (0.81999) (0.10811) (0.24517) (0.35973) (0.08906) 
Financial crisis -0.15662** -0.22506** 0.02831 -0.16762** -0.19625** 0.00533 
 (0.07226) (0.10716) (0.03858) (0.05758) (0.08736) (0.03122) 
Market size 0.00025 0.00266 -0.00115* 0.00029 0.00112 -0.00094* 
 (0.00094) (0.00164) (0.00067) (0.00091) (0.00146) (0.00055) 
Regulatory quality -0.07618 0.51016 -0.02543 -0.01028 0.23307 0.09429 
 (0.21555) (0.36371) (0.10541) (0.15731) (0.26352) (0.08794) 
Government 
effectiveness 
-0.14861 0.11174 -0.44189*** -0.07868 0.05817 -0.16104 
(0.12922) (0.18425) (0.12201) (0.14851) (0.20125) (0.11978) 
Country Dummy              0.53835  
             (0.57824)   
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
test 
22.729*** 8.872** 7.699**       
Anderson-Rubin Wald 
test  
99.64*** 80.32*** 41.68***    
Cragg-Donald Wald F 
stat 
19.499 11.833 14.202    
Endogeneity test 27.264*** 16.477*** 17.268***    
Hansen J statistics P-
value 
0.8451 0.2602 0.9946 0.5015 0.1729 0.3817 
Number of observations 324 198 126 324 198 126 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis; significance levels: *< 0.10, **< 0.05, ***< 0.01. 
Comparison of the behaviour of macroeconomic determinants between advanced and 
emerging markets reveals some interesting results. The results show that patents, exports 
and trade openness, with different signs, are common determinants of R&D investment. 
Numbers of patent applications have a significant positive relationship with R&D 
investment in both advanced and emerging markets. This implies that both types of country 
encourage protection of property rights. Moreover, people or firms in both types seek to 
take early opportunities for new inventions or creations. Varsakelis (2001) reached the 
same conclusion based on 50 countries. Exports have a positive impact on R&D 
investment in emerging markets and a negative impact in advanced countries. This is 
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because emerging markets can make products more cheaply than developed countries, 
which attracts international attention and earns higher profits. Moreover, emerging markets 
may adopt an export-led growth strategy. Empirical evidence from emerging markets has 
shown a positive relationship between exports and R&D investment. Kumar and Saqib’s 
(1994) study of India and Braga and Wilmore’s (1991) study of Brazilian firms found a 
positive relationship between the two. 
On the other hand, trade openness is positively associated with R&D investment in 
advanced countries but negatively associated in emerging countries. This result implies 
that, due to discrimination in trade restrictions, tax competition and exchange rates, trade 
openness has a positive effect in advanced countries and a negative effect in emerging 
markets. The empirical evidence has supported both directions: Sameti et al. (2010) 
supported a positive relationship, while Eaton and Kortum (2001) supported a negative 
relationship. In this regard, Gupta (2009) suggested that neither trade openness nor a 
closed economy, but controlled, regulated and selective trade are appropriate for emerging 
markets. The GDP growth index exhibits a significant negative relationship with R&D 
investment in advanced countries. This means that, as a result of the recent financial crisis, 
GDP growth in advanced countries slowed down and was not used as a tool for innovation. 
Moreover, advanced countries had already gained benefits from past technological 
advancements and innovation. Akinwale et al. (2012) observed a negative relationship 
between R&D and economic growth. It is assumed that emerging markets grew more than 
twice as much as advanced countries. As a result, GDP growth shows a positive sign, but is 
not significant for emerging countries. This is because emerging countries spent their 
income on infrastructural development. 
Consistent with cyclical theory, there is no doubt that the recent financial crisis adversely 
affected advanced countries, creating a credit crunch in these countries. Emerging markets 
were more resilient during the financial crisis and are considered to be crisis-resistant 
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countries. With a one-unit change in FDI, the probability of R&D investment decreases by 
one percent in emerging countries. This may be because FDI in emerging markets does not 
contribute to R&D investment, or may help production and exports rather than R&D 
intensity. Moreover, FDI is comparatively low in emerging markets. A similar result was 
revealed by Kathuria’s (2008) study of the emerging market of India. Market size has a 
negative impact on R&D investment in emerging markets. Emerging markets have small 
market size due to lower per capita income and consequently lower purchasing power 
(Gupta, 2009). Small market size provides weak incentives for R&D investment. 
Moreover, government effectiveness and R&D investment have a negative relationship in 
emerging countries. This implies that emerging markets have a lack of good governance. 
The results suggest that macroeconomic determinants behave differently for R&D 
investment between advanced and emerging countries due to their different nature and 
purpose. 
                                                  Table 6.5: Comparison of Results 
Determinants Hypothesis All Advanced Emerging 
GDP growth Positive Reversely Supported Reversely Supported  
Exports Positive Reversely Supported Reversely Supported Supported 
Trade openness Positive Supported Supported Reversely Supported 
FDI Positive   Reversely Supported 
Patent Positive Supported Supported Supported 
Financial crisis Negative Supported Supported  
Market size Positive   Reversely Supported 
 
Table 6.5 compares the results with the hypotheses. All hypotheses based on the literature 
are either supported or reversely supported by IV estimation. It was hypothesised that 
higher GDP growth contributes to higher R&D investment in a country. This is reversely 
supported for advanced countries. This suggests that lower GDP growth may contribute to 
higher R&D investment for sustainable or long-term growth. The export hypothesis is 
supported for emerging countries; that is, higher export performance has a positive 
relationship with R&D intensity. However, export intensity negatively affects R&D 
investment for advanced countries. The trade openness hypothesis is supported for 
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advanced countries, while reversely supported for emerging countries. FDI and R&D 
investment are negatively related for emerging markets. This is because FDI is still weak 
in emerging markets. Only the patent hypothesis provides the same results for all 
categories, supporting the hypothesis. Financial crisis negatively affects advanced 
countries but does not affect emerging countries. Market size is reversely supported for 
emerging markets. This suggests that lower market size may result in greater R&D 
investment in order to grow faster and compete with global markets. All results are the 
same for all countries and for advanced countries because about 60 per cent of the sample 
consisted of advanced countries. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the macroeconomic determinants of R&D investment. 
Macroeconomic behavioural differences between advanced and emerging countries have 
been investigated. Panel data fixed-effects and random-effects regression models with an 
IV approach were used for36 countries for the period 2002-2011. 
GDP growth, exports, trade openness, patents and financial crisis are found to be the main 
macroeconomic determinants of a country’s R&D investment.GDP growth negatively 
affects R&D investment, showing that lower GDP growth induce sa country to be more 
innovative. Moreover, as a result of the recent financial crisis, countries employed capital 
for real investments or projects that would provide quick returns, rather than long-term 
R&D investment. Export intensity and R&D intensity are negatively associated. This 
means that the adverse effects of the recent financial crisis reduced the exit probability of 
exporter firms. There is a positive relationship between trade openness and R&D intensity. 
Higher trade openness opens the door to global market competition, which influences firms 
to invest in R&D. Patents have a positive impact on a country’s R&D investment. This is 
because patents motivate greater investment in R&D in order to obtain first-mover 
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advantage. Financial crisis negatively affects countries’ R&D investment. This implies that 
recession adversely affects a country’s productivity, investment and employment. 
When the sample countries were separated into advanced and emerging, the estimation 
provided surprising results. The results suggest that macroeconomic determinants behave 
differently for R&D investment between advanced and emerging countries, owing to their 
different nature and purpose.GDP growth, exports, trade openness, patents and financial 
crisis are found to be the macroeconomic determinants for advanced countries, while 
exports, trade openness, FDI, patents and market size are the macroeconomic determinants 
for emerging countries. Among the common determinants, only patents have a positive 
impact on R&D investment for both advanced and emerging countries. This implies that 
both types of country encourage protection of property rights. Moreover, people and firms 
in both types seek to take early opportunities for new inventions or creations. Export 
intensity positively affects emerging countries while negatively affecting advanced 
countries. This is because emerging markets can make products more cheaply than 
developed countries, which attracts international attention and earns higher profits. On the 
other hand, trade openness is negatively related to R&D investment in emerging countries 
while positively related in advanced countries. The result simply that discrimination in 
trade restrictions, tax competition and trade openness has a positive effect in advanced 
countries and a negative effect in emerging markets. GDP growth and financial crisis 
negatively impact on R&D intensity. Due to the recent financial crisis, investment reduced 
dramatically in advanced countries, which also affected their GDP growth. FDI and market 
size negatively affect R&D intensity in emerging markets. FDI is still weak and market 
size small in emerging countries. 
It is hoped that this study will serve as new evidence for investors and policy makers when 
considering R&D investment in advanced and emerging countries. Due to missing values, 
not all advanced and emerging markets were included in the analysis, which is a limitation 
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of this study. In addition, also due to missing values, some economic factors that may have 
an impact on country-level R&D investment were not included. Due to data availability, 
interest rates, savings and the lag of the dependent variable were considered as 
instrumental variables, which is another limitation of the study. However, the empirical 
results of this study may provide lessons for other advanced and emerging markets. Further 
investigation is needed on other advanced and emerging markets to identify specific 
macroeconomic determinants of R&D investment. 
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Chapter 7: Institutional Determinants of R&D Investment: Evidence 
from Emerging Countries 
7.1 Introduction 
R&D investment is considered to be one of the most essential elements in promoting 
economic growth and development (OECD, 2015b). Wang (2010) observed that countries 
with a sufficient level of R&D investment can achieve target economic growth by 
promoting productivity and advancing their knowledge base. A central focus of innovation 
research is analysis of R&D determinants (Barge-Gil and López, 2014). Previous research 
has used the Schumpeterian hypothesis and inter-industry effects to explain the 
determinants of R&D investment (Barge-Gil and López, 2014). RBV (Lai et al., 2015) and 
the behavioural view (Lewellyn and Bao, 2015) have also been used to explain the 
determinants. However, Wang (2010) stated that institutional factors may also help to 
explain R&D investment. Following an observation by Barge-Gil and López (2014), who 
pointed out the omission of important R&D determinants from the literature, this paper 
examines the institutional determinants of R&D investment. 
Scott (1995) and Oliver (1997) stated that strategic choices such as R&D are driven by the 
institutional framework. Wang et al. (2015) supported this notion, indicating that R&D 
investment strategy, structure and process must be compatible with institutional demands. 
There are several reasons why the institutional environment is considered to be the most 
important driver of innovative activities. First, good institutional quality may attract 
foreign investors (Bénassy-Quéré, 2007), help firms to access external finance (La Porta et 
al., 1997), mitigate opaque information (Hillier et al, 2011), and provide incentives 
(Edquist and Johnson, 1997);it therefore promotes R&D investment. Second, institutions 
influence the cost of innovation (Wang et al., 2015). Poor or corrupt institutions may 
increase the cost of R&D investment. Third, good governance, with strong intellectual 
property rights (IPR), provides investor protection, thereby facilitating investment in R&D. 
In this regard, Ghosh and He (2015) stated that stronger investor protection reduces 
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managers’ opportunistic behaviour of diverting cash flow to themselves; therefore, more 
resources are deployed to value-enhancing capital projects such as R&D. Fourth, strong 
institutions ensure returns from uncertain investments such as R&D by managing risk 
(Edquist and Johnson, 1997) and fostering an innovation-friendly environment. 
However, this relationship between institutions and R&D investment may not be true all 
the time (Edquist and Johnson, 1997). Institutional settings introduce stability, and even 
rigidity, into the economy, and may act as a brake on innovation rather than an accelerator 
(Edquist and Johnson, 1997). Moreover, all parts of institutions may not contribute equally 
to R&D activities. Different structures may exist simultaneously, and may even contradict 
explanations of investment in R&D. For instance, economic policies such as government 
subsidies may impact positively on R&D investment, while social factors such as 
corruption and politics may be negatively related. Moreover, aligning institutional settings 
with corporate governance and strategic decision making also depends on corporate 
politics. 
Although the institutional framework shapes strategic investment decisions around the 
world, this issue is even more critical for emerging economies. Peng et al. (2008) pointed 
out that the institutional framework is more sensitive to firms’ investment decisions and 
performance in emerging economies. Furthermore, firm strategies depend mainly on 
institutional settings in emerging markets (Meyer et al., 2009). Nowadays, emerging 
countries are considered as lands of opportunity for foreign investors. Therefore, 
investment growth, and sustainability in emerging markets depends on foreign investment, 
debt and aid, which are guided by institutional development. Accordingly, emerging 
economies are markedly improving their institutional quality (OECD, 2011). In addition, 
evidence shows that in recent years emerging markets have considerably increased their 
R&D investment. For example, according to Booz & Company (2012), in 2011 only India 
and China increased their R&D spending, by about 28 per cent. Therefore, considering the 
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importance of institutional factors in emerging economies, this chapter examines the 
institutional determinants of R&D investment for firms in emerging economies. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it investigates the institutional 
determinants of R&D spending for 3,973 firm-year observations from 20 selected 
emerging markets during the period 2006-2013. Earlier researchers have emphasised single 
factors, such as legal institutions (Anderlini et al., (2013), political instability, education 
systems (Varsakelis, 2006), government effectiveness (Dolfsma and Seo, 2013) and 
regulation (Blind, 2012). This is thought to be the first study to consider all aspects of 
institutions and attempt to identify the social, legal and political institutional determinants 
of R&D investment in the emerging market context. Thus, this study provides significant 
insights into the importance of the external environment for R&D investment in emerging 
markets. Second, advanced econometric techniques are used, which take into account the 
problems of unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity by applying GMM estimation to 
panel data. Finally, exploring the institutional determinants of R&D investment by 
emerging market firms is also more important to policy makers, as returns on R&D 
investment in emerging countries are higher than in advanced countries (Lederman and 
Maloney, 2003). 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 presents the theory and hypotheses of the 
study. Section 7.3 introduces the data and research method. Results and discussion are 
presented in Section 7.4, and Section 7.5 draws conclusions from the study. 
7.2 Theory and hypotheses 
Jorde and Teece (1990) pointed out that innovation activities, as a form of investment, are 
sensitive to institutional quality. Similarly, Daude and Stein (2007) reported that 
investment decisions may depend on various dimensions of the institutional environment. 
The investment decisions of individual firms are also influenced by the institutional 
framework (North, 1990). In terms of R&D investment, Pattit et al. (2012) found that 
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institutions have an influence on technological innovation and emerging technological 
opportunities. Furthermore, Cincera and Veugelers (2013) investigated the R&D 
investment gap between the US and the EU and observed that the gap relates mostly to 
structural differences between the countries. Therefore, it is highly likely that stronger 
institutional settings help to boost R&D investment and improve a country’s knowledge 
accumulation and knowledge spill-over. On the other hand, weak institutional settings 
hinder R&D activities (OECD, 2005, p. 113). This tends to confirm the notion of 
contingent RBV, that firm capabilities depend on institutional settings (Priem and Butler, 
2001; Yi et al., 2013). 
There may be huge disparities in features of institutions. In this regard, Mahendra et al. 
(2015) stated that it is difficult to measure institutional variables, as each country and 
region may have different understandings and perceptions of what institutions are. 
Moreover, firm- and country-level institutional variables differ (Dunning, 2006). Firm-
level institutional factors are beyond the scope of this analysis. Country-level institutions 
have an impact on firm strategy (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). Similarly, Pindado et al. 
(2015) found that country-level institutions strongly affect the market valuation of firms’ 
R&D investment. Among country-level factors, financial systems, education systems, 
public policy and training systems are important institutional factors for national 
innovation systems (Freeman, 1987; Dosi et al., 1990; Lundvall, 1992). In contrast, as 
suggested by Kaufmann et al. (2009), institutional variables have been used, including 
government effectiveness, rule of law, corruption, political instability and regulatory 
quality. An institutional setting is a set of social, political and legal factors that establishes 
the basis for production, exchange and distribution (Davis and North, 1971). By and large, 
these factors are more tangible than other factors. 
Government effectiveness has an impact on firm performance through its effect on 
managerial assumptions and actions (Pearce et al., 2011); therefore, it reduces agency 
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costs. Lower agency costs increase the likelihood of efficient investments. Moreover, an 
effective government gives investors’ confidence in their investments and safeguards 
future returns from investments. In addition, effective government encourages private and 
public firms to engage in R&D investment and accelerates technological innovation. In an 
empirical study, Mahmood and Rufin (2005) stated that an active role of government 
accelerates technological innovation through spill-overs creating networks between firms 
and individuals. Moreover, greater government capacity may promote R&D investment, 
providing greater support, budgets and subsidies for creative and innovative activities. As 
the role of government tends to be much more influential in emerging markets (Hong et al., 
2015), this leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Government effectiveness positively impacts on R&D investment. 
Rule of law or a strong legal system seem to be important in encouraging R&D 
investments. La Porta et al. (1997) found that a strong legal system helps firms to access 
external finance to support strategic investments such as R&D. Moreover, the legal system 
enhances investors’ protection and confidence. The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act 2002 is 
seen as an example of good investor protection. Therefore, following institutional theory, 
Furukawa (2007) stated that a stronger rule of law provides strong protection of patent 
rights and investment incentives, which motivate investors to engage in R&D activity. 
However, sometimes tight laws may discourage new entrants, who are more likely to be 
drivers of technological progress. In light of the above arguments, this study proposes the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis2: Strong rule of law and R&D investment are positively correlated. 
According to Bardhan (1997), corruption adversely impacts on investment and growth. As 
investors must pay bribes to officials for permits and licences, corruption increases the cost 
of investment (Daude and Stein, 2007). Romer (1994) added that, by increasing the cost of 
fixed investments, corruption reduces the entry of new goods and technologies. However, 
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advocates of corruption have argued that it speeds up the work of officials, and therefore 
may improve efficiency in emerging countries (Bardhan, 1997). Corruption makes projects 
uncertain and less profitable. Consequently, both local and foreign investors become 
demotivated from engaging in long-term and costly investments such as R&D. Moreover, 
corruption remains a major problem of doing business and innovating in most emerging 
countries (IFC, 2002). Thus, the following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis3: Corruption negatively impacts on R&D investment. 
Political theory posits that political stability creates a favourable environment for doing 
business, which affects firm performance in important ways (Mangena et al., 2012). A 
favourable political environment is crucial to financial and technical progress and 
conducive to infrastructural development, particularly in R&D activities (Henisz, 2002). In 
addition, R&D subsidies depend on the political decisions of a country. For instance, the 
German government increased its R&D budget by nine per cent during the crisis between 
2008 and 2009 (Hud and Hussinger, 2015). On the other hand, political instability 
increases the propensity for policy changes that adversely affect investment and economic 
growth. Thus, Alesina and Perotti (1996) found that political turmoil reduces investment. 
Allard et al. (2012) also concluded that political instability creates barriers to firm-level 
R&D spending. The Economist (2014) stated that political conditions vary among 
emerging countries, and thus firms face greater risks and challenges than in advanced 
countries. Hence, the following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 4: Political instability is negatively related to R&D investment. 
Jalilian et al. (2007) pointed out that effective regulations help to achieve social objectives 
set by governments for regulatory authorities, enabling social goals to be achieved at 
minimum cost. On the other hand, inefficient and inconsistent government regulations lead 
to uncertainty for investors as they raise investment costs (Parker, 1999). Good quality 
regulations help firms with market entry and keeping up to date with developments. They 
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also increase a country’s investment opportunities. In this regard, Kirkpatrick et al. (2006) 
concluded that the quality of the regulatory framework and foreign investment are closely 
related. They also observed that, with weak government regulations, foreign investors may 
be reluctant to invest in large investment projects such as R&D. As emerging markets are 
improving the quality of their government regulations, the following hypothesis is 
postulated: 
Hypothesis 5: Regulatory quality is positively correlated with R&D investment. 
In addition to the above, other factors also impact on firms’ R&D investment. Scott (1995) 
and Oliver (1997) stated that strategic choices such as R&D spending are driven by 
institutional frameworks, along with industry conditions and firm-specific resources. Firm 
size (Lall, 1983), cash flow (Bhagat and Welch, 1995), debt ratio (Hall, 1992) and GDP 
growth (Wang, 2010) have an impact on R&D investment decisions. Larger firms tend to 
be more diversified, more technologically complex and better aware of technological 
opportunities (Lall, 1983). Pecking order theory and internal fund theory argue that 
financial status, measured by the cash flow of a firm, determines the level of investment. 
Bhagat and Welch (1995) noted that R&D occurs mostly when firms have more operating 
cash flows on hand and are thus able to avoid the costs of external capital markets. 
According to Hall (1992), external finance, and specifically debt, is not favoured as a form 
of finance for R&D investment, as debt servicing usually requires a stable source of cash 
flow, which makes it more difficult to find funds for R&D investment. Increased GDP 
growth seems to be allocated to increased investment in R&D. Wang (2010) pointed out 
that GDP growth creates stronger incentives for R&D investment. 
7.3 Methodology 
7.3.1 Data 
To test the hypotheses, data were collected from several sources, including DataStream, 
and the World Bank’s Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
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Firm-level data, such as R&D expenditure, sales, total assets, total debt, cash flow and 
industry type, were drawn from DataStream.GDP growth data were obtained from the 
World Bank’s Development Indicators. Data on institutional factors, measuring 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, corruption and political stability, 
were collected from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
In order to be included in the sample, countries must have five consecutive years of data. 
The eight-year sample period of the study was from 2006 to 2013. The post-reform period 
of R&D reporting was considered so that the sample firms would treat R&D expenditure 
homogeneously. Moreover, gaps in the latest data were minimised where possible. Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan were excluded, as these countries are now 
considered as emerged economies. 
                                                Table 7.1: Sample by Country 
Country Frequency Composition Country Frequency Composition 
Bangladesh 2 0.300 Malaysia 35 5.255 
Brazil 8 1.201 Pakistan 12 1.802 
Chile 2 0.300 Philippines 11 1.652 
China 60 9.009 Poland 4 0.601 
Egypt 2 0.300 Romania 1 0.150 
Greece 37 5.556 Russia 12 1.802 
India 277 41.59 Saudi Arabia 2 0.300 
Indonesia 17 2.553 South Africa 28 4.204 
Israel 59 8.859 Sri Lanka 6 0.901 
Jordan 4 0.601 Turkey 87 13.063 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Following Pindado et al. (2015), financial firms were also excluded due to their different 
corporate structure and strategy. After dropping missing values and unrealistic figures 
(such as negative values of R&D expenditure), the sample consisted of 666 firms from 20 
emerging countries (see Table 7.1). 
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Panel data are a combination of cross-sectional and time series data. Panel data were used 
for this analysis because they enable control for firm heterogeneity, give more information, 
more variability and greater degrees of freedom, avoid multicollinearity problems, provide 
more efficient results, and are more suitable for identifying and measuring effects that are 
not detectable in pure cross-sectional or pure time series data (Baltagi, 2013). There are 
two types of panel data: balanced and unbalanced. If each cross-sectional unit has the same 
number of time-period observations, the panel data are balanced; otherwise, they are 
unbalanced. Unbalanced panel data were used for the sample countries, as this might 
mitigate the survivorship bias problem (Hillier et al., 2011). 
                                            Table 7.2: Definitions of Variables 
R&D intensity R&D expenditure over sales 
Government effectiveness Measures competency or capacity of the government 
Rule of law Measures judicial strength 
Corruption Measures misuse of power 
Political instability Measures likelihood of political instability 
Regulatory quality Captures the ability of the government to promote development 
Firm size Measured by total assets 
Cash flow Ratio of cash flows to sales 
Debt ratio Ratio of total debt over total assets 
GDP growth Annual GDP growth of a country 
Industry Type Takes a value of 1 if the industry is innovative, and 0 if it is non-
innovative
3
 
 
Table 7.2 gives definitions of the variables. All variables are standardised to a common 
USD exchange rate. Some of the explanatory variables have higher scales than others, and 
the high absolute values of variables increase the presence of heteroscedasticity 
(Grabowski, 1968). In order to avoid these problems, the natural logarithms, ratios and 
percentages of the variables were adopted. 
Table 7.3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables. These show that governance 
indicators such as government effectiveness, rule of law, corruption, political stability and 
                                                 
3
 Innovative and non-innovative firms were split following Kallunki et al. (2009). 
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regulatory quality vary among emerging markets. This implies that some emerging 
countries have stronger governance than others. For example, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
have greater political instability than any other emerging countries. Cash flows and GDP 
growth also vary among emerging markets. This is because the impact of the recent global 
financial crisis was not the same for all firms. Firm size also varies among emerging 
countries because some, such as China and India, have more MNEs than others. However, 
R&D investment is relatively similar among emerging markets. 
                                                    Table 7.3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
R&D intensity 0.007801 0.020360 0.000000 0.252287 
Government effectiveness 0.232742 0.477687 -0.893061 1.367924 
Rule of law 0.067994 0.418766 -0.976797 1.366790 
Corruption -0.211879 0.459603 -1.42297 1.562048 
Political instability -0.912160 0.565566 -2.812080 1.056947 
Regulatory quality 0.053516 0.525419 -0.963199 1.540422 
Size 5.383533 0.859591 3.265525 8.643295 
Cash flow 9.942318 19.25407 -685.430 122.1800 
Debt ratio 0.250561 0.181732 0.000000 0.882208 
GDP growth 5.554006 3.970243 -8.870000 14.16000 
Industry dummy 0.631545 0.482438 0.000000 1.000000 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
7.3.2 Model 
In order to examine the institutional determinants of R&D expenditure, the following 
model was devised. A semi-logarithmic model was used for the analysis because 
government effectiveness, rule of law, corruption, political instability and GDP growth 
contain negative values, preventing use of the logarithm for these values. Industry type is a 
dummy variable, taking values of 0 and 1, for which a logarithm could not be used as the 
logarithm of 0 does not exist. 
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ln(R&DIntensityit) = αi + β1(GovernmentEffectivenessit) + β2(RuleofLawit) + 
β3(Corruptionit) + β4(PoliticalInstabilityit) + β5(RegulatoryQualityit) + 
β*(ControlVariablesit) + ƞi + dt + Ii + vit                            (1) 
where subscript i represents the firm and t represents the year. R&D intensity is considered 
as a dependent variable which, following Xiao (2013), takes the logarithm of annual R&D 
expenditure over sales. The main independent variables are government effectiveness, rule 
of law, corruption, political instability and regulatory quality. Firm, industry and 
macroeconomic variables are controlled, such as firm size, cash flow, debt ratio, industry 
dummy and GDP growth. The error component εit is separated into four sub-components: 
εit = ηi + dt + Ii + vit. ηi is considered as an individual effect to control for individual 
heterogeneity, which is then eliminated by taking first differences. In addition, the time 
dummy, denoted by dt, captures the time-specific effect to control for macroeconomic 
variables. As the industries are separated into innovative and non-innovative, industry 
dummy Ii is included to capture industry-specific effects. Moreover, vit is considered as a 
random disturbance term, which is assumed to be i.i.d normal. 
7.3.3 Method 
In order to examine the institutional determinants of R&D spending in emerging countries, 
a GMM estimation was performed, following Hiller et al. (2011). 
7.3.3.1 Endogeneity problem 
This study faced the challenge of endogenous variables. Some explanatory variables in the 
model are endogenous, which may create a problem of endogeneity. For example, firm size 
may also impact on R&D investment, as greater availability of resources may encourage 
managers to commence new R&D activities (Pindado et al., 2015). This endogeneity 
problem can be addressed by an IV approach, such as 2SLS or GMM estimation. In 
general, external instruments are used for IV estimation, while internal instruments (lag of 
explanatory variables) are used for GMM estimation. The IV approach provides consistent 
estimation under the assumption that valid instruments exist (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). 
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However, it is very complex, if not impossible, to find valid external instruments (Pindado 
et al., 2014). In addition, GMM embeds all other instrumental methods as special cases 
(Hiller et al., 2011). As a consequence, GMM estimation was used. 
7.3.3.2 Problems of estimation 
Panel data may suffer from heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation problems. 
Heteroscedasticity may arise because different countries in the sample have different 
characteristics, thus the residuals are unlikely to be constant across observations. Using the 
lag of dependent variables may create auto-correlation problems. These problems cannot 
be controlled by OLS. Moreover, in the presence of endogeneity, OLS estimation will be 
biased and inconsistent and standard errors will be unreliable. Wintoki (2012) observed 
that, if the explanatory variables are not strictly exogenous (the variables in this study are 
endogenous) and the panel’s time period is small, as in this case, both OLS and fixed-
effects estimation may produce biased results. However, both problems are addressed by 
GMM estimation. 
7.3.3.3 Auto-correlation 
As a result of first difference transformation, there may be first-order serial correlation, 
AR(1), although this will not create a specification problem with the model. However, the 
results show that first-order serial correlations are not present. The hypothesis that the error 
terms are not second-order serially correlated was tested, denoted by AR(2). The results 
show that there are no second-order serial correlations in the models. 
7.3.3.4 Instruments 
In order to apply GMM, the instruments must be valid. The Hansen J statistic of over-
identifying restrictions was used to test the validity of the instruments. GMM estimation 
uses multiple lags, which implies that the model is over-identified. Lagged levels t-1, t-3 
and t-4 were used as instruments for difference equations, and one lag as an instrument for 
the level equation. In order to choose the best possible instruments, the trade-off between 
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the exogeneity and strength of each instrument was considered, following Keasey et al. 
(2015). Furthermore, the Hansen J test results show that the instruments are valid in the 
models. The rule of thumb is that the number of instruments should not be higher than the 
number of observations. In this case, the test results show that the number of instruments is 
far lower than the number of observations. Both results provide confidence that the 
instruments used are strong enough for GMM estimation. 
7.3.3.5 System GMM 
There are two types of GMM estimation: difference GMM and system GMM. As both sets 
of moment conditions (first difference and level equation) were considered, system GMM 
was adopted. There are no stationary problems in the analysis, which is a pre-condition for 
system GMM. In addition, system GMM has been found to be more efficient than 
difference GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998), while difference GMM estimation has a 
problem of weak instruments (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1999). 
7.3.3.6 Two-step estimation 
A two-step estimation was performed on the grounds that it produces more efficient 
estimates than one-step estimation. In two-step estimation, the standard covariance matrix 
is robust to panel-specific heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, but the standard errors 
are downward biased. To fix the possible downward bias, the Windmeijer (2005) finite-
sample corrected covariance matrix was applied. 
7.3.3.7 Joint significance 
Two Wald tests were used to examine whether the independent variables are jointly equal 
to zero: z1 is a test of the joint significance of the regressors, and z2 is a test of the joint 
significance of the time dummies, suggesting that aggregate factors exert a significant 
influence on the relationship between R&D investment and the explanatory variables. The 
two Wald tests provided good results for the models. 
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7.4 Results and discussion 
Table 7.4 presents the empirical results of the GMM estimation. In line with expectations, 
government effectiveness, rule of law, corruption and political instability have a significant 
impact on R&D expenditure in emerging countries. Thus, the results support the 
institutional-based view. Moreover, the results show that firm size, debt ratio and cash flow 
enhance R&D performance considerably. This implies that R&D investment may result not 
only from financial factors but also in response to social, legal and political factors. 
                           Table 7.4: Summary of Results for GMM Estimation 
Variable Estimation 
Standard 
Error 
R&D intensity 1t  0.681484*** (0.091022) 
Government effectiveness 0.001858* (0.000980) 
Rule of law 0.001295* (0.000774) 
Corruption -0.002112** (0.001005) 
Political instability -0.000844** (0.000392) 
Regulatory quality 0.001211 (0.001000) 
Size 0.000795** (0.000387) 
Cash flow -0.000127*** (0.000028) 
Debt ratio -0.003298** (0.001282) 
GDP growth 0.000022 (0.000028) 
Industry dummy Yes  
Year dummy Yes  
Total observations 3973  
AR(1) 
 
-2.7  
AR(2) 
 
0.31  
z1 51.5(11)  
z2 1.89(5)  
Hansen 191.12(169)  
                      Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Levels of significance: * <0.10, ** <0.05, ***<0.01. 
The lagged value of the dependent variable is significantly different from zero, showing 
the persistency of R&D investment. A persistence rate of 68.14 percent suggests that firms 
in emerging markets follow stable R&D policies. García‐Quevedo et al. (2014) reached the 
same conclusion based on a path-dependent hypothesis. Government effectiveness has a 
positive influence on R&D investment in emerging countries. A change of one unit in 
government effectiveness is associated with a 0.18 per cent change in firms’ R&D 
expenditure. This is because effective government creates a favourable environment for 
1
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R&D investment by facilitating access to finance and market entry, by attracting more 
investment, and in particular by accelerating technological investment. On this point, Jiao 
et al. (2015) have stated that firms perform better in innovation under effective governance 
than firms without such an environment. Thus, the results support Hypothesis 1. 
There is a significant positive relationship between the legal system and R&D investment 
of a country. With a one-unit change in legal system, the likelihood of R&D investment 
increases by 0.13 per cent. This implies that strong legal systems attract investors and 
increase investor confidence in R&D. In this regard, Jiao et al. (2015) have added that a 
good legal environment not only increases firms’ R&D investment but also improves the 
efficiency of technological innovation, which increases the number of patent applications. 
Jiao et al.’s (2015) study of an emerging market and Hillier et al.’s (2011) study of nine 
EU countries, Japan and the US reached the same conclusion. Therefore, this result 
supports Hypothesis 2. 
R&D investment is discouraged by corruption. With a one-unit change in corruption, there 
is a probability of R&D expenditure decreasing by 0.21 per cent. This is because 
corruption increases investment costs and discourages foreign investors. These results 
support Hypothesis 3. 
The political environment significantly explains R&D investment. With a one-unit 
deterioration in political conditions, there is a probability of R&D expenditure decreasing 
by 0.08 per cent. In emerging markets, political unrest discourages local and foreign 
investors. Allard et al. (2012) obtained similar results. These results support Hypothesis 4. 
Regulatory quality has a positive but insignificant impact on R&D investment. This is 
because upholding rights is not directly related to R&D expenditure. Firm size has a 
significant positive impact on R&D investment, consistent with Lall’s (1983) finding. 
Large firms invest more in R&D than small firms. Larger firms have more resources to 
invest in R&D activities and are able to benefit from returns on their innovative activities. 
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In line with Bhagat and Welch’s (1995) study based on US firms, cash flow negatively 
impacts on R&D spending. This may happen when firms depend more on external than 
internal funding for R&D investment. The recent financial crisis restrained firms from 
using internal funding. Due to the less collateralisable value of R&D investment, the debt 
ratio significantly negatively affected R&D in emerging markets. Moreover, agency costs 
and information asymmetry problems are likely to influence R&D investment negatively. 
A one-unit change in debt decreases the probability of R&D investment by 0.32 per cent. 
This result is consistent with Hall’s (1992) study. As cash flow and debt both negatively 
influence R&D investment, it is highly likely that, following pecking order theory, firms 
will finance R&D from equity. Although GDP growth is higher in emerging markets, 
contrary to the accelerated principle, it is uncorrelated with R&D expenditure. This is 
because emerging countries spend their income on infrastructural development. Moreover, 
the recent financial crisis adversely affected emerging countries. Based on a study of 
OECD countries, Wang (2010) also found GDP to be a fragile determinant of aggregate 
R&D. 
7.4.1 Robustness test 
The robustness of the results was tested using OLS estimation (see Table 7.5).
4
In order to 
control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, a cluster-robust standard error was used. 
The key results concerning institutional factors remain unchanged except for government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality. Regulatory quality becomes statistically significant, 
while government effectiveness has a positive sign but is statistically insignificant. The 
results also show that rule of law is positively related to R&D investment, while corruption 
and political instability impact negatively on R&D spending in emerging markets. The 
coefficients of these variables are remarkably stable with GMM (rule of law = 0.00129 –
0.00123, corruption = 0.00211 – 0.00197, political stability = 0.00084 – 0.00089).  It can 
                                                 
4
 Regression analysis was also conducted using Tobit estimation, with similar results. 
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be seen that the results are robust and fully support Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, while 
Hypotheses 1 and 5 are supported but not robustly. However, other variables retain the 
same sign. 
                                                  Table 7.5: Robustness Test 
Variable Estimation 
Standard 
Error 
R&D intensity 1t  0.83228*** (0.03570) 
Government effectiveness 0.00050 (0.00098) 
Rule of law 0.001237* (0.00070) 
Corruption -0.00197** (0.00098) 
Political instability -0.00089** (0.00038) 
Regulatory quality 0.00247** (0.00118) 
Firm size 0.00012 (0.00016) 
Cash flow -0.00009** (0.00003) 
Debt ratio -0.00378*** (0.00092) 
GDP growth 0.00005 (0.00006) 
Industry dummy Yes  
Time dummy Yes  
R-squared 0.7888  
F test 169.2(17)  
               Standard errors in parenthesis; significance levels: * <0.10, ** <0.05, ***<0.01. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Institutional environments function as a base or framework for investment. For example, 
weak institutions signal poor investor confidence and indicate investment risk. Institutional 
quality shapes variations across countries in firms’ ability and opportunities for R&D 
investment. Thus, this study has examined the institutional determinants of R&D 
expenditure using panel data GMM estimation for 20 emerging countries for the period 
2006-2013. The results are in the line with theoretical predictions. Institutional theory 
suggests that institutional factors play a vital role in a country’s R&D investment. The 
results show that government effectiveness and rule of law have significant positive 
impacts, while corruption and political instability have significant negative impacts on 
R&D investment in emerging countries. Moreover, firm size, cash flow and debt ratios are 
important determinants of R&D investment in emerging markets. 
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It is hoped that this study will serve as new guidance to investors and policy makers when 
considering R&D investments in emerging countries. Due to missing values, some 
economic and cultural factors that might impact on firm-level R&D investment were not 
included in this study. In addition, due to missing values, not all emerging markets were 
included in the analysis. These are limitations of this study. However, the empirical results 
of this study may provide lessons for other emerging markets. Further investigation is 
needed on other emerging markets, as well as developed markets, to identify specific 
institutional determinants of R&D investment. 
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Chapter 8: Contribution of Systems and Safeguards to the 
Relationship Between R&D Investment and Firm Performance in 
Emerging Markets 
8.1 Introduction 
RBV stresses that heterogeneous internal resources and capabilities determine a firm’s 
performance. Canto and Gonzalez’s (1999) study confirmed the relevant role of resources 
and capabilities in R&D activities. R&D investment is used as a source of competitive 
advantage, long-term growth and technological advancement, which lead to better firm 
performance. The existing literature has also found a relationship between R&D and firm 
performance (Grabowski, 1968; Guellec and Potterie, 2001; Del Monte and Papagni, 2003; 
Yeh et al., 2010). However, the relationship between R&D investment and firm 
performance may be strengthened or weakened by country-level factors. In a recent paper, 
Pindado et al. (2015) have shown that country-level factors moderate the relationship 
between R&D and firm performance. Differences in a country’s investor protection and 
institutional setting are the most important factors that moderate the R&D and firm 
performance relationship. 
The R&D literature has so far focused on firm-level factors (Grabowski, 1968; Pindado et 
al., 2010; García-Quevedo et al., 2014) and corporate governance factors (Zhang et al., 
2014; Honoré et al., 2015) that influence firm-level R&D investment. Recently, 
researchers have begun to consider country-level factors (Hiller et al., 2011; Pindado et al., 
2015) as important determinants of R&D activity. The main reason is that institutional 
differences in emerging markets explain a large portion of the variation in innovative 
activities and outputs. However, this research has not separated investor protection and 
country-level corporate governance factors. Following Haidar (2009) and Kaufmann et al. 
(1999), these factors are separated in this study because of their different and distinct roles 
in firms’ decision making. Country-level investor protection provides the “safeguards” and 
country-level corporate governance establishes the “systems” of a country. Investor 
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protection deals with ownership, rights, corporate responsibility and disclosure, while 
governance relates to the rules and processes that facilitate firms’ operations. 
It is assumed that greater investor protection reduces information asymmetry by disclosing 
R&D activities. Moreover, through monitoring and guidance, investor protection reduces 
fraud and earnings management, and improves the allocation of resources and access to 
external financing, which have an impact on firm performance (La Porta et al., 1998; Leuz 
et al., 2003; Xiao, 2013). Xiao (2013) confirmed that country-level investor protection has 
a significant impact on R&D investment, although such protection may vary between firms 
and countries. On the other hand, good country governance minimises the risks of and 
ensures high returns from R&D investment (Edquist and Johnson, 1997; Ngobo and Fouda, 
2012). In addition, good governance creates an attractive environment for investment, 
assists financing decisions (La Porta et al., 1997; Bénassy-Quéré, 2007) and compensates 
for corporate governance weaknesses in firms. Hiller et al. (2011) found that country-level 
governance factors influence R&D investment. This study seeks to shed light on investor 
protection and country governance factors, and to identify which have a greater influence 
on the relationship between R&D activities and firm performance in emerging markets. 
Nowadays, emerging markets are considered as lands of opportunity and low-cost 
innovation centres. As a result, in recent years, MNEs have established significant R&D 
centres in emerging markets (Patra and Krishna, 2015). Moreover, R&D-related FDI into 
emerging markets has recently increased significantly. These investor decisions are 
influenced mainly by country characteristics, such as law enforcement and patent 
protection. Moreover, the rate of return from the same investment is higher in emerging 
markets than in developed countries (Logue, 2011), which also ensures the importance of 
country-level factors. Therefore, Peng et al. (2008) have pointed out that country-level 
factors are more sensitive to firms’ investment decisions and performance in emerging 
economies, although opponents have claimed that these factors have indirect influences in 
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emerging countries. Therefore, in considering the importance of country-level factors in 
emerging economies, this study examines their moderating effects on the relationship 
between R&D investment and firm performance. 
Country-level factors such as investor protection and country governance influence firm-
level decisions such as R&D investment (Hiller et al., 2011; Xiao, 2013). This study seeks 
to identify which has a greater moderating effect on the relationship between R&D and 
firm performance. Using GMM estimation of panel data for 2,549 firm-year observations 
consisting of 437 firms from 17 emerging countries, it is found that a country’s safeguards 
tend to have a greater moderating effect than its systems. The results indicate that 
safeguards promote firm-level innovation in an emerging market, while systems substitute 
for firm-level corporate governance. In addition, for risky and uncertain investments such 
as R&D, investors seek protection to cover possible losses. 
This study makes the following contributions to the R&D literature. First, it examines the 
non-linear relationship between R&D and firm performance based on emerging-market 
firms. Second, it contributes to the debate on whether safeguards or systems are more 
important for firm-level strategic decision making. The study considers three factors as 
safeguards (disclosure, directors’ liabilities and shareholders’ ability to sue) and six 
components of systems (government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control 
of corruption, political stability and accountability). Third, a robust econometric technique 
is used that controls for unobserved behaviour of the firm. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.1 presents a literature review, and Section 
8.2 presents the theory and hypotheses of the study. Section 8.3 introduces the data and 
research method, and in Section 8.4 the results are presented and discussed. Section 8.6 
draws conclusions from this study. 
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8.2 Theory and hypotheses 
Based on the theory and empirical evidence on investor protection, country-level 
governance, R&D spending and firm performance, three hypotheses are developed. 
                                       Figure 8.1: Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researchers have, for a long time, been trying to measure the relationship between R&D 
and firm performance. However, the results have been inconsistent. Santos et al. (2014) 
found no significant relationship, while Knecht (2013) found a negative relationship 
between R&D intensity and firm performance. In contrast, Ehie and Oilbe (2010) and 
Gunday et al. (2011) found that R&D investment impacts positively on firm performance. 
R&D investment increases profitability by increasing the quality as well as the quantity of 
products produced and sold. These empirical results have raised debate about when R&D 
starts to show an impact, and whether R&D may impact on performance in the same year 
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as the investment. In this regard, Knecht (2013) pointed out that the current year’s R&D 
investment reduces current year profits but may impact positively on future firm 
performance. Moreover, Parcharidis and Varsakelis (2007) and Natasha and Hutagaol 
(2009) found that R&D investment impacts negatively on profit for the year of the 
investment, but there may be a strong positive relationship after two years. This is because 
new product development, new production methods and information technology need time 
to show results. Thus, in line with Yeh et al. (2010), the following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a non-linear relationship between R&D and firm 
performance. 
Since the seminal works of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), researchers have found that 
investor protection has a significant impact on firm finance, investment and growth. 
Investor protection law increases investor confidence, both legally and psychologically. 
Anderson and Gupta (2009) argued that stronger investor protection assures investors that, 
besides their original investment, more of the firm’s profits will get back to them as 
dividends and interests. This protection encourages investors and entrepreneurs to pay 
more for financial assets that increase the R&D investment of a firm. Moreover, investor 
protection ensures access to external financing, and therefore has a significant impact on 
investment in R&D activities (Brown et al., 2013). In addition, investor protection 
influences the relationship between R&D and firm performance by improving the 
efficiency of a firm’s R&D investment. Pindado et al. (2015) found that effective investor 
protection leads to a positive relationship between R&D and market value, while Xiao 
(2013) found that stronger investor protection facilitates faster sales growth in R&D-
intensive industries. From the above discussion, the following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 2: Investor protection (safeguards) positively moderates the strength of 
the relationship between R&D and firm performance. 
In making strategic decisions on risky and uncertain investments such as R&D, firms 
consider the background of institutional and country-level governance factors. Wu et al. 
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(2016) stated that the institutional environment may stimulate R&D activity by providing 
capacities or constraints beyond those of individual firms. Moreover, Peng et al. (2008) 
stated that strategic choices such as R&D investment are driven by the institutional 
framework confronting managers, along with industry conditions and firm-specific 
resources. In addition, Hiller et al. (2011) argued that better governance ensures greater 
disclosure and accountability, which in turn facilitates the availability of external financing 
for R&D. These result simply that, when country-level governance becomes strong, 
financial factors become more effective in boosting R&D investment. They found that 
country-level governance factors reduce the sensitivity of internal cash flows and R&D. 
Moreover, dimensions of country-level governance are also related to better performance 
(Gugler et al., 2013). In line with this result, Pindado et al. (2015) found that country-level 
governance factors significantly impact on the market valuation of firms’ R&D 
investments. Following Pindado et al. (2015), the following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 3: Country-level governance (systems) positively moderates the 
strength of the relationship between R&D and firm performance. 
8.3 Data, model and method 
8.3.1 Data 
8.3.1.1 Datasources 
In order to test the hypotheses, data were collected from several sources, including 
DataStream, the World Bank’s Protecting Minority Shareholders data, and the ICRG 
database. Firm-level data were drawn from DataStream, including R&D expenditure, fixed 
assets, total assets, total debt, sales, earnings before income and tax (EBIT), and return on 
invested capital (ROIC).Investor protection data, measured by disclosure, liability and 
ability of investors to sue, were obtained from the Protecting Minority Shareholders data. 
Data on country-level governance factors, measured by government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, political stability and accountability, 
were also obtained from the Protecting Minority Shareholders data. 
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8.3.1.2 Sample selection 
In order to be included in the sample, countries must have five consecutive years of data. 
The eight-year sample period was from 2006 to 2013. This period was considered on the 
basis of data availability from the World Bank’s Protecting Minority Shareholders data, 
which provide data on most emerging countries from 2006. Moreover, gaps in the latest 
data were minimised where possible. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan 
were excluded, as these countries are now considered as emerged economies. Following 
Pindado et al. (2015), financial firms were also excluded due to their differing corporate 
structure and strategy. After dropping missing values and unrealistic figures (such as 
negative values of R&D expenditure), the dataset consisted of 437 firms from 17 emerging 
countries (see Table 8.1). 
                                                   Table 8.1: Sample Selection 
Description 
No. of 
Countries 
No. of 
firms 
Initial search on DataStream  51 34,528 
Firms with five consecutive years of data 39 1,657 
Countries with more than one firm 21 1,639 
Dropped: Countries that are already emerged 4 1,202 
Final sample 17 437 
Source: DataStream, Protecting Minority Shareholders database, ICRG 
8.3.1.3 Structure of the data 
Panel data were used for this analysis, which are a combination of cross-sectional and time 
series data. Panel data involve a large number of data points, offer more degrees of 
freedom and reduce multicollinearity among the explanatory variables; thus, they offer 
efficient estimation (Perera and Lee, 2013; Hsiao, 2003). There are two types of panel 
data: balanced and unbalanced. If each cross-sectional unit has the same number of time-
period observations, the data are balanced, otherwise they are unbalanced. Unbalanced 
panel data were used for the sample countries, as unbalanced data mitigate the survivorship 
bias problem (Hillier et al., 2011). 
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8.3.1.4 Variable construction 
Table 8.2 shows definitions of the variables. All variables are standardised to a common 
USD exchange rate. Some of the explanatory variables have higher scales than others, and 
the absolute value of variables increases the presence of heteroscedasticity (Grabowski, 
1968). In order to avoid these problems, the natural logarithm, ratio and percentage of the 
variables were adopted. 
                                           Table 8.2: Summary Variables 
Data Type Variable Description 
Firm data: Return on assets (ROA) Earnings before interest and tax over assets 
ROIC Earnings over invested capital 
R&D intensity R&D expenditure of the firm in a year over sales 
R&D intensity
2
 Square of R&D intensity 
Firm size Natural logarithm of firm’s total assets 
Sales growth Changes in sales over sales 
Leverage Total debt over total assets 
Tangibility Fixed assets over total assets 
Industry data Industry dummy Takes a value of 1 if the firm is in an innovative 
industry 
Investor 
protection: 
Disclosure Measures the transparency of transactions 
Liability Measures directors’ liabilities 
Investor suits Measures investors’ rights to sue for misconduct 
Country 
governance: 
Government effectiveness Captures the ability of a country’s government 
Regulatory quality Captures the riskiness of investments 
Rule of law Captures the quality of the jurisdiction 
Control of corruption Measures the misuse of power for private gain 
Political stability Measures the propensity for changes in 
government, terrorism and violence 
Accountability Measures the responsiveness of government to its 
people 
Dependent variable 
Firm performance is a multidimensional concept (Murphy et al., 1996). It can be measured 
in financial terms (objective), in terms of sales, profitability and productivity growth 
performance, or in non-financial terms (subjective), in terms of increases in efficiency. 
However, it is difficult to measure the non-financial growth of a firm. Among the financial 
terms, profitability measures for firm performance are widespread, and ROA is a 
commonly-used profitability measure in R&D research (Roberts and Amit, 2003). 
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Therefore, following Yeh et al. (2010), in this study ROA is considered as a dependent 
variable for EBIT over assets. In addition to ROA, ROIC is also considered as a dependent 
variable to observe the impact of country-level factors. 
Independent variables 
R&D Intensity: A variety of measures of R&D have been used in the literature, including 
R&D expenditure, R&D intensity, R&D employment intensity and R&D growth. The most 
frequently used measure is R&D intensity. Measures of R&D intensity include ratios of 
R&D expenditure to sales, R&D to outputs, R&D to GDP, R&D to employees, and the 
proportion of scientific personnel to the total workforce. The standard measure is the R&D 
expenditure to sales ratio (Scherer, 1980), which shows modest year-to-year variations in 
R&D expenditure (Khyum et al., 2005) and normalises for differences in industry size 
(Jaruzelski et al., 2005), although House et al. (1994) stated that the R&D to employee 
ratio has less short-term variability. In this study, the R&D expenditure to sales ratio is 
considered as a measure of R&D intensity, following Honoré et al. (2015). 
Investor Protection: A growing number of studies have used an investor protection 
variable for analysis. According to Gourevitch (2005), investor protection is the “sum of 
practices that serve to ensure that the firm is operated to maximize the value of their 
shareholders’ stock, rather than spent or wasted on something else”. La Porta et al. (2000) 
observed that investor protection should include rights to receive dividends on pro rata 
terms, to vote for directors, to participate in shareholders’ meetings; to subscribe to new 
issues of securities on the same terms as insiders; to sue directors or the majority for 
suspected expropriation; and to call extraordinary shareholders’ meetings. La Porta et al.  
(1998) used six variables as measures of investor protection: voting by mail, blocking 
shares before meetings, cumulative voting, oppressed minority mechanisms, pre-emptive 
rights to new issues, and share capital required to call an extraordinary shareholder 
meeting. Djankov et al. (2006) introduced a further measure of investor protection against 
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expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. They argued that this new 
measure predicts a variety of stock market outcomes and works better than the previous 
anti-directors index. Many researchers have subsequently used these variables to measure 
investor protection, including McLean et al. (2012) and Xiao (2013). 
However, La Porta et al.’s (1998) measurements of investor protection have been criticised 
by several authors. Haidar (2009) has claimed that they are based on an adhoc collection of 
variables meant to capture the stance of corporate law towards investor protection. On the 
other hand, the World Bank’s Doing Business investor protection index has focused on 
how regulations control the misuse of corporate assets by directors. This methodology was 
originally developed by Djankov et al. (2006) and adopted with minor modifications by the 
World Bank. Siems (2006) has argued that “the choice of variables by La Porta et al. not 
only suffers from a US bias but is also a poor proxy for shareholder protection in general, 
because their eight variables do not capture the most significant aspects of the law”. 
In this study, investor protection variables are measured following Haidar (2009). The 
three components of the Doing Business investor protection index are disclosure, liability 
and investor suits. Disclosure measures the transparency of transactions, and is the mean of 
five sub-indices ranging from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater disclosure. The 
sub-indices are: a corporate body that can provide legal approval for transactions; 
disclosure of transactions to the public; mandatory disclosure in annual reports; mandatory 
disclosure to the board of directors or supervisor; and pre-audit by an external body. 
Liability measures directors’ liabilities, and is the mean of seven sub-indices ranging from 
0 to 10, with higher values indicating higher liabilities. The sub-indices indicate that 
investors are able to make the approving body, directors and members of supervisory 
boards liable for damages due to acting negligently or being influenced by the approving 
body. Investor suits measures investors’ rights to sue officials and directors for 
misconduct, and is the mean of six sub-indices ranging from 0 to 10, with higher values 
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indicating greater power of investors to challenge transactions. The sub-indices indicate 
whether investors can obtain relevant documents from a company and can recover legal 
expenses. Investor protection is the sum of the average of disclosure, liability and investor 
suits, and the shareholder governance index. The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher 
values indicating stronger minority investor protection. Dummy variables are used for each 
component: disclosure, liability and investor suits higher than the mean are equal to 1, and 
otherwise 0. 
Country-level governance: Following Kaufmann et al. (1999), country-level corporate 
governance is measured by six components comprising government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, political stability and accountability, 
and ranges from 0 to 4, with higher values indicating stronger government effectiveness. 
Regulatory quality measures the riskiness of investments not covered by the political, 
economic and financial risk components, measured by a combination of sub-components 
ranging from 0 to 12, with higher values indicating greater strength of regulatory quality. 
The sub-components are contract viability/expropriation, profit repatriation and profit 
delays. Rule of law measures judicial strength and is a single component with two 
elements, law and order, ranging from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating stronger rule of 
law. Control of corruption measures the misuse of power, ranging from 0 to 6, with higher 
values indicating less corruption. Political stability measures the propensity for changes in 
government, terrorism and violence, ranging from 0 to 12. The sub-components of political 
stability are legislative strength, government unity and popular support. Accountability 
measures the responsiveness of a government to its people, ranging from 0 to 6, with 
higher values indicating greater accountability. Dummy variables are used for each 
component, with a value higher than the mean taking a value of 1, and 0otherwise. 
182 
Control variables 
In addition to R&D and country-level factors, firm- and industry-level characteristics 
influence firm performance. In order to remove the effect of confounding factors on 
performance, firm-level factors are considered, including firm size, sales growth, leverage 
and tangibility, as well as industry-level characteristics represented by an industry dummy. 
Following Artz et al. (2010), Ehie and Olibe (2010), García-Manjón and Romero-Merino 
(2012) and Pindado et al. (2015), control variables are used. Firm size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Majumder (1997) found that firm size has a significant 
impact on firm performance. Firm growth is measured as changes in sales over sales, and 
not only influences R&D but also indicates whether firm strategies are working, which 
indirectly influences firm performance (Grant, 2001; Geroski, 2005). Moreover, 
Asimakopoulos et al. (2009) found that firm growth impacts positively on profitability. 
Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt over total assets. Asimakopoulos et al. 
(2009) found that leverage impacts negatively on firm profitability, as high leverage 
increases the propensity for bankruptcy. Tangibility is measured as the ratio of fixed assets 
to total assets. High tangibility confirms that firms have no asset constraints, which 
encourages them to grow market share as well as exhibit consistent performance. 
Industry-level differences influence both R&D investment and performance. For example, 
the food and clothing industry generally has insignificant R&D investment, the aircraft 
industry invests in R&D under government contracts, and the auto industry’s R&D 
investment is highly related to institutional quality (Branch, 1974). Industry data were 
collected to control for industry effect, measured using a dummy variable. Innovative or 
technology-based industries take a value of 1, and non-innovative and non-technology 
industries take a value of 0. Innovative and non-innovative industries were separated (see 
Table 8.3), following Kallunki et al. (2009). 
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                 Table 8.3: Technology-Based versus Non-Technology-Based Firms 
Technology-Based Industry Non-Technology-Based Industry 
Aerospace and defence Beverages  
Automobiles Coal 
Biotechnology and medical research Containers and packaging 
Construction materials Food and tobacco 
Communications and networks Hotels and entertainment 
Electronics Leisure products 
Engineering Office equipment 
Healthcare equipment and supplies Oil and gas 
Machinery and equipment components Paper and forest products 
Renewable energy Media and publishing 
Pharmaceuticals Transport infrastructure 
Metals and mining Textiles and apparel 
Software and IT Water utilities 
Telecommunications Miscellaneous 
 
8.3.1.5 Summary statistics 
Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 report descriptive statistics of the sample by firm, industry and 
country respectively. They are presented in three separate tables to provide a clearer 
picture of the sample. The firm-level data (Table 8.4) indicate that, except for ROIC, the 
values of variables do not vary across firms over time. ROIC has a high standard deviation 
of 13.32, indicating that this value varies greatly across firms over time. Moreover, the 
high standard deviations of the firm size and sales growth variables confirm variation in 
firm observations. It is a common belief that firm size and firm growth vary in all countries 
worldwide. ROA, ROIC, R&D intensity and sales growth show higher skewness and 
kurtosis than other variables. One reason for this is that the values of these variables are 
not logarithmically transformed. In general, logarithmic transformation reduces the 
skewness and kurtosis. Table 8.5 clearly shows that technology-based firms invest more in 
R&D than those in non-technology-based industries, with a difference of approximately 32 
percent. Tabrizi (2005) also points out that innovative firms spend more on R&D than non-
innovative firms. In general, technology-based firms place more weight on bringing new 
knowledge to the markets, advancing technology, and increasing employee skills, internal 
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competencies and capabilities. These results support considering control of the industry 
effect in the model. 
Table 8.6 shows descriptive statistics for country-level factors, including investor 
protection and country-level governance variables. The results show that BRIC countries 
are ahead of other emerging countries in R&D investment. Investor protection may vary 
not only by firm but also by country. Israel, Malaysia and South Africa have higher than 
average values for each of the investor protection components, which ensure balanced and 
strong investor protection. In contrast, in several countries, such as China, Indonesia and 
Russia, investor protection components vary greatly, indicating unbalanced and low 
investor protection. For instance, China has a disclosure index of 10, which is strong, but 
its score for the directors’ liability index is 1, which indicates weak investor protection. On 
the other hand, Malaysia, Poland and Colombia have higher than average values for 
country-level governance components, indicating balanced and strong governance systems. 
Russia’s government effectiveness and Pakistan’s accountability are very low compared 
with other countries. Most interestingly, emerging countries still suffer from a lack of 
control of corruption. The data show that this value is low compared with other 
components. Among emerging countries, only Malaysia has higher than average values for 
both investor protection and country governance factors. When compared with the median, 
India, Israel, South Africa, Malaysia and Bangladesh have stronger investor protection, 
while Poland and Colombia have higher governance. This suggests that, among the sample 
countries, investor protection is stronger than governance. 
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                                                                                                           Table 8.4: Sample by Firm 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 25% Minimum 75% Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
ROA 0.09583 0.10049 0.04569 -0.5095 0.13473 1.38429 1.83170 20.7376 
ROIC 11.2362 13.3173 4.84000 -49.440 15.3700 190.470 3.11021 31.7871 
R&D intensity 0.01340 0.03546 0.00103 0.00000 0.01046 0.56101 8.19602 98.1054 
Leverage 0.26685 0.17483 0.12342 0.00000 0.39289 0.85863 0.40124 2.45744 
Firm size 5.60229 0.84762 4.99050 3.66950 6.18292 8.64330 0.39833 2.91994 
Sales growth 0.15500 0.59238 -0.03695 -1.5331 0.26712 22.5106 21.2309 719.792 
Tangibility 0.48427 0.18637 0.34538 0.05703 0.62196 0.96268 0.11058 2.38450 
Source: Author’s calculations 
                                                                                                          Table 8.5: Sample by Industry 
 Technology-based Industries Non-technology-based Industries 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
ROA 0.09556 0.09839 -0.50950 0.95239 0.09632 0.10416 -0.29166 1.38429 
ROIC 11.2542 12.4647 -47.5100 166.190 11.2041 14.7194 -49.4400 190.470 
R&D intensity 0.01774 0.04145 0.00000 0.56101 0.00569 0.01854 0.00000 0.43474 
Leverage 0.25136 0.16793 0.00000 0.85863 0.29442 0.18334 0.00000 0.80964 
Firm size 5.55981 0.82941 3.75097 8.00070 5.67792 0.87441 3.66950 8.64330 
Sales growth 0.16529 0.66898 -1.53317 22.51064 0.13668 0.42266 -0.76285 6.64761 
Tangibility 0.46694 0.18793 0.05703 0.96268 0.51513 0.17955 0.07258 0.92924 
Source: Author's calculations 
186 
                                                                                
                                                                                            Table 8.6: Sample by Country 
Country 
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India 171 39.130 0.0141 6.0000 4.0000 7.3840 5.8152 0.7500 0.6583 0.6700 0.4072 0.5582 0.8300 0.6443 
Turkey 68 15.561 0.0061 8.6597 4.0000 5.0000 5.8979 0.5000 0.5965 0.6621 0.4200 0.5501 0.5480 0.5475 
China 52 11.899 0.0163 10.000 1.0000 3.8723 4.9553 0.5000 0.5539 0.6616 0.3550 0.7235 0.3768 0.5282 
Israel 27 6.1785 0.0504 7.0000 9.0000 9.0000 8.3000 1.0000 0.8200 0.8300 0.5000 0.5017 0.7100 0.7277 
South Africa 21 4.8055 0.0028 8.0000 8.0000 8.0000 8.0000 0.5000 0.7922 0.4116 0.4315 0.7028 0.8300 0.6118 
Malaysia 19 4.3478 0.0035 10.000 9.0000 7.0000 8.7000 0.7500 0.7658 0.6700 0.4200 0.7142 0.7751 0.6838 
Greece 18 4.1190 0.0091 1.3448 3.6293 5.0000 3.3095 0.7500 0.7034 0.7500 0.3300 0.7261 0.9200 0.6958 
Indonesia 12 2.7460 0.0046 9.5294 5.0000 3.0000 5.8588 0.5000 0.6759 0.5000 0.5229 0.6080 0.6300 0.5708 
Philippines 10 2.2883 0.0032 2.0000 3.0000 8.0000 4.3000 0.7500 0.7266 0.4200 0.3394 0.6772 0.6885 0.5992 
Russia 9 2.0595 0.0048 6.0000 2.0000 6.0000 4.7000 0.2500 0.7421 0.6202 0.3066 0.6333 0.5555 0.5167 
Brazil 8 1.8307 0.0230 5.0000 8.0000 3.0000 5.3000 0.5000 0.5947 0.3353 0.4529 0.7098 0.7500 0.5568 
Pakistan 8 1.8307 0.0094 5.5902 5.8197 6.8361 6.0492 0.5205 0.5921 0.5533 0.3208 0.4620 0.3411 0.4453 
Poland 4 0.9153 0.0203 7.0000 2.0000 8.8571 5.9571 0.7500 0.8854 0.7500 0.4343 0.8075 1.0000 0.7710 
Jordan 3 0.6865 0.0108 4.0000 4.0000 1.0000 3.0000 0.5000 0.7837 0.6700 0.4747 0.7411 0.6511 0.6342 
Sri Lanka 3 0.6865 0.0006 4.5000 5.0000 7.0000 5.4750 0.5000 0.6220 0.4560 0.4200 0.6170 0.4560 0.5110 
Bangladesh 2 0.4577 0.0020 6.0000 7.0000 7.0000 6.7000 0.5000 0.5107 0.3750 0.4593 0.5657 0.4614 0.4771 
Chile 2 0.4577 0.0015 7.3636 6.0000 5.0000 6.1091 0.7500 0.9418 0.7864 0.7155 0.7500 0.7900 0.7918 
Total 437 100 
            Min. 
  
0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 3.0000 0.2500 0.4500 0.3300 0.2500 0.4100 0.1700 0.4200 
Max. 
  
0.5610 10.000 9.0000 9.0000 8.7000 1.0000 0.9500 0.8300 0.7800 0.8500 1.0000 0.8100 
Mean 
  
0.0134 7.0033 4.4816 6.3781 5.9619 0.6562 0.6648 0.6474 0.4092 0.6029 0.6989 0.6131 
Median     0.0033 6.0000 4.0000 7.0000 5.7000 0.7500 0.6800 0.6700 0.4200 0.5700 0.7900 0.6300 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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8.3.2 Model 
In order to examine the impact of the influence of country governance factors on the 
relationship between R&D spending and firm performance, the following model was 
devised. A semi-logarithmic model is used for the analysis, firstly because the investor 
protection and governance variables are dummy variables which take values of 0 and 1, so 
logarithms for these variables cannot be used as the logarithm of 0 does not exist. 
Secondly, ROA, ROIC and sales growth can be negative; thus, the logarithm cannot be 
used for these values. 
Performanceit= αi + β1(Performanceit-1) + β2(R&D Intensityit)+β3ln(Firm Sizeit) 
+β4(Sales growthit)+β5(Leverageit)+β6(Tangibilityit)+ηi+dt+Ii+vit
  
(1) 
Performanceit= αi + β1(Performanceit-1) + β2(R&D Intensityit)+β3(R&D 
Intensity2it) + β4 In(Firm Sizeit) + β5(Sales growthit) +β6(Leverageit)+ 
β7(Tangibilityit) +ηi+dt+Ii+ vit                         (2) 
Performanceit= αi + β1(Performanceit-1) + β2(R&D Intensityit) + β3(Firm Sizeit) 
+ β4ln(Sales growthit) + β5(Leverageit) +β6(Tangibilityit)+ β7(R&D*Investor 
protectionit)+ ηi+dt+Ii + vit       
(3) 
Performanceit= αi + β1(Performanceit-1) + β2(R&D Intensityit) + β3ln(Firm 
Sizeit) + β4(Sales growthit) + β5(Leverageit) +β6(Tangibilityit)+ 
β7(R&D*Disclosureit)+ β8(R&D*Liabilityit)+β9(R&D*Suitsit) +ηi+dt+Ii + vit (4) 
Performanceit= αi + β1(Performanceit-1) + β2(R&D Intensityit) + β3 ln(Firm 
Sizeit) + β4(Sales growthit) + β5(Leverageit) +β6(Tangibilityit)+ β7(R&D*Country 
Governanceit)+ ηi+dt+Ii + vit                                                          
(5) 
Performanceit= αi + β1(Performanceit-1) + β2(R&D Intensityit) + β3 ln(Firm 
Sizeit) + β4(Sales growthit) + β5(Leverageit) +β6(Tangibilityit)+ 
β7(R&D*Gov.Effectit)+ β8(R&D*Reg.Qualityit)+β9(R&D*lawit) 
+β10(R&D*Con.Corruptit) + β11(R&D*Pol.Stabilityit) 
+β12(R&D*Accountabilityit) +ηi+dt+Ii + vit     (6) 
Performanceit= αi + β1(Performanceit-1) + β2(R&D Intensityit) + β3 ln(Firm 
Sizeit) + β4(Sales growthit) + β5(Leverageit) +β6(Tangibilityit)+ β7(R&D*Investor 
protectionit)+ β8(R&D*Country governanceit)+ηi+dt+Ii + vit   (7) 
  
188 
Performanceit= αi + β1(Performanceit-1) + β2(R&D Intensityit) + β3 ln(Firm 
Sizeit) + β4(sales growthit) + β5(Leverageit) +β6(Tangibilityit)+ 
β7(R&D*Disclosureit)+ β8(R&D*Liabilityit)+β9(R&D*Suitsit) 
+β10(R&D*Gov.Effectit) + β11(R&D*Reg.Qualityit)+β12(R&D*lawit) 
+β13(R&D*Con.Corruptit) + β14(R&D*Pol.Stabilityit) 
+β15(R&D*Accountabilityit) + ηi+dt+Ii + vit        (8) 
where subscript i represents the country and t represents the year. Here αi, and β1to 
β15represent relationships between performance and the explanatory variables. The error 
component εit is separated into four sub-components εit = ηi + dt + Ii + vit, while ηi is 
considered as an individual effect to control for individual heterogeneity, which is then 
eliminated by taking first differences. The time dummy, denoted by dt, captures the time-
specific effect to control for macroeconomic variables on R&D and performance. As the 
industries are separated into technology-based and non-technology-based, an industry 
dummy Ii is used to capture industry-specific effects. vit is a random disturbance term 
which is assumed to be i.i.d. normal. 
8.3.3 Method 
In order to examine the moderating effect of investor protection and country governance 
on the relationship between a country’s R&D and firm performance, a GMM estimation 
was performed, following Pindado et al. (2015). Dynamic GMM estimation was used to 
address endogeneity concerns due to unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality. For 
example, R&D investment has an impact on firm performance (Ehie and Olibe, 2010), but 
performance may also impact on R&D investment, as a higher firm value may encourage 
managers to commence new R&D activities (Pindado et al., 2015). 
The GMM estimation consisted of the following steps. First, as the current performance of 
firms may influence their future performance, the lag of performance (a dependent 
variable) was included as an independent variable. Second, the first difference of all 
variables was taken in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable 
bias. The results show no first-order AR(1) serial correlation problems arising from the 
189 
first-difference transformation; however, there is a problem of second-order serial 
correlation AR(2). This suggests that the assumptions of the dynamic GMM estimation 
hold. Third, the lagged values of the explanatory variables were used as instruments. 
Lagged levels of t-1, t-2 and t-3 were used as instruments for the difference equation, and 
one lag as an instrument for the level equation, since system GMM was being used. This is 
because external instruments may not be readily available (Liu et al., 2015) and 
establishing them is extremely complex (Pindado et al., 2014). However, in order to be 
included in the model, the internal instruments must be valid. The Hansen J statistic of 
over-identifying restrictions was applied to test the validity of the instruments, and the 
results show that the instruments are valid in the model. 
In addition, two Wald tests were used to examine the joint significance of the time dummy 
and the explanatory variables. These provide good results for the model. 
8.4 Results and discussion 
Table 8.7 presents the results of the GMM estimation. Eight models (1 to 8) were used to 
examine the moderating effects. Model 1 is the basic model of this estimation, the results 
of which show that R&D intensity and performance have a negative relationship. With a 
one-unit change in R&D intensity, firm performance decreases by 28.75 units. This may 
happen if the current-year R&D investment makes a profit in the same year. Therefore, in 
Model 2, the square of R&D intensity was added, and the results show that R&D intensity 
and firm performance are positively related, confirming a non-linear relationship. Yeh et 
al. (2010) also reach the conclusion that R&D and firm performance have a non-linear 
relationship. Figure 2 shows that, after reaching an optimum level, R&D investment 
gradually decreases. 
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                                                                                        Table 8.7: Results Summary - GMM Estimation 
Dependent variable: ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
ROAt-1 0.33901*** 0.34842*** 0.33420*** 0.31604*** 0.36055*** 0.37214*** 0.34126*** 0.32839*** 
 (0.05816) (0.05455) (0.06048) (0.06026) (0.06107) (0.06206) (0.06026) (0.06084) 
R&D Intensity -0.28745** -0.80528** -1.74769*** -1.98745** -0.86995** -1.20102** -1.61770** -1.15217*** 
 (0.10148) (0.33087) (0.66749) (0.81784) (0.40987) (0.58546) (0.72354) (0.33043) 
R&D Intensity
2
 
 1.25087*       
  (0.69471)       
R&D Intensity*Investor Protection Index   1.49245**    1.019671*  
   (0.67411)    (0.57103)  
R&D Intensity*Disclosure Index    -0.07532    -1.20411** 
    (0.79452)    (0.50119) 
R&D Intensity*Liability Index    1.16469***    1.16232*** 
    (0.20589)    (0.17395) 
R&D Intensity*Shareholder Suits Index    0.69993**    1.92426*** 
    (0.30763)    (0.66634) 
R&D Intensity*Country Governance Index     0.62488  0.34465  
     (0.41149)  (0.41353)  
R&D Intensity*Government Effectiveness      0.93129*  -1.03571 
      (0.52909)  (0.72584) 
R&D Intensity*Regulatory Quality      0.11677  -0.03907 
      (0.13669)  (0.11459) 
R&D Intensity*Rule of Law      -0.81639  -0.22111 
      (0.63002)  (0.35535) 
R&D Intensity*Control of Corruption      0.48994**  0.11645 
      (0.21218)  (0.18279) 
R&D Intensity*Political Stability      -0.20242  0.12335 
      (0.19184)  (0.08610) 
R&D Intensity*Voice & Accountability      0.48013*  0.29057 
      (0.28443)  (0.28213) 
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Size 0.02092** 0.01671* 0.01430* 0.02047*** 0.01477** 0.01718** 0.01327* 0.02526*** 
 (0.00866) (0.00922) (0.00853) (0.00795) (0.00794) (0.00771) (0.00730) (0.00676) 
Sales Growth 0.01685* 0.01683* 0.01568** 0.01463** 0.01508** 0.01427** 0.01493** 0.01268* 
 (0.00876) (0.00882) (0.00716) (0.00774) (0.00780) (0.00716) (0.00711) (0.00760) 
Leverage -0.27373*** -0.26935*** -0.26858*** -0.27593*** -0.22654*** -0.25118*** -0.26978*** -0.23612*** 
 (0.03773) (0.03762) (0.03132) (0.03043) (0.03201) (0.03197) (0.03280) (0.02703) 
Tangibility -0.16526** -0.19321*** -0.15350*** -0.17499*** -0.16188*** -0.17639*** -0.15303*** -0.15372*** 
 (0.04755) (0.05132) (0.04221) (0.04760) (0.04173) (0.05070) (0.04141) (0.04010) 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total Observations 2549.00 2549.00 2549.00000 2549.00 2549.00 2549.00 2549.00 2549.00 
AR(1) 
 
-4.61 -4.8400 -4.51000 -4.42 -4.5100 -4.4800 -4.46 -4.4100 
P-value 
 
0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
AR(2) 1.43 1.48000 1.44000 1.19 1.47000 1.44000 1.44 1.33000 
P-value 0.152 0.14000 0.15100 0.233 0.14200 0.15000 0.151 0.18300 
z1 27.44(7) 29.6(8) 30.25(8) 30.93(10) 30.96(8) 19.85(13) 30.77(9) 23.99(16) 
P-value 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
z2 3.36 3.39(5) 2.87(5) 2.5(5) 5.03(5) 4.4(5) 3.89(5) 4.98(5) 
P-value 
 
0.0054 0.00510 0.01460 0.03 0.00020 0.00060 0.0018 0.00020 
Hansen 159.58(146) 168.48(147) 191.32(168) 235.84(210) 198.05(175) 333.74(304) 209.42(188) 339(325) 
P-value 
 
0.209 0.10800 0.10500 0.107 0.11200 0.11600 0.136 0.28500 
Levels of significance: * <0.10, ** <0.05, ***<0.01; Standard errors in parenthesis 
1
2
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The results show that with a one-unit change in R&D intensity, the probability of high firm 
performance increases by 125 units. This implies that R&D intensity takes time to show 
returns on the investment, confirming the general view that R&D intensity does not create 
benefits in the current year. In other words, strategic decisions such as R&D investment 
have a threshold level. Therefore, the results strongly support Hypothesis 1. 
              Figure 8.2: Non-Linear Relationship between R&D and Firm Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Model 3, the interaction terms of the investor protection index are added. R&D intensity 
is interacted with the investor protection index. The positive coefficient on the interaction 
term suggests that investor protection has a significant influence on R&D spending in 
increasing firm performance. The results remain robust in Model 7 after including the 
country governance index in the regression. This implies that investor protection enhances 
R&D investment by facilitating external finance (Hiller et al., 2011) and capital allocation 
(Xiao, 2013), which in turn increase firm performance. These results confirm the 
moderating role of investor protection on the relationship between R&D and firm 
performance. Therefore, the results support Hypothesis 2. 
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In Model 4, in order to examine which aspects of investor protection drive the positive 
effect on firm performance, the investor protection index is split into three sub-
components: disclosure, directors’ liability and shareholder suits. The base model shows 
that R&D intensity and firm performance have a negative relationship, but the relationship 
becomes positive when the interaction terms, except disclosure, are present. These results 
suggest that R&D intensity influences firm performance when directors are more liable for 
their activities, which makes them more accountable for their decisions. The positive 
relationship between R&D intensity, shareholder suits and firm performance is consistent 
with the idea that the possibility of shareholder suits puts pressure on directors to make 
investments such as in R&D that will enhance firm value. Directors’ liability and 
shareholder suits remain robust when new governance variables are added into the 
regression in Model 8. In addition, disclosure becomes significant. The negative coefficient 
of the interaction term of disclosure and R&D investment implies that disclosure of R&D-
related activities does not influence firm performance. This is because most investors in 
emerging markets are unaware of R&D-related activities or annual reports. Moreover, a 
substantial percentage of investors in emerging markets are illiterate. 
In Model 5, the country governance index is interacted. The results show that the 
interaction between country governance index and R&D investment has no influence on 
firm performance. This is because firm-level governance has a greater influence than 
country governance on strategic decisions such as R&D in generating firm performance. 
The contrasting effects of the country-level governance components may be another reason 
for the insignificance. Therefore, the results do not support Hypothesis 3. 
In order to examine aspects of country governance in greater depth, country governance is 
sub-divided into government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of 
corruption, political stability, and voice and accountability. It can be seen from the results 
of Model 6 that only government effectiveness, control of corruption and voice and 
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accountability have a positive influence on R&D intensity and firm performance. This 
implies that effective government may increase R&D spending as a result of spill-overs 
creating networks between firms and individuals. Moreover, control of corruption may 
facilitate the size of R&D investment, as it motivates innovation-related FDI and reduces 
investment costs. A high level of accountability of managers and directors to shareholders 
influences the relationship between R&D and firm performance. Voice and accountability 
ensures the responsible behaviour of managers, which influences investments in general, 
and R&D investments in particular. Moreover, high accountability ensures responsible 
decisions, actions and commitment to accomplishing the task. In addition, high 
accountability guarantees organisational learning and innovation. Interestingly, in Model 8, 
when three more variables of investor protection are introduced into the regression, these 
country-level governance variables become insignificant. The results suggest that investor 
protection, whether aggregate (Model 7) or separate (Model 8), tend to have a greater 
influence on the relationship between R&D and firm performance. 
ROAt-1 impacts positively on firm performance, indicating the persistent performance of 
the firm. Following path-dependent theory, this indicates that past-year performance 
motivates a firm to grow more. Firm performance is also influenced by firm size. A larger 
firm size indicates greater assets, higher capacity, higher investment and greater human 
capital, which help to utilise more resources and obtain greater returns. The coefficient of 
sales growth is positive and significant, implying that growth opportunities help firms to 
expand knowledge, skills and abilities, and to provide new products to customers, which in 
turn increases firm performance. In contrast, leverage shows a negative impact on firm 
performance. This is because high leverage increases the probability of bankruptcy. 
Similarly, tangibility and firm performance are negatively related. Greater tangibility 
indicates higher fixed assets, such as equipment and buildings, and lower investment. 
However, higher investment creates more value for firms. 
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                                                                                                          Table 8.8: Robustness Test 
Dependent variable: ROIC Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
ROICt-1 0.32548*** 0.30947*** 0.29790*** 0.28841*** 0.31386*** 0.28515*** 0.30707*** 0.27625*** 
 (0.06676) (0.07282) (0.06853) (0.06600) (0.06587) (0.06539) (0.06896) (0.06376) 
R&D Intensity -41.0297** -83.53255** -206.7691** -152.2283* -158.5874* -189.7526*** -239.8045*** -91.61253* 
 (12.83565) (23.9575) (102.0035) (63.2158) (84.75506) (70.16853) (83.15336) (53.59715) 
R&D Intensity
2
  107.3062**       
  (49.96016)       
R&D Intensity*Investor Protection Index   179.2447*    103.5832*  
   (101.6571)    (59.66239)  
R&D Intensity*Disclosure Index    -156.907*    -221.3451*** 
    (80.65221)    (73.59762) 
R&D Intensity*Liability Index    122.29***    94.18442*** 
    (40.29115)    (25.62528) 
R&D Intensity*Shareholder Suits Index    167.0042***    275.8891*** 
    (64.56421)    (76.62181) 
R&D Intensity*Country Governance Index     129.4959  108.3986**  
     (84.70142)  (43.01148)  
R&D Intensity*Government Effectiveness      40.98203  -132.972 
      (81.80536)  (81.59818) 
R&D Intensity*Regulatory Quality      26.10056  -4.76183 
      (21.49742)  (15.57178) 
R&D Intensity*Rule of Law      -63.55827  9.29344 
      (76.23429)  (44.41675) 
R&D Intensity*Control of Corruption      51.66614*  -0.76609 
      (27.56927)  (20.3361) 
R&D Intensity*Political Stability      -35.56865*  2.12354 
      (20.85312)  (12.57721) 
R&D Intensity*Voice & Accountability      143.7323***  56.49137 
      (54.98981)  (35.56836) 
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Size 3.61181** 2.33438* 3.47277*** 4.18488*** 3.47588*** 3.47346** 3.70869*** 3.92055*** 
 (1.43249) (1.33657) (1.09780) (1.22285) (1.13490) (1.01697) (1.13978) (0.98160) 
Sales Growth 2.74672** 2.75763* 2.45074** 2.11113* 2.42449** 1.97972** 2.18203** 1.86360* 
 (1.34867) (1.41090) (1.22624) (1.10525) (1.20188) (0.97474) (1.02054) (1.13083) 
Leverage -39.59039*** -37.92565*** -31.38161*** -30.66891*** -31.83194*** -32.02911*** -35.95089*** -30.36872*** 
 (5.81462) (5.65427) (4.59028) (4.22288) (4.54046) (4.32129) (4.35212) (3.85153) 
Tangibility -36.74622*** -33.5642*** -28.06347*** -34.03286*** -31.47292*** -31.58779*** -30.0136*** -30.52369*** 
 (8.54340) (8.25) (6.86035) (8.17854) (7.11744) (7.35731) (7.43422) (6.68155) 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total Observations 2549.00 2549.00 2549.00 2549.00 2549.00 2549.00 2549.00 2549.00 
AR(1) 
 
-3.17 -3.10000 -3.10000 -3.07 -3.17000 -3.0100 -3.01 -3.0100 
P-value 
 
0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300 
AR(2) 1.36 1.34000 1.33000 1.15 1.33000 1.15000 1.27 1.15000 
P-value 0.173 0.18200 0.18400 0.251 0.18400 0.25200 0.203 0.24900 
z1 24.76(7) 21.49(8) 19.66(8) 19.73(10) 22.62(8) 16.71(11) 24.37(9) 24.27(16) 
P-value 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
z2 1.91(5) 2.2(5) 1.95(5) 2.19(5) 1.93(5) 2.42(5) 1.96(5) 2.69(5) 
P-value 
 
0.0917 0.05320 0.08460 0.0546 0.08740 0.03540 0.083 0.02080 
Hansen 161.36(156) 169(151) 192.44(171) 219.06(195) 181.62(159) 294.52(266) 192.41(170) 339.51(325) 
P-value 
 
0.368 0.15000 0.12500 0.114 0.10600 0.11100 0.115 0.27900 
Significance levels: * <0.10, ** <0.05, ***<0.01; Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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8.5.1 Robustness Test 
In order to test the robustness of the models, ROIC is considered as a dependent variable. 
ROIC measures the efficiency of the firm on the basis of capital investment, expressed as 
profit per dollar of invested capital. ROIC has advantages over ROA in measuring 
profitability. For example, it does not include non-operating items in measuring 
profitability. Moreover, ROA can easily be skewed when a firm has excess cash. In 
contrast, ROIC overcomes these shortcomings. Moreover, it helps to compare firms with 
different financial structures. Thus, robustness was tested using ROIC. 
Table 8.8 reports the results of GMM estimation, where ROIC is the dependent variable. 
The results show that investor protection factors interacting with R&D have a significant 
impact on firm performance. All the results in Models 1, 2, 3, 5 and 8 are similar to those 
for ROA. In Model 4, the results show that disclosure and R&D jointly negatively impact 
on firm performance. This implies that higher disclosure of R&D negatively impacts on 
firm performance. Therefore, R&D disclosure principles play a vital role. If R&D costs are 
treated as an expense in the period they are incurred, net income decreases. In Model 6, the 
composite country governance index becomes significant. This is because the capital 
investments (ROIC) rather than total assets (ROA) of a firm are influenced by both 
investor protection and country governance. The implication is that the external 
environment is very important for investment and the ability to gain returns on it. In Model 
7, the results become robust, as control of corruption and voice and accountability, together 
with R&D, have an impact on firm performance. The results for control of corruption and 
voice and accountability remain the same as for ROA. On the other hand, political stability 
negatively influences R&D investment. This is because political stability varies greatly 
between emerging markets because many are less democratic and less accountable to their 
people, which discourages foreign investment in innovative activities. 
198 
From the test for robustness, it can be concluded that safeguards (investor protection) have 
a greater impact on the R&D and firm performance relationship than systems (country 
governance). This is because investors seek safeguards for their investments. The recent 
financial crisis also led them to prefer safeguards to systems. With risky and uncertain 
investments like R&D, investors seek protection from possible losses. 
8.6 Conclusion 
Country-level factors play an important role in attracting investors, and especially foreign 
investors, to innovative activities in emerging markets. Thus, this study has examined the 
moderating effects of country-level factors, such as investor protection and governance, on 
the relationship between R&D and firm performance. In order to analyse the moderating 
effect, GMM estimation was applied to panel data for 437 firms from 17 emerging 
countries. In the first part of analysis, the R&D intensity and firm performance relationship 
was investigated. Consistent with Yeh et al. (2010), it is found that there is a non-linear 
relationship between R&D intensity and firm performance. This is because R&D intensity 
takes time to show returns on investment. Moreover, it confirms the common view that 
R&D intensity does not create benefits in the current year. 
In the second part of the study, the moderating effects of investor protection on the 
relationship between R&D and firm performance were examined. Whereas the first part 
showed that R&D intensity and firm performance have a negative relationship, the 
relationship becomes positive when the interaction terms are included in the regression. 
The results show that R&D investment may generate higher profits when there is strong 
investor protection. Investor protection enhances R&D investment by facilitating external 
finance (Hiller et al., 2011) and capital allocation (Xiao, 2013), which in turn improves 
firm performance. More insightful information is provided when investor protection is 
separated into the sub-components of disclosure index, liability index and shareholder suits 
index. The results indicate that R&D intensity influences firm performance when directors 
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are more liable for their activities. Moreover, the positive relationship between R&D 
intensity, shareholder suits and firm performance is consistent with the idea that the 
possibility of shareholder suits puts pressure on managers and directors to make 
investments such as in R&D that will enhance firm value. However, disclosure shows a 
negative impact when ROIC is considered as the dependent variable. This is because, if 
R&D costs are treated as an expense in the period they are incurred, net income is 
decreased. Moreover, disclosure of information relating to innovative activities does not 
influence most investors in emerging markets. 
In the third part of the study, the moderating effects of country-level governance factors on 
the R&D and firm performance relationship were investigated. The results show that the 
combined country governance factor has no influence on R&D investment and firm 
performance. This suggests that firm-level governance factors may be more influential in 
firm-level strategic decisions such as R&D. Contrasting effects among country governance 
factors may be another reason for this result. Therefore, when the country governance 
factors are separated into the sub-components of government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, control of corruption, political stability and voice and accountability, it 
is found that government effectiveness, control of corruption and voice and accountability 
have an influence on the R&D and firm performance relationship. This implies that good 
governance facilitates R&D investment by facilitating networking between firms and 
individuals. Moreover, control of corruption increases innovative activities in a country, 
which influences firm performance. Control of corruption may decrease the cost of fixed 
investments, thus increasing R&D activity. It is also found that accountability together 
with R&D positively influence firm performance. This is because high accountability 
guarantees organisational learning and innovation. 
Overall, in comparing investor protection and country governance, it is found that investor 
protection factors tend to moderate the relationship between R&D and firm performance to 
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a greater extent than country governance. This is because, with risky and uncertain 
investments such as R&D, investors seek protection from possible losses. 
This study contributes to the debate over which factors moderate the relationship between 
R&D and firm performance most. Moreover, it will help national and foreign investors to 
make decisions about R&D in emerging countries. This analysis could be extended to 
analyse the influence of macroeconomic factors on the R&D and firm performance 
relationship, and future work might be extended to other emerging countries. The main 
limitation of this study is that, due to missing values of R&D and investor protection 
factors, not all emerging countries were included. 
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Chapter 9: Financing Behaviour of R&D Investment in Emerging 
Markets – The Role of Multinationality and Financial Systems 
9.1 Introduction 
In order to finance R&D, firms need to raise capital from internal or external sources. 
However, there is a dilemma about whether to raise capital from internal sources, external 
sources, or both. Schumpeter (1942) argued that, due to agency problems, R&D investment 
is preferably financed internally. Moreover, internal sources are less costly and easier to 
raise. However, due to financial constraints, firms may depend on external sources for 
R&D investment (Hottenrott and Peters, 2012). Furthermore, external financing provides 
tax shields. Brown and Peterson (2009) emphasised both internal and external sources of 
finance for R&D investment, while Brown et al. (2009) found that neither internal nor 
external finance appear to be easy sources of R&D investment. The latter argued that firms 
build up cash reserves when funds are sufficient and spend them in years when funds are 
limited. Similarly, the Modigliani-Miller (M-M) theorem posits that firms choose optimum 
levels of investment to obtain higher returns, which do not depend on how firms raise 
capital. This inconclusive situation and the challenges of the recent global financial crisis 
prompt the investigation described in this chapter. 
This chapter examines sources of financing for R&D investment, which will direct firms to 
make financial policies and reach financial goals with least cost. Moreover, studying 
sources of financing will help firms to prepare budgets for R&D projects. However, firms’ 
financing decisions are highly correlated with multinationality, as well as national 
institutional settings. Mudambi et al. (2012) observed that multinationality has a significant 
impact on the performance of a firm’s initial public offering (IPO) performance. Similarly, 
institutional settings such as (bank-based and market-based) financial systems embed firms 
in a specific environment within which to choose sources of finance (David et al., 2008). 
Therefore, identifying appropriate channels for financing R&D investment in the context 
of multinationality and financial systems promotes the long-run growth of the firm. This 
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study will also help investors, lenders, managers, R&D workers and policy makers to be 
aware of sources of finance for R&D and how to promote R&D activities. 
This study examines sources of finance for emerging countries, as they are growing faster 
than developed countries in terms of GDP and purchasing power per capita. It is assumed 
that growth rates in emerging markets will be three times higher than those of advanced 
economies by 2020. Faster growth may lead to higher rates of return than on similar 
investments in developed countries (Logue, 2011). Emerging markets are considered to be 
low-cost innovation centres and lands of opportunity for investors. In addition, investment 
in R&D helps firms to emerge from crises and provides sustainable long-term growth 
(OECD, 2009). Therefore, in recent years, emerging markets have considerably increased 
their R&D investments. Emerging-market firms must consider appropriate, sufficient and 
cost-effective sources of finance for R&D investment, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
proposed that financing and investment decisions are interactive processes. However, there 
have been few empirical studies regarding the financing of R&D investments in emerging 
markets. Most earlier studies have focused on the link between financial constraints and 
R&D investment, and most have been based on developed countries. For the USA, these 
have included Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Hall (1990, 2002), Bhagat and Welch 
(1995), Bah and Dumontier (2001), Brown et al. (2009), Chaio (2002), Bougheas (2004) 
and Wang and Thornhill (2010). Those on the UK have included Bhagat and Welch 
(1995), Bah and Dumontier (2001), Bougheas (2004) and Brown et al. (2012). For Japan, 
studies have included Bhagat and Welch (1995), Bah and Dumontier (2001), Bougheas 
(2004) and David et al.(2008), and for Germany, Muller and Zimmermann (2006) and 
Czarnitzki and Kraft (2009). This study seeks to close this gap. 
Nohria and Gulati (1997) observed a relationship between organisational slack and R&D 
activities. The theory of financial slack posits that organisational slack affects R&D 
financing differently depending on firm size (Chen and Humbrick, 1995), profitability 
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(Bhat, 2008), type of ownership (Kim et al., 2008), experimentation with new strategies, 
new products and new markets (Hambrick and Snow, 1977) and global competitive 
pressure. Therefore, local firms’ and MNEs’ sources of finance for R&D investment may 
be different in emerging markets. On the other hand, pecking order theory suggests that 
firms follow an order in financing R&D investment, using first internal resources, then 
debt, and finally equity. This may happen due to information asymmetry and the nature of 
a country’s financial system. Benito (2003) examined financial systems and pecking order 
and found that firms in market-based financial systems follow a pecking order for the 
financing of R&D investments. 
This chapter makes two main contributions. First, it examines behavioural differences 
between local firms and MNEs in financing R&D investments in emerging markets. 
Previous research does not appear to have divided firms between local firms and MNEs to 
observe R&D financing. Second, evidence is provided of a relationship between financial 
systems and R&D investment in emerging markets. Earlier research has not focused on 
emerging markets. In relation to financial systems, the study distinguishes between bank-
based and market-based systems. In order to examine the sources of finance for local firms 
and MNEs in bank-based and market-based finance systems GMM estimation is applied 
using panel data from a sample of 310 firms during the period 2003-2012. After controlling 
for firm size, sales growth, export orientation and foreign ownership, it is found that 
emerging market firms do not use external funding for R&D investment. Interesting results 
are obtained when the sample is divided between local firms and MNEs, and bank-based 
and market-based finance. Local firms’ and MNEs’ sources of finance for R&D investment 
are different. Local firms do not use external funding for R&D investment, while MNEs 
use both internal and external funding for R&D in emerging markets, following financial 
slack theory. This result implies that access to finance plays a role in R&D financing. The 
study also finds that the financial system of the country in which firms are embedded 
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influences their choice of source of finance. Firms under bank-based financial systems use 
external funding, while those under market-based financial systems use internal funding 
for R&D investments in emerging markets, following pecking order theory. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.2 presents the hypotheses of the study, 
Section 9.3 introduces the data and research methods, Section 9.4 presents and discusses 
the results, and Section 9.5 draws conclusions from this study. 
9.2 Hypotheses to be tested 
Sources of finance for R&D investment may be different for local firms and MNEs. In 
general, local firms are small and less resource-intensive than MNEs (Boardman et al., 
1997; Tsang et al., 2008; Poulis et al., 2012). Thus, it is assumed that local firms have less 
capability to repay loans or continue with long-term R&D projects, making it harder to 
obtain external funding. Local firms have less access to multiple sources of funding; thus, 
external finance may be expensive for them. Moreover, owing to higher risk and 
uncertainty and constrained resources, local firms with greater debt-equity ratios will spend 
less on R&D. Transaction cost theory and the positive theory of agency argue that debt 
financing may discourage R&D investment. On the other hand, MNEs are large and have 
good networks in the national and international arena. As MNEs have sufficient resources 
and capability-based advantages over local firms (Xu et al., 2005), it is expected that they 
will have more internal funds to invest in R&D. Moreover, owing to operations and 
production activities in different areas, MNEs have access to multiple sources of funding. 
In addition, good networks and international exposure help MNEs to obtain external 
financing for R&D investments. Thus, better financial position, greater production 
capability, positive corporate brand image and greater access to trade (Poulis et al., 2012) 
allow MNEs to use both internal and external funding for R&D investment. Moreover, 
Brown and Peterson (2009) emphasised both internal and external sources of finance for 
R&D investment. Therefore, the following hypotheses are postulated: 
205 
Hypothesis 1: Owing to the risky and costly nature of R&D investment, local firms 
do not use external funding for R&D investment. 
Hypothesis 2: As MNEs have sufficient internal resources and multiple sources of 
funding, they use both internal and external funding for R&D investment. 
Different financial systems have comparative advantages for financing. Consequently, 
financing choices for R&D investment depend on countries’ financial systems (David et 
al., 2008). In bank-based financial systems, banks tend to be more active, more efficient 
and larger (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999). Such systems provide more credit facilities, 
promote long-term relationships with firms and resolve moral hazard problems. Thus, 
firms can easily get debt for long-term R&D investments. Disciplinary role theory and 
monitoring theory of debt posit that firms prefer debt as a mode of financing R&D. Debt 
financing is monitored by the client and also reins in managerial discretion, which 
positively affects R&D investment. Moreover, debt finance reduces over-investment, 
provides tax shields, and enables greater incremental innovation in firms. On the other 
hand, in market-based systems, stock markets tend to be larger, more active and more 
efficient (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999). Market-based systems are superior for long-
term financing. Moreover, market-based systems transmit prices, encouraging firms to 
engage in strategic investments such as R&D. Thus, firms can easily raise money from the 
market for R&D investment, and it is less costly because firms need not make regular 
interest payments. Schumpeter’s (1942) hypothesis and Myers’ (1984) pecking order 
theory both emphasise internal funding as a source of finance for R&D investment. Due to 
information asymmetry and the lower collateralisable value of R&D, it is difficult for firms 
to obtain external finance in a market based system. Therefore, the following hypotheses 
are postulated: 
Hypothesis 3: Bank-based financial systems provide more credit facilities, and are 
more efficient and active, leading firms to rely on external funding for R&D 
investment. 
Hypothesis 4: Market-based financial systems are superior for long-term financing 
such as R&D, leading firms to rely on internal funding for R&D investment. 
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The existing literature suggests that, in addition to internal and external funding, firms’ 
R&D is also affected by important factors such as firm size, sales growth, export 
orientation and foreign ownership, which are considered as control variables. Connolly and 
Hirschey’s (2005) study supported size advantages in the valuation effects of R&D 
expenditure. However, the existing literature has provided inconclusive results for the 
relationship between size and R&D. Larger firms have sufficient assets and capacity to 
invest more in R&D. They also tend to be more diversified, more technologically complex 
and better aware of technological opportunities (Lall, 1983). In contrast, Kriaa and Karray 
(2010) argued that, due to better networks of communication and co-ordination and 
informal controls, smaller size may have a positive effect on R&D activities. A high sales 
growth rate indicates a firm’s potential for growth, greatly contributing to an increase in 
R&D investment. According to Mueller (1967), “The faster a firm’s sales are increasing, 
the more confidence it will have about its ability to secure the benefits from uncertain 
R&D projects, and the more patience it can afford to show in waiting for these benefits.” 
Export-oriented firms will be more aware of new technologies and will also strive harder to 
maintain the competitiveness of their technologies (Lall, 1983). Exporting firms need to 
adapt their products and processes to meet the nature of demand, tastes and product 
standards in foreign markets (Kumar and Aggarwal, 2005). R&D activity may help firms 
to compete more effectively in international markets (Kumar and Saqib, 1996). Thus, 
export-orientated firms need to invest more in R&D than non-exporting firms. Kumar and 
Saqib’s (1996) study found a significant positive influence of export orientation on R&D 
investment. Foreign ownership may induce a firm to undertake R&D if knowledge from 
the parent needs to be adapted to local conditions or if specific projects require 
collaboration with a foreign owner (UNCTAD, 2003). Foreign ownership creates better 
access to finance for R&D investment, and Kriaa and Karray (2010) found a significant 
positive influence of foreign ownership on R&D investment. 
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9.3 Data and methodology 
9.3.1 Data 
This chapter focuses on emerging markets, selected on the basis of lists of emerging 
markets drawn from the IMF, Goldman Sachs, FTSE, MSCI, The Economist, S&P, Dow 
Jones, BBVA and Columbia University EMGP (see Appendix 2). Thomson Reuter 
DataStream, LexisNexis and firms’ annual financial reports were used to collect data from 
a sample of 51 emerging markets. In order to avoid sample selection bias, all listed firms in 
an emerging market were considered. First, 25,251 firms were identified from all emerging 
markets on DataStream. As there were missing values in these data, annual financial 
reports were used to fill in the gaps where possible. The LexisNexis database was used to 
collect data about whether a firm was local or an MNE. DataStream, LexisNexis and 
annual financial reports provided 310 firms from 20 emerging markets (see Tables 9.1 and 
9.2). The time period considered for this analysis was 2003-2012, in order to close a gap in 
the literature regarding the latest data. Countries with at least two firms were taken into 
account. South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore were excluded from the sample because 
these countries are now considered to be emerged countries. The firms included in the 
analysis must have 10 consecutive years of data, since the analysis is based on balanced 
panel data. Panel data were used because they enable the researcher to control for firm 
heterogeneity, give more information, greater variability and more degrees of freedom, 
avoid mulitcollinearity problems, provide more efficient results and are more suited to 
identifying and measuring effects that are not detectable in pure cross-sectional or pure 
time series data (Baltagi, 2013). 
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                                                   Table 9.1: Sample Selection 
Description 
No. of 
Countries 
No. of 
firms 
Initial search on DataStream  51 25251 
Firms with10 consecutive years of data 37 892 
Countries with at least two firms 23 878 
Dropped: Countries that are already emerged 3 568 
Final sample 20 310 
Source: DataStream, LexisNexis and Annual reports 
                                                  Table 9.2: Sample by Country 
Country 
No. 
of firms 
Percentage 
of firms 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Hong Kong 62 20.00 20.00 
India 52 16.77 36.77 
Turkey 30 9.68 46.45 
China 23 7.42 53.87 
South Africa 23 7.42 61.29 
Israel 22 7.10 68.39 
Bangladesh 21 6.77 75.16 
Greece 19 6.13 81.29 
Malaysia 13 4.19 85.48 
Philippines 8 2.58 88.06 
Indonesia 7 2.26 90.32 
Sri Lanka 5 1.61 91.94 
Brazil 4 1.29 93.23 
Mexico 4 1.29 94.52 
Pakistan 4 1.29 95.81 
Russia 4 1.29 97.10 
Chile 3 0.97 98.06 
Peru 2 0.65 98.71 
Poland 2 0.65 99.35 
Thailand 2 0.65 100.00 
Total 310 100  100.00 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Table 9.3 displays definitions of the variables. From the existing literature, these variables 
have been found to have a significant effect on firms’ R&D investment. In this study, R&D 
expenditure is considered as a dependent variable which takes the logarithm of firms’ 
annual R&D expenditure. The independent variable is internal and external funding. The 
control variables are firm size, sales growth, export orientation and foreign ownership. All 
variables are standardised to a common USD exchange rate. Some explanatory variables 
have higher scales than other, and the absolute value of variables increases the presence of 
heteroscedasticity (Grabowski, 1968). In order to avoid these problems, the natural 
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logarithm is adopted for R&D and size variables, cash flow to sales and debt to total asset 
ratios, and the percentage of foreign shareholders. 
                                                Table 9.3: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Type of data Description 
R&D Continuous R&D expenditure of a firm in a year (ln log) 
Internal funding Ratio Measured by ratio of cash flows to sales 
External funding Ratio Measured by ratio of debt to total assets 
Size Continuous Measured by total assets (ln log) 
Sales growth Ratio Annual sales growth of the firm 
Export-oriented Dummy A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm exports 
Foreign 
ownership 
Percentage Percentage of foreign shareholders to total shareholders 
Market dummy Dummy Takes a value of 1 if the firm is an MNE, and 0 if it is local 
Country dummy Dummy 
Takes a value of 1 if the country is market-based, and 0 if it is bank-
based 
Table 9.4 reports the summary statistics of all variables used for analysis of emerging 
markets. The results show that emerging-market firms do not depend on external funding. 
The recent financial crisis restricted firms from obtaining external funds. Although the 
internal funds variable shows significant variations, emerging-market firms rely on internal 
funding. The growing importance of emerging markets raises investor interest. Thus, 
foreign ownership in emerging markets is higher. Foreign investment, market competition 
and globalisation increase a firm’s size in emerging markets. 
                                         Table 9.4: Summary Statistics for All Firms 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
R&D 2.79634 1.50840 0 6.36103 
Internal funding 12.4723 18.9665 -191.19 291.59 
External funding 0.20387 0.18290 0 0.89991 
Size 5.63364 0.87232 2.84073 8.57482 
Sales growth 0.28944 3.62701 -0.94654 182.106 
Export-oriented 0.45788 0.49830 0 1 
Foreign ownership 14.2641 24.0204 0 95 
Market dummy 0.56997 0.49516 0 1 
Country dummy 0.58603 0.49262 0 1 
 Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 9.5 reports the summary statistics for local firms and MNEs in emerging markets. 
Local firms are defined as those that operate domestically and MNEs are firms that operate 
in more than one country. MNEs are more export-oriented than local firms. Firm-specific 
advantages of MNEs allow them to manage disadvantageous positions as a result of lower 
transaction costs and lower international trade barriers in foreign markets than local firms. 
The export behaviour of firms is also influenced by ownership structure (Athukorala et al., 
1995). MNEs have more foreign ownership than local firms. As most MNEs’ headquarters 
and parent companies are administered or controlled by two or more nations, they have 
greater foreign ownership than local firms. 
                     Table 9.5: Summary Statistics for Local Firms and MNEs 
 Local Firms MNEs 
Variable Mean Std Dev  Min. Max. Mean Std Dev  Min. Max. 
R&D 2.56415 1.50157 0 5.98412 2.97105 1.49073 0 6.36103 
Internal funding 12.4305 19.0091 -95.79 291.59 12.7202 17.8354 -155.25 69.56 
External funding 0.21878 0.19982 0 0.89991 0.19282 0.16820 0 0.88721 
Size 5.44267 0.90229 2.98182 8.57482 5.77894 0.81754 2.94052 8.55341 
Sales growth 0.27994 2.17944 -0.94654 53.5833 0.29721 4.41872 -0.87891 182.107 
Export-oriented 0.35442 0.47851 0 1 0.53598 0.49884 0 1 
Foreign 
ownership 
9.69633 20.1836 0 95 17.7306 26.0390 0 90 
Country dummy 0.48856 0.50005 0 1 0.65975 0.47392 0 1 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Table 9.6 reports the summary statistics for firms under bank-based and market-based 
finance systems in emerging markets. Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, Israel, Greece, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka are considered to be bank-based, while Brazil, China, Chile, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Turkey and 
Thailand are considered to have market-based financial systems (World Bank, 1991; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999; Allen et al., 2012). Bank-based finance provides greater 
credit facilities to firms than market-based finance; thus, firms under bank-based finance 
systems have more external funding than those under market-based finance. On the other 
hand, firms with market-based finance have strong stock markets that attract investment by 
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foreign investors. This also influences firms’ sales and export performance. As a result, 
firms with market-based finance have more foreign ownership, higher sales growth and 
better export performance than those with bank-based finance. 
           Table 9.6: Summary Statistics for Bank-based and Market-based Countries 
 Bank-based Market-based 
Variable Mean Std Dev  Min. Max. Mean Std Dev  Min. Max. 
R&D 2.80711 1.39596 0 6.13468 2.78808 1.58378 0 6.36103 
Internal funding 12.1149 16.1242 -99.96 137.3 12.9350 19.7644 -155.25 291.59 
External funding 0.24142 0.21435 0 0.89991 0.17756 0.15153 0 0.85699 
Size 5.44425 0.87343 3.1038 7.73149 5.76842 0.84405 2.94052 8.57482 
Sales growth 0.17095 0.34730 -0.77542 7.56387 0.37369 4.72897 -0.94655 182.107 
Export-oriented 0.55150 0.49753 0 1 0.39171 0.48827 0 1 
Foreign 
ownership 
9.00601 19.9688 0 95 17.9933 25.8864 0 95 
Market dummy 0.46830 0.49919 0 1 0.64129 0.47975 0 1 
Source: Author’s calculations 
9.3.2 Method of study 
Panel data were estimated using GMM, following previous studies (Hiller et al., 2011; 
Pindado et al., 2015). The panel data GMM estimation technique is used to control for 
endogeneity and individual heterogeneity. For example, firm size and R&D investment 
causality may run in both directions – from firm size to R&D investment and vice versa –
which may create an endogeneity problem. Individual heterogeneity is important for this 
analysis because R&D investment decisions depend on firm-specific factors such as 
strategy, firm culture and the propensity to innovate (Hillier et al., 2011). As difference 
GMM estimation has a problem with weak instruments (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 
1999), system GMM was used. Moreover, system GMM is more efficient than difference 
GMM (Blundell and Bond, 2000). A two-step estimation was performed, following 
Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction. 
In order to determine the consistency and validity of the model, the Hansen J statistic, 
second-order auto-correlation test and two Wald tests were used. The Hansen J statistic 
shows that the instruments are valid in the model. The second-order auto-correlation AR(2) 
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test shows that there are no second-order serial correlations, and the two Wald tests for the 
time dummy and explanatory variables show that the model passes the specification tests. 
The model for the analysis is as follows: 
ln(RDit) = αi + β1(Internal Fundit) + β2(External Fundit) + β3ln(Sizeit) +β4(Sales 
growthit) + β5(Export orientedit) +β6(Foreign ownershipit)+ ηi +Ci + Mi+εit (1) 
In order to control for individual heterogeneity, ηiis taken as the individual effects in the 
model and then eliminated by taking the first differences of the variables. Country, market 
and time dummies are also included in the empirical model. The country dummy captures 
country-specific effects, the market dummy captures market-specific effects and the time 
dummy captures the time-varying effects that control the effect of macroeconomic 
variables on firms’ value. εit is the random disturbance, which is assumed to be i.i.d. 
normal. 
9.4 Results 
Table 9.7 presents the econometric results for the whole sample. As can be seen, R&D 
investment is highly persistent in emerging markets. This implies that about 76 per cent of 
past R&D behaviour affects current levels of R&D investment. The results show that 
emerging-market firms do not use external funding for R&D investment. With a one-unit 
change in external funding, the probability of R&D investment decreases by 35.32 percent. 
Internal funding also exhibits the same sign for R&D investment, implying that emerging-
market firms may depend on equity finance for R&D investment. Brown et al. (2009) also 
observed that, rather than internal or external funding, firms may use equity issues. The 
control variables of firm size, sales growth, export orientation and foreign ownership are 
found to be important determinants of R&D investment. Firm size has a significant 
positive impact on R&D investment in emerging markets. According to Schumpeter’s 
(1942) hypothesis, larger firms make greater R&D investments. Lall’s (1983) study of 
India obtained similar results. Sales growth increases a firm’s probability of engaging in 
R&D investment. Demand-pull theory indicates that the greater the market demand, the 
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greater the percentage of expenditure allocated to R&D. The results confirm the demand-
pull theory. Firms with greater export orientation are more likely to engage in R&D 
investment. Outward-oriented firms will be more aware of new technologies and will also 
strive harder to maintain the competitiveness of their technologies (Lall, 1983). Anwar and 
Sun (2013) reached the same conclusion, based on Chinese electrical appliance industries. 
Foreign ownership has a positive and significant impact on R&D investment. Similar 
results were found by Lee (2012) based on Korean firms. 
                                    Table 9.7: Results Summary for All Firms 
Variable Name All Firms 
 
Standard Error 
R&D 1t  0.76036*** (0.06604) 
Internal funding -0.00208** (0.00107) 
External funding -0.35319*** (0.14285) 
Size 0.25448*** (0.07854) 
Sales growth 0.03812*** (0.01701) 
Export-oriented 0.38077* (0.22613) 
Foreign ownership 0.00232*** (0.00080) 
Market dummy Yes  
Country dummy Yes  
Year dummy Yes  
Total observations 2732  
AR(1), P-value -3.42 0.001 
AR(2), P-value 0.95 0.345 
z 1 , P-value 89.25(9) 0.000 
z 2 , P-value 
 
3.26(9) 0.0008 
Hansen, P-value 157.53(137) 0.111 
       Significance levels: * <0.10, ** <0.05, ***<0.01; Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Table 9.8 presents the results for local firms and MNEs in emerging markets. After 
controlling for the financial systems of a country, the results show that local firms’ and 
MNEs’ financing of R&D investment are different, following organisation slack theory. 
This result implies that access to finance plays a role in R&D financing. External funding 
negatively affects local firms, meaning that local firms do not use external funding for 
R&D investment. This is because local firms are relatively small and find it difficult to 
obtain external funding for non-collateralisable and long-term R&D projects. In addition, 
external funding may be expensive for R&D projects due to their risky and uncertain 
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nature, and because debt holders have an inherent bias towards prudence. Moreover, local 
firms may use equity, venture capital or FDI for R&D investment. With a one-unit change 
in external funding, local firms’ R&D decreases by 0.11 percent. This conforms with 
Hypothesis 1. 
                           Table 9.8: Results Summary for Local Firms and MNEs 
Variable Name        Local Firms             Standard 
                                Error 
         MNEs                  Standard 
                                          Error 
R&D 1t  0.92793*** (0.03827) 0.87997*** (0.05658) 
Internal funding -0.00109 (0.00085) 0.00652* (0.00333) 
External funding -0.46829* (0.23972) 0.58659* (0.31179) 
Size 0.12116** (0.05432) -0.02388 (0.08967) 
Sales growth 0.04701*** (0.01660) 0.01179 (0.03963) 
Export-oriented 0.25002* (0.14105) 0.08868* (0.05254) 
Foreign ownership 0.00154** (0.00073) 0.00248** (0.00124) 
Country dummy Yes  Yes  
Year dummy Yes  Yes  
Total observations 1171  1558  
AR(1), P-value -4.15 0.000 -2.71 0.007 
AR(2), P-value -0.45 0.650 1.13 0.259 
z 1 , P-value 131.75(8) 0.000 61.07(8) 0.000 
z 2 , P-value 
 
1.72(9) 0.0910 1.77(9) 0.0763 
Hansen , P-value 121.58(118) 0.392 129.92(126) 0.387 
Levels of significance: * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, ***< 0.01; Standard errors in parenthesis. 
On the other hand, MNEs use both internal and external funding for R&D investments. 
Brown and Peterson’s (2009) study also emphasised the use of both internal and external 
finance sources for R&D investment. As MNEs have more internal resources and better 
access to finance, they may use both sources for R&D financing. These results support 
Hypothesis 2. The results show that with a one-unit change in internal funding, R&D 
investment increases by 0.65 per cent, while for external funding it increases by 58.66 per 
cent. It can therefore be said that MNEs are keener to use external funding than internal 
funding for R&D investment. This is because large firms like MNEs may have easy access 
to external funding (Chiu et al., 2012). With regard to the other regressors, the R&D 
investments of both types of firm depend on export performance and foreign ownership, 
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while local firms’ R&D is affected by their size and sales growth. Moreover, both local 
firms and MNEs show a higher persistence of R&D investment. 
Table 9.9 reports the results for bank-based and market-based finance. The hypothesis 
suggests that bank-based finance provides credit facilities, which boost firms to invest 
more in R&D, and external funding provides tax shields and encourages more incremental 
innovation by firms. The results show that with a one-unit change in external funding, 
R&D investment increases by 103.10 per cent. Thus, consistent with David et al. (2008), 
the results support Hypothesis 3. 
           Table 9.9: Results Summary for Bank-Based and Market-Based Countries 
Variable Name   Bank-Based                Standard           
                                               Error 
        Market-Based              Standard           
                                               Error 
R&D 1t  0.80711*** (0.10723) 0.71832*** (0.07679) 
Internal funding 0.00152 (0.00223) 0.00728* (0.00433) 
External funding 1.03099** (0.50474) -0.56288* (0.30680) 
Size 0.22147** (0.10341) 0.22296*** (0.07541) 
Sales growth 0.03143 (0.06419) 0.01550 (0.05249) 
Export-oriented -0.99760** (0.39255) 0.04259 (0.09872) 
Foreign ownership 0.00134 (0.00144) 0.00255*** (0.00095) 
Market dummy Yes  Yes  
Year dummy Yes  Yes  
Total observations 1126  1603  
AR(1), P-value -3.25 0.001 -2.54 0.011 
AR(2) , P-value 1.52 0.129 0.70 0.485 
z 1 , P-value 61.08(8) 0.000 66.59(8) 0.000 
z 2 , P-value 
 
3.77(9) 0.0003 1.68(9) 0.0969 
Hansen, P-value 30.48(38) 0.802 50.07(40) 0.352 
Significance levels: * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, ***<0.01; Standard errors in parenthesis. 
In line with Hypothesis 4, firms with market-based finance rely on internal funding for 
R&D investment, which is consistent with Bougheas’ (2004) study. It also follows pecking 
order theory for R&D financing. Market-based finance provides greater flexibility in firms’ 
R&D investment. Moreover, due to weak banking systems, it is difficult to obtain external 
funding for R&D in market-based finance systems. With regard to the other regressors, the 
size of firms in both bank-based and market-based finance systems significantly positively 
affects R&D investment. Strong capital markets under market-based finance attract foreign 
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owners. On the other hand, export orientation negatively affects R&D in bank-based 
systems. One explanation for these results is that exporting firms form a relatively low 
percentage of total firms. Both bank-based and market-based finance firms show higher 
persistence rates in R&D investment. 
9.5 Conclusion 
The growing importance and recent increased investment in R&D in emerging markets 
make this an interesting topic for research. Moreover, the recent global financial crisis 
made emerging markets illiquid and vulnerable. Thus, by applying system GMM to firm-
level panel data over the period 2003-2012, this chapter has examined sources of finance 
for R&D investment in emerging markets. The sample firms were split between local firms 
and MNEs, and between firms under bank-based and market-based finance systems in 
emerging markets. 
The results reveal that local firms’ and MNEs’ sources of finance for R&D investment are 
different. Local firms do not use external funding for R&D investment, following 
transaction cost theory and the positive theory of agency. External funding may be 
expensive for R&D projects due to their risky and uncertain nature. On the other hand, 
MNEs use both internal and external funding for R&D investments, which is consistent 
with pecking order theory, according to which firms first use internal funds, then turn to 
external finance. Although Myers emphasised the order of finance sources, both sources of 
finance may be used. As MNEs are large, they are ensured availability of internal funding 
and access to multiple sources of debt financing, MNEs may use both internal and external 
funding for R&D investment. In addition, both local firms’ and MNEs’ R&D investment 
decisions are affected by their export performance and level of foreign ownership. In the 
case of local firms, firm size and sales growth have significant positive impacts on R&D 
investment. 
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It is found that the financial systems of the country in which a firm is embedded determine 
its choice of sources of finance for R&D projects. Firms in bank-based finance 
environments use external funding for R&D investment, consistent with disciplinary role 
theory and the monitoring theory of debt. Banks provide flexible credit facilities and 
monitor the client, which positively affects R&D investment. David et al.’s (2008) results 
were similar. Firms in market-based finance environments use internal funding for R&D 
investment, following pecking order theory and Schumpeter’s hypothesis. Internal funding 
can be raised easily and is less costly in market-based systems. Bougheas (2004) found a 
positive relationship between internal funding and R&D investment. In addition to internal 
and external funding, for firms in both bank-based and market-based finance 
environments, size has a significant effect on R&D investment in emerging markets. 
It is hoped that this study will be helpful to investors, lenders, managers and policy makers 
when considering R&D investments in emerging markets. Although this study has 
considered the financing of R&D investments, a limitation is that it has not separated 
different sources of internal finance, such as cash flows and equity, nor external finance 
sources such as banks, government grants, venture capital and FDI. Another limitation is 
that, owing to missing values, not all emerging markets have been included in the analysis. 
However, the empirical results of this study may provide lessons for other emerging 
markets. Further research is needed on other emerging markets to identify specific sources 
of finance for R&D investment under different financial environments.  
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Chapter 10: Summary and Conclusions 
10.1 Background of the study 
R&D is used as a source of firm growth, and firms’ technological advancement, 
competitive advantage, market power, profitability and innovativeness depend on their 
R&D investment. In addition, increased R&D investment ensures a country’s economic 
growth. It is widely accepted that a country is poorer with less investment in R&D. An 
inefficient R&D strategy may cause low economic growth, low wages, large 
unemployment rates, and even trade deficits (Perez-Sebastian, 2015). Therefore, 
identifying appropriate R&D determinants and sources of finance may enhance R&D 
investment and help policy makers to increase innovative activities in emerging markets. 
Thus, this thesis has examined the firm-, country- and institutional-level determinants and 
sources of financing for R&D investment, and has assessed the impact of R&D investment 
on firm performance in and around emerging markets. Using emerging markets as the 
sample for this study was motivated by the distinct importance of R&D investment for 
emerging countries. In recent years, R&D investment in emerging markets has increased 
considerably for strategic reasons (Gorodncihenko et al., 2008), and because it produces 
higher returns than in advanced countries (Lederman and Maloney, 2003). 
10.2 Summary of research methods 
This thesis is empirical in nature and has followed a positivist approach. Quantitative 
methods were adopted to analyse the sample data. The sample data were collected from 
secondary sources. The datasets used capture the available data from recent periods. Firm-
level sample data were collected mainly from the DataStream database, while 
macroeconomic data and data on R&D intensity were collected from LexisNexis and the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. The World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators provided six indicators which encapsulate different aspects of 
country-level governance quality: government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
219 
law, control of corruption, political stability and absence of violence, and voice and 
accountability. Data on investor protection were sourced from the World Bank’s Doing 
Business index, based on Djankov et al. (2008). The primary focus was on the investor 
protection index (IPI), a composite score calculated on the basis of several components 
capturing different aspects of the degree of investor protection. These constituent indices 
include the extent of disclosure, which assesses the transparency of related-party 
transactions, the degree of director liability and the ease of shareholder law suits. GMM 
estimation was mainly used for the data analysis, as well as OLS and fixed- and random-
effects models with an IV approach. In addition, a Granger causality test was used to 
examine causality between the US and emerging markets. 
10.3 Summary of findings 
Chapter 5 examined the determinants of firm-level R&D spending during a financial crisis. 
The relationship between financial crisis and R&D investment in emerging markets was 
also tested. In order to examine the relationship, a Granger causality test and GMM 
estimation were used, with panel data from a sample of 310 firms from 20 emerging 
markets during the period 2003-2012. The sample was divided between local firms and 
MNEs, and between innovative and non-innovative firms. The financial crisis did not 
affect all firms, industries and countries in the same way (Fillippetti and Archibugi, 2011; 
OECD, 2012). Therefore, it is found that both local firms and MNEs were adversely 
affected by the recent financial crisis. However, MNEs were affected 1.62 times as much 
as local firms due to their greater international exposure. On the other hand, innovative and 
non-innovative firms showed different results. Non-innovative firms were negatively 
affected, while innovative firms were positively affected by the financial crisis. The results 
suggest that the degree to which firms’ R&D was affected by the financial crisis depended 
on their R&D policy. These empirical results support the cyclical and counter-cyclical 
views of R&D investment. The cyclical view suggests that financial crises have a negative 
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impact on R&D investment. Stiglitz (1993) and Hall (2002) argued that firms will decrease 
their R&D investments during a financial crisis due to credit rationing and limited internal 
funding. On the other hand, the anti-cyclical view suggests a positive relationship between 
financial crises and R&D investment. This may occur if firms have no financial 
constraints. Therefore, Paunov (2012) pointed out that firms without financing constraints 
are less likely to abandon innovative projects. Overall, the financial crisis adversely 
affected the R&D investment of emerging-market firms. It is also found that firm age, firm 
size, export orientation, debt ratio and foreign ownership are the main determinants of 
R&D investment in emerging markets during a financial crisis. When the sample was split 
between crisis-affected and less-/unaffected countries, some interesting results were 
revealed for R&D determinants. The results show that the R&D determinants of affected 
and less-/unaffected countries behave differently. For affected countries the determinants 
are firm size, exports, profitability and foreign ownership, while for less or unaffected 
countries they are firm size, sales growth and profitability. These result simply that, 
whether or not a country is affected, firm size and profitability play an important role in 
R&D spending. This also confirms RBV, indicating that firm resources and capabilities are 
important determinants of R&D investment, even during a financial crisis. Moreover, it is 
found that the probability of a decrease in R&D investment is 60 per cent higher in 
affected countries than in less-/unaffected countries. The work presented here has profound 
implications for future studies of R&D investment in emerging markets and may help 
policy makers, investors, managers and senior executives to make decisions about R&D 
investment in emerging markets. 
Chapter 6 examined the macroeconomic determinants of a country’s R&D investment. A 
fixed- and random-effects regression model with an IV approach was applied, using panel 
data from36 countries for the period 2002-2011. It is found that GDP growth, exports, 
trade openness, patents and financial crisis are the main macroeconomic determinants. 
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Interesting results emerged when the sample countries were split between advanced and 
emerging countries. It is found that GDP growth, exports, trade openness, patents and 
financial crisis are the macroeconomic determinants for advanced countries, while exports, 
trade openness, FDI, patents and market size are the macroeconomic determinants for 
emerging countries. Among the common determinants, only patents have a positive impact 
on R&D investment for both advanced and emerging countries. This implies that both 
types of country encourage protection of property rights. Export intensity positively affects 
emerging countries, while negatively affecting advanced countries’ R&D intensity. On the 
other hand, trade openness is negatively related to R&D intensity in emerging countries, 
while positively related in advanced countries. In general, the results of the analysis 
suggest that macroeconomic determinants behave differently for R&D investment between 
advanced and emerging countries due to their different nature and purpose, and their level 
of economic development. This finding, in particular, will help investors and policy 
makers in emerging countries. 
Chapter 7 examined the important role played by institutional environments in R&D 
investment in emerging countries. Scott (1995) and Oliver (1997) pointed out that strategic 
choices such as R&D investment are driven by the institutional framework, along with 
industry conditions and firm-specific resources. Consistent with this statement, and using 
GMM estimation on panel data for 666 firms from 20 emerging markets during the period 
2006-2013, it is found that institutional quality has a significant impact on innovation in 
emerging markets. The results show that government effectiveness and rule of law have 
significant positive impacts, while corruption and political instability have significant 
negative impacts on R&D investment in emerging countries. These results imply that 
effective government may create a favourable environment for R&D investment by 
facilitating access to finance and market entry, attracting more investment and, in 
particular, accelerating technological investment. Moreover, strong legal systems attract 
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investors and increase their confidence in investment. On the other hand, corruption 
increases investment costs and discourages foreign investors in emerging markets. In 
addition, political unrest discourages local and foreign investors from investing in R&D. 
These results support the theoretical predictions of institutional theory, and will be helpful 
for policy makers and R&D investors in emerging markets to establish how external 
environments facilitate innovation, and consequently promote economic growth. 
Chapter 8 examined how, in addition to firm-level factors, country-level factors also 
influence firm-level decision making such as R&D investment. Turk (2015) pointed out 
the importance of country-level factors in firm financing and investment decisions, while 
Jong et al. (2008) found that country-level factors such as rule of law and a strong 
economy influence firm-level decisions. Similarly, Xiao (2013) confirmed that country-
level investor protection (safeguards) has a significant impact on R&D investment, while 
Hiller et al. (2011) found evidence for country-level governance factors (systems). 
Although opponents of country-level factors have claimed that these factors influence the 
innovative activities of emerging countries in directly, country-level factors are moderators 
in facilitating a favourable environment for doing business. This study has sought to 
identify which factors moderate the relationship between R&D and firm performance. 
Using GMM estimation of panel data for 437 firms from 17 emerging countries, it is found 
that a country’s safeguards tend to moderate the relationship between R&D and firm 
performance to a greater extent than its systems. These results indicate that safeguards 
promote firm-level innovation in emerging markets, while the systems of emerging 
countries are substituted by firm-level corporate governance. Moreover, in the case of risky 
and uncertain investments such as R&D, investors seek protection from possible losses. 
The investor protection index was then split into three sub-components: disclosure, 
directors’ liability and shareholder suits. The results suggest that R&D intensity influences 
firm performance when directors are more liable for their activities, making them more 
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accountable for their decisions. The positive relationship between R&D intensity, 
shareholder suits and firm performance is consistent with the idea that the possibility of 
being sued by shareholders puts pressure on directors to make investments such as R&D 
that will enhance firm value. The negative coefficient of the interaction term of disclosure 
and R&D investment implies that disclosure of R&D-related activities does not influence 
firm performance. This is because most investors in emerging markets do not read or are 
unaware of R&D-related activities or annual reports. Moreover, a substantial percentage of 
investors in emerging markets are illiterate. On the other hand, when country governance 
was split into six sub-factors – government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
control of corruption, political stability, and voice and accountability –only government 
effectiveness, control of corruption and voice and accountability were found to have a 
positive influence on R&D intensity and firm performance. This implies that effective 
government may result in increased R&D spending as a result of spill-overs creating 
networks between firms and individuals. Moreover, control of corruption may facilitate the 
size of R&D investment, as it motivates innovation-related FDI by reducing investment 
costs. High accountability of managers and directors to shareholders influences the 
relationship between R&D and firm performance. Voice and accountability ensure the 
responsible behaviour of managers, which influences investment in general, and R&D 
investment in particular. Moreover, high accountability ensures that responsible decisions 
and actions are taken, fosters commitment to accomplish tasks, and guarantees 
organisational learning and innovation. Interestingly, when three more variables of investor 
protection were introduced into the model, these country-level governance variables 
became insignificant. The results suggest that investor protection, whether aggregate or 
broken down, tends to have a greater influence on the relationship between R&D and firm 
performance. Therefore, this study contributes to the debate on whether safeguards or 
systems are more important for firm-level strategic decision making such as R&D 
decisions. 
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Chapter 9 examined the financing behaviour of R&D investment in selected emerging 
markets. In order to examine the sources of finance, panel data GMM estimation was used 
for a sample of 310 firms from 20 countries during the period 2003-2012. The results show 
that, overall, emerging markets do not tend to use external funding for R&D investment. 
Interesting results were produced when the sample was divided between local firms and 
MNEs, and between bank-based and market-based financial systems. It is found that R&D 
financing behaves differently for local firms and MNEs. Local firms do not use external 
funding, while MNEs use both internal and external funding for R&D investment. It is also 
found that a country’s financial system may restrict firms in a specific environment from 
choosing a particular source of finance. Firms within bank-based systems tend to rely on 
external funding, and firms within market-based systems depend more on internal funding 
for R&D investment. These results support the theoretical predictions. In particular, they 
confirm that financial slack affects R&D financing differently, depending on firm size, 
profitability, type of ownership and the extent to which the firm experiments with new 
strategies, products or markets (Hambrick and Snow, 1977). Moreover, firms within 
market-based financial systems follow a pecking order in financing R&D investments. 
This study will be helpful for various stakeholders, including investors and managers, in 
explaining R&D financing behaviour in emerging markets. 
10.4 Contribution of the study 
This study makes various contributions. First, it takes into account firm-, macro- and 
institutional-level variables in analysing their impacts on firms’ R&D investment decisions 
in emerging countries. These variables were separated into different levels due to their 
distinct importance. Moreover, including all variables in a single model might have 
produced misleading results regarding the significance of the variables. Second, this is 
through to be the first study that relates the impact of financial crises to R&D investment in 
emerging markets. The recent financial crisis had adverse effects worldwide, so it was 
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essential to examine how local firms and MNEs, and innovative and non-innovative firms, 
behaved during the crisis. Third, this study has compared the macroeconomic determinants 
of R&D investment behaviour between advanced and emerging markets. This will be 
helpful for policy makers in emerging markets, where policy making and implementation 
tend to follow developed markets. Fourth, the study has identified the institutional 
determinants of R&D investment in emerging markets. As institutional settings vary 
among emerging markets, this study will provide guidance to investors in emerging 
markets. Fifth, the study has shown which country-level factors, such as investor 
protection (disclosure, directors’ liability and shareholder suits) and country governance 
factors (government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, corruption, political 
stability and voice and accountability) better facilitate firm-level R&D activities. Sixth, the 
study has identified which sources of financing (debt or cash flow) are used for R&D 
investments in emerging markets. In addition, it has examined the influence of national 
financial systems (bank-based or market-based) on financing decisions with regard to 
R&D investment in emerging markets. Finally, the advanced methodology of GMM has 
been used for the data analysis, which controls for the problem of endogeneity, and the use 
of panel data has taken into account unobserved heterogeneity. 
10.5 Implications of the study 
The implications of this study are as follows. First, this study has examined the relationship 
between financial crises and R&D investment in emerging markets. The study separated 
local and multinational, and innovative and non-innovative firms. The results of this 
analysis show that both local and multinational firms were negatively affected by the 
recent financial crisis. However, MNEs were more greatly affected than local firms. 
Moreover, innovative and non-innovative firms behaved differently during the crisis 
period. In particular, innovative firms continued to invest in innovation, while non-
innovative firms reduced their R&D investment. This knowledge will give a general idea 
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of how particular firms are likely to behave during a financial crisis. It will also enable 
managers, and particularly foreign investors, in these firms to make informed decisions 
about R&D investment during a financial crisis. In addition, the results confirm that RBV 
holds true even in a crisis period. Specifically, it is found that firm age, firm size, export 
orientation, debt ratio and foreign ownership are the main R&D determinants, even in the 
presence of economic slowdown. This knowledge will help managers to concentrate more 
closely on firm resources and capabilities to increase innovative activities even during a 
crisis period. 
Second, this study has compared the macroeconomic determinants of R&D investment 
between advanced and emerging countries. The results show that emerging and advanced 
markets’ macroeconomic determinants are different with regard to innovation. The study 
has explained the reasons for this difference. Research in this area will be of particular 
interest to policy makers on sustainable innovation in emerging markets, as emerging 
markets’ policies tend to follow those of developed markets. 
Third, this research has shown the importance of the external environment, in particular 
institutional settings for firms’ decision making on innovation. In a recent study, Wu et al., 
(2016) also pointed out that the institutional environment may impact R&D activity by 
providing supports or constraints beyond the capacity of an individual firm. In consistent 
with this view, our findings reveal that government effectiveness and legal system support 
the R&D investment while corruption and political environment discourage R&D 
investment in the emerging markets. Thus, to make R&D investment strategy and decision, 
managers need to assess and consider the institutional settings of a country. Moreover, it 
will create awareness among the emerging markets policymakers that to promote 
innovative activities and subsequently sustainable development should take into account 
institutional environment. 
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Fourth, the existing literature has shown a relationship between R&D and firm 
performance. However, external factors such as investor protection and good governance 
may contribute to this relationship. This study has revealed that this relationship may be 
more greatly strengthened by stronger investor protection than by good governance. This 
implies that investor protection is important for R&D activity-based growth of firms. This 
information will help firms to make changes to their strategies in order to increase their 
R&D activities. 
Fifth, this study has examined the sources of finance for R&D investment in emerging 
markets. In particular, it has observed how multinationality and institutional settings play a 
role in firm financing. The results show that local firms do not use external funding, while 
MNEs use both internal and external funding for R&D investments. This implies that 
organisational slack plays an important role in financing decisions. On the other hand, 
bank-financed firms tend to use external funding, while market-financed firms tend to use 
more internal funding for R&D investments. This means that the institutional setting in 
which a firm operates is important for its financing policy. This new knowledge will direct 
managers, investors and lenders in emerging markets to set appropriate financing policies 
for firms. 
10.6 Limitations of the study 
As with other research, this study has limitations. First, this study has related the financial 
crisis to R&D investment in emerging countries. However, the recent financial crisis 
mainly affected developed countries. Thus, it would be interesting to examine and compare 
the impact of future financial crises on developed and emerging countries. Moreover, the 
corporate governance of firms, such as foreign ownership, should be taken into account 
because, in the presence of foreign ownership, firms may have greater access to finance for 
investment in innovative activities during a recession. This will ensure the persistence of 
investment in R&D, even during a crisis period, and implies that foreign ownership may a 
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play a different role in alleviating the crisis effect and, consequently, increasing R&D 
investment. Second, this study has examined the macroeconomic differences between 
advanced and emerging countries with regard to R&D investment. However, due to data 
availability, the number of countries in the sample was reduced. A larger number of sample 
countries and equal distribution between advanced and emerging countries might change 
the results. Third, the study has measured the institutional determinants of R&D 
investment in emerging countries. However, there is controversy about which factors 
constitute institutions. Fourth, this study has separated country-level governance systems 
and investor protection because of their distinct roles. However, most researchers (e.g. 
Pindado et al., 2015) have used both as country-level governance factors. Fifth, the study 
has measured financing sources for R&D investment in emerging markets. It has also 
examined MNEs and local firms, as well as bank-based and market-based systems in the 
analysis. However, in addition to these factors, management quality/ability may also 
influence firms’ financing behaviour. Finally, it was important to consider R&D reporting 
in the analysis. Due to differences between accounting standards in different countries and 
flexibility in IAS 38, firms may have manipulated their R&D expenditure. 
10.7 Areas for future research 
The results of this analysis help explain the macroeconomic and institutional-level 
determinants of R&D investment in emerging countries. Further analysis might be carried 
out in the domain of developed countries because the macroeconomic policies and 
institutional settings of developed countries are different from those of emerging markets. 
Moreover, further research on workforce diversity and innovation would be valuable. 
Greater diversity in terms of skills and ethnicity might help a firm to be more innovative 
and dynamic. In addition, CEO tenure might impact on R&D investment. For example, a 
short-term CEO might want to benefit from investments that provide quick returns. Future 
studies might focus on the reporting dilemma of R&D (see Table 10.1). There is 
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considerable debate about whether R&D expenditure should be treated as an expense 
which goes through the income statement, or as an intangible asset (capitalised) on the 
balance sheet which is amortised year by year (Anagnostopoulou, 2008). IAS 38 (2004) 
mandates that firms classify their research costs entirely as expenses or capitalise 
development costs when certain criteria are met. 
                                                    Table 10.1: R&D Reporting 
 
 Standards 
R&D expensed 
as incurred R&D capitalisation conditions 
International IAS 38 and IAS 36 Research cost Development cost Yes 
UK SSAP 13 Research cost Development cost Yes 
Bangladesh BAS 38 Research cost Development cost Yes 
China CAS 6 Research cost Development cost Yes 
Korea Korean GAAP Research cost Development cost Yes 
Sweden BFN R1, RR 15 Research cost Development cost Yes 
Italy Accounting Standard No. 24 Research cost Development cost Yes 
USA SFAS N o 2 Yes   
SFAS N o 86 (Software 
development costs) 
   
Japan ASBJ Yes   
Germany German GAAP Yes   
Indonesia PSAK. 19-90 Yes   
France Art. 361-2, PCG 99 Yes   
Australia AASB 1011 Yes   
 
However, according to US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), R&D 
expenditure should be fully expensed and is required to be disclosed in the same period, 
whereas before 1975, US GAAP allowed firms to capitalise R&D. In the 
reliability/relevance trade-off, IAS comes down on the side of relevance, while US GAAP 
favours the side of reliability (Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean, 2006). Similarly, the accounting 
standards of the USA (GAAP), Japan (ASBJ), Australia (AASB 1011), Indonesia (PASK 
19-90) and France (Art. 361-2, PCG 99) support immediate expensing rather than 
capitalisation. Thus, most current accounting standards are in favour of immediate 
expensing rather than capitalisation (Anagnostopoulou, 2008). They argue that an 
expensing policy may help a firm to manage future write-downs more accurately and to 
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maintain their competitiveness in stock markets by avoiding cross-listing problems 
(Khazabi, 2008). In addition to R&D reporting, terrorism and innovation would be 
interesting areas for further research. 
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Appendix 1: List of Advanced and Emerging Countries 
 Advanced Economy  Emerging Economy 
1 Austria 1 Brazil 
2 Belgium 2 Bulgaria 
3 Canada 3 China 
4 Czech Republic 4 Colombia 
5 Denmark 5 Croatia 
6 Estonia 6 Hungary 
7 Germany 7 India 
8 Finland 8 Lithuania 
9 France 9 Mexico 
10 Ireland 10 Poland 
11 Israel 11 Romania 
12 Japan 12 Russian Federation 
13 Korea 13 Turkey 
14 Latvia 14 Ukraine 
15 Netherlands   
16 Norway   
17 Portugal   
18 Singapore   
19 Slovak Republic   
20 Spain   
21 UK   
22 USA   
  Source: IMF 2011 
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Appendix 2: List of Emerging Countries, 2013 
List of Emerging Countries 
  IMF 
Goldman 
Sachs 
BRICS+N11 FTSE MSCI 
The 
Economist S&P 
Dow 
Jones BBVA 
Columbia 
University 
EMGP 
Argentina √ 
     
√ √ √ 
Bahrain 
      
√ √ 
 Bangladesh 
 
√ 
     
√ 
 Brazil √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Bulgaria √ 
     
√ √ 
 Chile √ 
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
China √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Colombia 
  
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Czech Republic 
  
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Egypt 
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Estonia √ 
     
√ √ 
 Greece 
   
√ 
     Hong Kong 
    
√ 
    Hungary √ 
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
India √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Indonesia √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Iran 
 
√ 
       Israel 
        
√ 
Jordan 
      
√ √ 
 Kuwait 
      
√ √ 
 Latvia √ 
     
√ √ 
 Lithuania √ 
     
√ √ 
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Malaysia √ 
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Mauritius 
      
√ √ 
 Mexico √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Morocco 
  
√ 
 
√ √ √ √ 
 Nigeria 
 
√ 
     
√ 
 Oman 
      
√ √ 
 Pakistan √ √ √ 
   
√ √ 
 Peru √ 
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Philippines √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Poland √ 
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Qatar 
      
√ √ 
 Romania √ 
     
√ √ 
 Russia √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Saudi Arabia 
    
√ 
    Singapore 
    
√ 
    Slovakia 
      
√ √ 
 Slovenia 
        
√ 
South Africa √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Sri Lanka 
      
√ √ 
 South Korea 
 
√ 
  
√ 
  
√ √ 
Sudan  
       
√ 
 Taiwan 
  
√ 
 
√ √ 
 
√ √ 
Thailand √ 
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Turkey √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Tunisia 
       
√ 
 UAE 
  
√ 
   
√ √ 
 Ukraine √ 
      
√ 
 Venezuela √ 
      
√ 
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Vietnam 
 
√ 
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Appendix 3: Summary of Literature Findings for R&D Determinants (Firm-, Macro- and Institutional-Level) 
 
 
Authors Country/Market Methods Positive Relation Negative Relation No relation 
Lee and Hwang (2003) Korea Fixed effect 
model 
Firm size, Sales Dividend  
Bhagat and Welch (1995) US, Canada, 
British, European 
and Japan 
Vector auto 
regression 
(VAR) 
Debt ratio and tax payment for 
Japanese firm. Stock return for all 
firm except Canada 
Debt ratio and tax payment for 
US firm 
 
Cheng and Chen (2006) China Factor Analysis Assets, Sales, Staff numbers, R&D 
staff, Technical staff 
Profit to sales ratio, Debt ratio  
Grabowski (1968) US OLS Patent, product diversification, 
availability of fund 
  
Grabowski and Vernon (2000) US OLS Expected return, cash flow   
Mahlichi and Schluga (2006) Japan Fixed effect 
Estimation 
Expected return   
Lee S. (2012) Korea FGLS Ownership concentration, foreign 
ownership 
Institutional ownership  
Pamukcu and Utku-ismihan (2009) Turkey Probit Model Human capital stock, import 
penetration, IPR-related technology 
transfer, Foreign direct investment, 
value added 
Profitability  
Lall (1983) India OLS Firm size, age, Number of foreign 
license agreement, Royalties, High 
level management wage 
Export, General wage  
Simanjumtak and Tjandrawinata 
(2011) 
US Random Effect 
Model 
Profitability, R&D intensity and 
cash flow 
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Authors Country/Market Methods Positive Relation Negative Relation No relation 
Howe and McFetridge (1976) Canada Covariance 
Analysis 
Current sales, cash flow and 
government incentives 
  
Griffiths and Webster (2010) Australia Fixed effect 
estimation 
Managerial dimension, 
competitive strategy, 
communication with employee, 
past profit and growth rate 
  
Waterson and Lopez UK WLS   Firm size and 
Concentration 
Wan et al.,(2005) Singapore Multiple 
Regression 
Decentralize structure, Presence 
of organization resources, Belief 
that innovation is important, 
Willingness to take risk, 
Willingness to exchange ideas 
  
Othman and Ameer (2009) Malaysia OLS Sales and sales growth Diversification  
Mishra (2007) India Tobit model Firm size, market share and 
human capital 
  
Lai et al.(2015) Taiwan, Japan, 
Korea (2011) 
Logistic 
Regression 
Firm size, and Goodwill and 
Patent 
  
Ayygari et al.(2011) US GMM Access to finance, highly 
educated manager, ownership by 
families, individual or manager, 
and foreign competition 
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Author’s Country Methods Positive relation Negative Relation No relation 
Kumar and Saqib (1996) India Probit and 
Tobit Model 
Competition, export-orientation 
and vertical integration 
  
Alessandri and Pattit (2014) US Fixed Effect 
estimation 
Stock option Managerial ownership  
Avermaete et al.,(2003) Belgian Chi-square Test Age, size, regional economic 
performance 
  
Tan and Hwang (2002) Taiwan Bivariate Probit 
Model 
Imported Technology   
Gannicott (1984) Australia 2SLS Foreign Ownership Firm Size Government 
Subsidy 
Driver and Guedes (2012) UK Fixed Effect 
and GMM 
Ownership of CEO Governance  
Cumming and Macintosh (2000) Cananda Ordered 
Multinomial 
discrete 
dependent 
variable model 
Patent protection, strategic 
alliance, early stage firms 
Debt-equity ratio  
Chiang and Mensha (2004) US Pearson 
Correlation, 
Regression 
Larger market share, higher 
percentage of technical 
employees, diversified product 
  
Galende and Fuente (2003) Spain Multiple 
Regression 
Size, debt, human resources, 
commercial resources, 
organizational resources, 
diversification and 
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internationalization 
Anwar and Sun(2013) China IV approach Foreign Presence   
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Authors Country/Market Methods Positive Relation Negative Relation No relation 
Lynskey (2004) Japan Negative 
Binomial 
Regression 
Technological capability, 
availability of internal fund, 
Venture Capital Funding, 
University-Industry Linkage 
  
Spithoven and Teirlinck (2015) Belgium Generalized 
Tobit Model 
Internal R&D capability, 
Network Resources, Formal and 
informal protection 
  
Pindado et al,(2015) US, Japan and 
EU 
GMM Legal system, Financial system    
Hillier et al.,(2011) US, Japan and 9 
EU Countries 
GMM Legal environment, minority 
shareholder protection, strong 
law enforcement, bank-based 
financial system, effective board 
control, a strong market for 
corporate control 
  
Wang (2010) 26 OECD Extreme-
Bound-
Analysis 
Tertiary education and 
proportion of scientific 
researcher, Patent right 
protection, Income growth 
Foreign technology Inflow  
Guloglu et al.(2012) G7 Fixed Effect 
Regression 
High technology export, FDI 
Inflow and rate of R&D 
Investment 
Rate of Interest Trade Openness  
Sameti et al.,(2010) 30  OECD Fixed effect 
Model 
Trade Openness, Economic 
growth, Government subsidy 
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Author’s Country/Market Methods Positive Relation Negative Relation No relation 
Pindado et al.(2010) Eurozone GMM Size, firm growth and Market 
Share 
Free cash flow, depend on 
external finance, labour 
intensity, and Capital 
Intensity 
 
Bhattacharya and Bloch (2004) Australia Probit Model Firm size, market structure, 
R&D intensity, trade share, 
profitability 
  
Becker and Pain (2008) UK IV approach Sales, profitability, market 
competition, interest and 
exchange rate, government 
funded R&D 
  
Wang and Kafouros (2009) China OLS Technological opportunities, 
Level of foreign presence 
 International 
Trade, FDI 
Varsakelis (2006) 29 Countries Random Effect 
Model 
Quality of education and quality 
of government institutions 
  
Allard et al., (2012) 107 countries SUR  Political instability  
Blind (2012) 21 OECD WLS Regulation   
Mahendra et al.,(2015) Indonesia Logit model Institutional quality, Access to 
finance 
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Srholec (2011) Developing 
countries 
Logit multi-
level model 
National economy, 
Technological and institutional 
framework 
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Abbreviations 
2SLS Two-stage least squares 
ADF Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test 
B/S Black-Scholes equation 
CIS Community Innovation Survey 
EBIT Earnings before income and tax 
FDI Foreign direct investment 
GLS Generalised least squares 
GMM Generalised methods of moment 
GNP Gross national product 
IFC International Finance Corporation 
i.i.d. Independent and identically distributed 
IPO Initial public offering 
IV Instrumental variable 
LIMS Limited information maximum likelihood 
MNEs Multinational firms 
NBER National Bureau of Economic Research 
OLS Ordinary least squares 
R&D Research and development 
RBV Resource-based view 
RJV Resource joint venture 
ROA Return on assets 
ROIC Return on invested capital 
SFAS Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
TFP Total factor productivity 
US GAAP US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
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